EFTA00712749.pdf
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From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹ >
Subject: September 4 update
Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2012 20:42:41 +0000
4 September, 2012
Article
I. Al Monitor
Why Shimon Peres Still Matters
Shai Feldman
Article 2.
Al-Hayat
Egypt Infiltrates the Turkish-Saudi-Iranian Trio?
George Semaan
Article 3.
The New Yorker
Two Presidents find a mutual advantage
Ryan Lizza
Article 4.
Spiegel
Was Yasser Arafat Poisoned?
Juliane von Mittelstaedt and Volkhard Windfuhr
Article 5.
Foreign Policy
The 50 most powerful Democrats on foreign policy
Anicic I.
Al Monitor
Why Shimon Peres Still Matters
Shai Feldman
Sep 3, 2012 -- Some three weeks ago, on the occasion of his 89th birthday,
Israeli President Shimon Peres gave loud and clear public expression to his
opposition to a possible Israeli military strike against Iran's nuclear
installations. This followed two years during which Peres is said to have
counseled Israel's leaders in closed quarters against the ramifications of
such an attack. Giving a number of separate interviews on Aug. 16, Peres
did not oppose such a strike under all circumstances. Rather, he warned
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against an attack that would not receive a green light from Washington.
Coming after almost every former chief of Israel's defense and intelligence
agencies — and a few of the serving chiefs as well — have already
expressed publicly or semi-publicly their opposition to such a strike, Peres'
intervention raises a good question: Why does he matter? Why does
someone, who in the Israeli constitutional set-up fills no more than a
ceremonial role, count? Without decision-making authority, why should
Peres' voice be considered a significant addition to the already formidable
chorus warning of the implications of such an attack? The significance of
Peres' intervention in this debate has little to do with the office of the
presidency which he now holds. Nor is it only tied to the fact that in the
past few years — after a political career that now spans at least six decades
— Peres has become a consensus figure in a country where almost no one
enjoys such respect. Instead, it results from Peres' unique standing as the
father of Israel's own nuclear efforts. The nuclear reactor in Dimona —
the centerpiece of Israel's nuclear option — was an offspring of the Israeli
alliance with France, forged in the mid-1950s. The architect of the alliance
was then-Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres. It resulted not only in
massive French arms sales to Israel but also in the joint attack on Egypt
known as the 1956 Sinai-Suez War. The French needed Israel to help
topple Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser who supported their
opponents in Algeria. The side payment their Socialist leaders were willing
to provide Israel was a 26-megawatt nuclear research reactor. Now, some
six decades later, Peres continues to be credited by the Israeli public for an
option that enjoys almost total support among Israeli Jewish voters who
view it as the ultimate deterrent for "a rainy day." Moreover, Israelis
intuitively understand that the option that Peres helped create is also
relevant in the Iranian context. Even if its nuclear facilities will be
destroyed, Iran will renew its efforts and may ultimately obtain nuclear
weapons. And what then? Regardless of the Israeli and U.S. rhetoric that
currently excludes containment options, Israelis know that under such
circumstances their country may have no choice but to rely on deterrence.
Should that happen, it is to Peres that Israelis will owe a great debt because
without him this option would not exist. Admittedly, this aspect of the
current Israeli debate about Iran is somewhat puzzling. For if deterrence is
excluded against a geographically distant adversary like Iran, what justifies
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over six decades of Israeli investments in the nuclear project? Surely, this
option was never meant as a hedge against Israel's very proximate
Palestinian neighbors. Indeed, every reader of a physics textbook
describing nuclear fallout can conclude that even deterring proximate
adversaries such Israel's immediate state neighbors is problematic. So if
the project in which Israel invested considerable resources during times of
great scarcity would not deter a nuclear Iran, who and what would it deter?
Peres also knows well that the key to Israel's ability to maintain its ultimate
strategic deterrent was the willingness of successive US presidents —
whether Democrat or Republican — to view Israel as a "special case" in
nuclear matters and to exclude it from the tougher stipulations of US
nuclear non-proliferation policy. For this reason, Peres rightly attributes
enormous significance to the legitimacy that Israel's case enjoys in the US.
