DOJ-OGR-00003687.pdf

--- Page 1 --- **Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE** **Document 207** **Filed 04/16/21** **Page 13 of 34** Based on the statute's text, context, and history, the Court follows Weingarten and concludes that the appropriate inquiry is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual abuse of a minor on the facts alleged in this case. There is no question that they did. The Court thus concludes that § 3283 governs the limitations period for the charges here. **2. The 2003 amendment to the statute of limitations applies to these offenses** Maxwell next contends that because the charged conduct took place before the PROTECT Act's enactment, that statute did not lengthen the statute of limitations applicable to her alleged offenses. Here too, the Second Circuit has provided guidance in its decision in Weingarten. Although the court did not provide a definitive answer there, it explained that the view Maxwell now takes conflicts with established principles of retroactivity and the decisions of at least two other circuit courts. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58 & n.8; see Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has set out a two-step framework to determine whether a federal statute applies to past conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Courts look first to the language of the statute. If the statute states that it applies to past conduct, courts must so apply it. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54. Otherwise, the statute applies to past conduct unless doing so would create impermissible retroactive effects. Id. The Court begins with Landgraf's first step. To assess a statute's meaning here, courts must consider the text of the statute along with other indicia of congressional intent, including the statute's history and structure. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004). **13**