And it is for the very same reason that Peres should be rightly worried that
exercising a military option against Iran before the US has reached the
conclusion that all other options have been exhausted, risks endangering
this critically important US backing. In the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid
Peace Conference and as foreign minister in Rabin's government, Peres
was at the front line of Israel's efforts to ward off Egypt's efforts to press
Israel to sign the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Egypt
waged this campaign both regionally and internationally: In the framework
of the post-Madrid multilateral negotiations on Arms Control and Regional
Security (ACRS) and during the 1995 negotiations on the indefinite
extension of the NPT. Egypt held the ACRS talks hostage to the nuclear
issue, resulting by 1995 in the collapse of the entire multilateral process. It
also threatened to block the NPT's indefinite extension.
Now as president of his country some 20 years later, Peres surely
remembers that if it were not for the backing it received from the US, Israel
would not have been able to prevail on both occasions. Peres also knows
that in the future, Israel may be subjected to similar if not greater pressures.
It is therefore not surprising that he views Washington's position as
critically important and that his assessments on all matters nuclear continue
to count.
Shai Feldman is director of the Crown Centerfor Middle East Studies at Brandeis
University and a seniorfellow at the Belfer Centerfor Science and International
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Affairs (of Harvard University's John F Kennedy School of Goverment). He was
head of the Jaffee Centerfor Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.
Artick 2.
Al-Hayat
Egypt Infiltrates the Turkish-Saudi-Iranian
Trio?
George Semaan
3 September 2012 -- The new regime in Egypt has sent a signal which
might further complicate the Syrian crisis, increase polarization between
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and add a new player on the arena of the
ongoing Cold War in the region between major regional and international
actors. President Mohamed Morsi called — from the heart of the Iranian
capital — for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad. In his speech
before the non-alignment summit, he presented a book of conditions for
cooperation with the Islamic Republic, at the head of which being its
relinquishing of the regime in Damascus. On the eve of the summit, he had
proposed the establishment of a quartet committee including Egypt, Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey to settle the crisis sweeping Syria, which
constituted a first message saying that his country was ready to play its
usual role.
It would be too soon to predict the ways Egypt will use to restore its status
as a regional actor, just like it would be too early to predict the direction of
its relations with Iran, without taking into account the circumstances,
repercussions and transformations it is witnessing in the post-revolution
phase, and the roles being played by Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. The entry of a new player on the scene connotes change at the level
of the rules of the game and its arena, as well as the availability of
conditions, tools and cards.
Full diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran have not existed since the
Iranian revolution, after President Anwar al-Sadat granted political exile to
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and signed the Camp David Accords. The
two countries thus settled for the presence of missions, but the situation
changed with the collapse of President Hosni Mubarak's regime. The day
he became Egyptian foreign minister following the revolution, Nabil al-
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Arabi stated that his government did not perceive the Islamic Republic as
being a hostile state and "is about to open a new page with all the
countries, including Iran." And in February 2011, the military council
allowed the entry of two Iranian warships via the Canal of Suez for the first
time since 1979.
When Gulf circles expressed their fears at this level, the Egyptian Foreign
Ministry clarified that "Cairo is seeking normal relations with Tehran,
essential and normal relations, that is all." This statement was followed by
more than one confirmation issued by Egyptian officials, stressing that the
Gulf security was linked to their country's security. And certainly, Riyadh
was the first capital to be visited by President Morsi to corroborate his
insistence on the historical relations between the two countries, knowing
that Saudi Arabia had decided to help Cairo by providing it with $4 billion,
also to confirm its insistence on stability for Egypt and its economy.
A lot was said about the reasons behind the gradual retreat of Egypt's role
in the Middle East and Africa since the signing of the Camp David
Accords, from America's methodic policy to limit its role to the domestic
arena, to the regime's preoccupation with the fighting of the extremist
movements and the fixation of its men and entourage on corruption and the
preparations for succession. But this remained a temporary stage in a
history whose constant principles and facts cannot be disregarded.
Pharaonic Egypt, which settled on the Nile banks, would not have hesitated
for a moment to go beyond the eastern side of the river until the border
with Syria and Iraq and across the Euphrates and the Tigris to preserve
what it considers to be its national security in the face of those coming
from the East, i.e. from the Land of the Two Rivers and behind it.
Throughout history, its people never backed down on this constant reality,
from Ramses II who launched a campaign against the Hittites, to the
Mamluks who embarked to Palestine to deter Tamerlane and his troops,
Ibrahim Pasha who knocked on the doors of Astana through Lebanon and
Palestine and President Gamal Abdul Nasser who threatened leader Abdul
Karim Qassim when the latter threatened Kuwait and showed on more than
one occasion determination to defend Syria in the face of the threats which
used to be launched from time to time by the Turkish army in the 1950s.
This is not to forget the temporary unity between Cairo and Damascus.
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Even President Hosni Mubarak never hesitated for a second to provide a
cover for the international-Arab alliance which led Saddam Hussein out of
Kuwait around 20 years ago, while prior to that, he had established the
Arab Cooperation Council with Baghdad, Amman and Sana'a to remain a
partner in the security of the Gulf where more than two and a half million
Egyptians work, and where the largest Arab economy benefitting most
Arab states resides. And when the Council collapsed during the Kuwait
invasion, he sealed — along with Syria and the Gulf Cooperation Council
states — a gathering dubbed the Damascus Declaration. When this
Declaration collapsed, the ties with both Riyadh and Damascus were
enhanced to maintain Cairo's role in leading any Arab project, or at least
continue to be a key partner in the decision-making process. Moreover, he
did not hesitate to warn against the Shiite Crescent when Iran knocked on
Sinai's doors from Gaza!
With all this history, Egypt rejected the "Turkish model" that Recep Tayyip
Erdogan asked it to follow the day he visited Cairo following President
Mubarak's toppling, as it rejected Guide Ali Khamenei's statements in
which he said that the Egyptian revolution was an extension of the Islamic
one. Cairo wishes to regain its political weight in the region, from North
Africa to the border with Iraq, without being a number in Ankara's or
Tehran's credit. In addition, President Mohamed Morsi does not need
lessons from the Islamic Republic, as he belongs to a movement which was
established around 90 years ago and is considered to be the largest political
Islamic power in the Arab world.
Prior to the revolution, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood stood alongside
Hamas in Gaza, just like Iran which supported it among other Islamic
movements. Moreover, it opposed and is still opposing the Camp David
Accords, just like Tehran, throughout the last thirty years. On the other
hand, a lot was said about its relationship with the Islamic Republic,
knowing it definitely does not want to see the Arab-Iranian conflict prevail
over the conflict with Israel. But reality does not convey that wish, seeing
how direct clashes are taking place between Iran and its Arab opponents on
more than one Arab arena, from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, the Emirates,
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, among other locations scattered here
and there. And unless the Arab states feel that Tehran has amended its
policy, the region will continue to lack stability and become engaged in
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more than one armament race whose results will be catastrophic. It would
be enough to say that this race will erode the oil revenues at the expense of
human and financial development in the states of the region. And in light
of this situation, Egypt cannot remain idle, in the presence of national and
pan-Arab interests that enjoy priority over any religious or sectarian
considerations.
True, Iran succeeded in hosting the non-alignment summit and will head
the group for the next three years, but what is also true is that it is
completely aware of the fact that the group's member states and some
countries in Latin America cannot act as its quarterback in its standoff with
the United States and Europe. Only the Islamic geographic depth can
provide it with the strength and political support it desperately needs. Iran
could have increased its influence and improved its position, had it known
how to deal with the Islamic powers that have risen and are now rising to
power thanks to the Arab spring - i.e. had it relinquished its sometimes
excessive Shiite rhetoric, discontinued its threats to the Arab Gulf states
and stopped interfering here and there. With some wisdom and modesty, it
could have established relations with its neighbors, and used them in the
face of its opponents in the West and Israel. At this level, the Egyptian or
Gulf gate could have constituted an important passageway, sparing it from
the repercussions of the economic and political siege imposed on it.
However, Iran relied on its Persian history and allowed the prevalence of
its nationalistic tendency and Shiite ideology to present itself as being a
power that should dominate the region. By doing so, it provoked the Arabs
and Sunni Islam alike, from beyond Pakistan to the Atlantic. In addition, it
provoked fear among the superpowers over their interests in the region.
Then there was the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, one
which always constituted a source of concern for Tehran and distracted it
from the Gulf and the Middle East, and the major gift represented by the
toppling of the Baath regime in Iraq where the current government does
not have the right to disagree with Iran in several areas. As to its greatest
investment — i.e. the building of Hezbollah — it earned further immunity
and strength following the July 2006 war.
Certainly, it will not be easy for Egypt to turn the clock backward, as it
cannot simply become a quick and direct threat to this Iranian expansion.
However, Tehran's sustainment of its current policies will push Cairo into
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the camp of the GCC states and Turkey in the context of this Cold War,
whose main headline today surrounds Bashar al-Assad's departure or stay.
On the other hand, it will also not be easy for Cairo to infiltrate what was
achieved by Ankara throughout a decade of its absence — which is why
Ankara might have the biggest share when reaping the fruits of the Arab
spring, from Iraq where Turkish presence is wide in Kurdistan, to Syria via
the opposition forces, Lebanon in the future and Tunisia, not to mention
Turkish presence in Central Asia and the Balkans. Moreover, it will not be
easy to compete with the role that the Gulf Cooperation Council states
have started to play after they learned how to use their economic and oil
capabilities to assume political roles they used to avoid in the past, taking
into account the extent of Egypt's ability to play on the same arena as
America, Russia and China among others, and whether or not its situation,
troubles and domestic disputes will allow it to cross the Nile.
Still, Egypt's alignment alongside Saudi Arabia and Turkey could help
constitute an efficient trio in the region in the face of Iranian expansion and
Russian stringency towards the Syrian crisis, which might eventually end
with some sort of a settlement granting tripartite attention to Syria's
Sunnis, while Tehran and Moscow will find a way to tend to their interest
and the Alawites' affairs. But is it too late for settlements?
The New Yorker
Two Presidents find a mutual advantage
Ryan Lizza
September 10, 2012 -- Barack Obama and Bill Clinton have never been
close. Some of their advisers concede that the two men don't really like
each other. They have openly disagreed on policy issues and political
strategy, and the acrimony generated during the 2008 Democratic
primaries, when Hillary Clinton ran against Obama for the nomination, has
yet to fully dissipate. Nevertheless, a carefully orchestrated reconciliation
of sorts has been under way for some time now. The former Democratic
President, long spurned by the current one, has been given a prominent
speaking spot at the Convention, in Charlotte, the night before the
President's speech—a spot usually reserved for the Vice-President. Joe
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Biden was bumped to the following night, in the slot immediately before
Obama.
The reconciliation began in earnest late last summer. Patrick Gaspard, the
former White House political director, who has moved to the Democratic
National Committee, approached Douglas Band, Clinton's closest political
adviser and longtime gatekeeper, with some suggestions about how the
former President might help with Obama's 2012 reelection campaign.
Band, who, by reputation, has an acute sense for moments of political
advantage, tried to explain that you don't just call up Bill Clinton and tell
him to raise money and campaign for you. Band recommended that the two
Presidents begin by playing golf. The next day, Obama phoned Clinton and
invited him out for a round. Several Clinton associates say that this was the
moment they realized that Obama truly wanted to win in 2012. Why else
would he spend hours on a golf course being lectured by Clinton?
The Presidential round was played at Andrews Air Force Base on
September 24, 2011, and since then Clinton has become a visible and
vigorous champion of Obama's reelection. Clinton agreed to participate in
several fund-raisers; he was in a documentary, released on March 15th,
attesting to Obama's sound judgment in ordering the raid on Osama bin
Laden; and he recently appeared in an Obama campaign ad. "President
Obama has a plan to rebuild America from the ground up," Clinton says.
"It only works if there is a strong middle class. That's what happened when
I was President. We need to keep going with his plan." Behind the scenes,
Clinton has been involved in detailed discussions about campaign strategy.
For Clinton, Obama's solicitousness is a welcome affirmation of his legacy
and, perhaps, an opportunity to boost his wife's Presidential prospects. For
Obama, the reconciliation could help him win in November. It's also an
ideological turnaround: Obama, who rose to the Oval Office in part by
pitching himself as the antidote to Clintonism, is now presenting himself as
its heir apparent. It's a shrewd, even Clintonian, tactical maneuver.
The relationship between a sitting President and his living predecessors is
rarely easy. According to "The Presidents Club," by Nancy Gibbs and
Michael Duffy, Lyndon Johnson sometimes drafted the popular former
President Dwight D. Eisenhower into his publicity schemes, which
frustrated Ike, who complained to aides about being used. After Johnson
left office, Richard Nixon cultivated him carefully, even sending weekly
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national-security briefings to his ranch, in Stonewall, Texas, by
government aircraft. It worked; Johnson, who was alienated from his party
because of Vietnam, mostly kept quiet during Nixon's 1972 reelection
campaign, against George McGovern. Ronald Reagan treated the recently
disgraced Nixon with deference, which helped start Nixon's late-career
return to respectability, but the two men eventually fell out over Reagan's
Soviet policy. In 1989, George H. W. Bush recruited Jimmy Carter to help
with policy toward Panama; that helped revive Carter's reputation, but the
relationship soured in 1991, when Carter tried to rally world leaders
against Bush's invasion of Iraq. When Carter attempted to offer advice at
the start of Clinton's Presidency, Clinton, with the Iraq incident fresh in
memory, rebuffed him. Likewise, Obama, early in his term, ignored
Clinton's advice, which is said to have left Clinton feeling wounded.
Obama, throughout his career, has faced a challenge in how best to manage
his political antecedent. Clinton is fifteen years Obama's senior and was
the dominant figure in Democratic politics during the years of his rise.
Obama had graduated from Harvard Law School and moved back to
Chicago in 1991, the year before Clinton was elected. He made his first
mark on Chicago politics during the 1992 campaign, running a voter-
registration drive that contributed to Clinton's victory in Illinois—the first
time that a Democratic Presidential nominee had won the state since 1964.
Yet Obama came to share an ambivalence toward Clinton's policies that
was common on the left. In 1996, Clinton, after vetoing two versions of
controversial welfare-reform legislation, which he deemed too harsh,
announced that he would sign the slightly modified third version. Obama,
who was then practicing law at a firm well connected in progressive circles
and lecturing at the University of Chicago, saw Clinton's election-year
decision as a sellout. He told one newspaper that he found it "disturbing."
Later, as an Illinois state senator, Obama said that he wouldn't have
supported Clinton's welfare bill, and he helped pass a state law that
restored benefits to legal immigrants, a group that Clinton's policy had
made ineligible.
In 2000, Obama's political career was nearly derailed by Clinton. Obama
was running against Bobby Rush, the incumbent congressman from the
South Side of Chicago, in the Democratic primary. Rush had supported
Clinton during his impeachment battle, and although Obama's challenge
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was a long shot, Clinton helped insure Rush's victory with an appearance
in the district just a week before primary day. Obama was so shattered by
the defeat that he considered giving up politics. "It's impossible not to feel
at some level as if you have been personally repudiated by the entire
community," he wrote subsequently, in his 2006 book, "The Audacity of
Hope," and that "everywhere you go, the word `loser' is flashing through
people's minds."
By 2004, when Obama ran for the U.S. Senate, he had softened his critique
of Clinton and adopted a more centrist position. Clinton's policies, derided
by the left as triangulation, had been a necessary "correction" to the liberal
excesses of the Democratic Party, Obama told me in April of that year. He
was developing a new theme, which helped carry him to the White House,
four years later: the obstacle wasn't ideology but blind partisanship. The
immediate target of the critique, unveiled during his famous speech at the
2004 Convention, was George W. Bush. But the argument could also be
applied to the Clinton years, and it soon was. In a well-known remark in
"The Audacity of Hope," Obama dismissed the partisan wars of the Clinton
and Bush years as a baby-boomer "psychodrama."
As the 2008 Presidential campaign took shape, Obama emerged as the
leader of a new, anti-Clinton wing. His "psychodrama" argument
blossomed into a full-scale criticism of the Clinton Presidency. This time,
though, the target was another Presidential aspirant, Hillary Clinton, who,
Obama argued, was too polarizing to get anything done in Washington.
Obama soon added a harsher note to the argument: that Hillary, perhaps
like her finger-wagging husband, was untrustworthy. On November 10,
2007, Obama's advisers, in a private memo before a pivotal speech in
Iowa, laid out the strategy. "Clinton," they argued, "can't be trusted or
believed when it comes to change," because "she's driven by political
calculation, not conviction."
An Obama Presidency, the candidate suggested in 2007 and 2008, would
be much bolder than Clinton's. "If we are really serious about winning this
election, Democrats, we can't live in fear of losing it," Obama declared in
his Iowa speech, echoing the advice of his pollsters and strategists. "This
party—the party of Jefferson and Jackson; of Roosevelt and Kennedy—has
always made the biggest difference in the lives of the American people
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when we led, not by polls, but by principle; not by calculation, but by
conviction."
The Clinton circle blames Obama's decision to go negative for the
subsequent nastiness of the 2008 Democratic primaries. Bill Clinton fumed
that the press failed to call out Obama for running on a message of hope
and change while attacking Hillary as untrustworthy. In New Hampshire,
on January 7th, he made his most famous remarks of the race, calling
Obama's record on Iraq "the biggest fairy tale I've ever seen!" He added,
"The idea that one of these campaigns is positive and the other is negative,
when I know the reverse is true and I have seen it and I have been blistered
by it for months, is a little tough to take." Clinton urged Hillary's campaign
to fire back, and, when it wouldn't, at least to his satisfaction, he did so on
his own.
The result was an internecine war that the two men have struggled to
overcome. In South Carolina, Obama's campaign suggested that Clinton's
"fairy tale" comment had racial overtones. (It was read as a subtle rejection
of the idea that an African-American could become President.) A few days
later, in Nevada, Obama compared Bill Clinton unfavorably to Ronald
Reagan. "I think Ronald Reagan changed the trajectory of America in a
way that, you know, Richard Nixon did not and in a way that Bill Clinton
did not," he said. No doubt the rhetoric was partly strategic. Every
Presidential candidate must distinguish himself from his party's previous
President, especially if the predecessor's spouse is an opposing candidate.
But Clinton "didn't see it as a tactic," Mark Halperin and John Heilemann
write in "Game Change," their account of the 2008 race. "He thought that
Obama might actually believe that Reagan's tenure had been superior to his
own."
Bill Clinton's attacks hurt Hillary as much as they did Obama. The Times
denounced Clinton's fairy-tale comment as a "bizarre and rambling attack"
and as exemplifying a campaign that was "perilously close to injecting
racial tension" into the conversation. At a press conference in South
Carolina the morning after Obama won the state, Bill Clinton seemed to
dismiss the victory as a fluke of local demography. "Jesse Jackson won
South Carolina in '84 and '88," he said. "Jackson ran a good campaign.
And Obama ran a good campaign here." Tim Russert told me that,
according to his sources, Bill Clinton, in an effort to secure an endorsement
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for Hillary from Ted Kennedy, said to Kennedy, "A few years ago, this guy
would have been carrying our bags." Clinton's role in the campaign rattled
Obama. He told ABC News in an interview that Clinton "has taken his
advocacy on behalf of his wife to a level that I think is pretty troubling."
Obama's victory in the primaries was hard for Bill Clinton to absorb. For
the remainder of the 2008 election, contact between him and Obama was
minimal: a quick phone call on the night Hillary conceded, a private
meeting in Harlem, and a joint campaign rally in Florida to excite
Democratic voters. In August, on the eve of the Convention, in Denver,
Clinton gave an interview to ABC in which he refused to say whether he
thought Obama was prepared to be Commander-in-Chief. But he rose to
the occasion at the Convention, in remarks prepared without participation
from the Obama campaign. "Barack Obama is ready to be President of the
United States," he said.
David Axelrod describes the Presidents' relationship as improved. "Would
I be truthful if I said to you that we went through a long and difficult
campaign in 2007-08 and as soon as it was over the relationship was
instantly close?" he said. "I mean, that just defies human nature. But I
think it's grown up over time."
Regardless of Bill Clinton's personal feelings about Obama, it didn't take
him long to see the advantages of an Obama Presidency. More than
anyone, he pushed Hillary to take the job of Secretary of State. "President
Clinton was a big supporter of the idea," an intimate of the Clintons told
me. "He advocated very strongly for it and arguably was the tie-breaking
reason she took the job." For one thing, having his spouse in that position
didn't hurt his work at the Clinton Global Initiative. He invites foreign
leaders to the initiative's annual meeting, and her prominence in the
Administration can be an asset in attracting foreign donors. "Bill Clinton's
been able to continue to be the Bill Clinton we know, in large part because
of his relationship with the White House and because his wife is the
Secretary of State," the Clinton associate continued. "It worked out very
well for him. That may be a very cynical way to look at it, but that's a fact.
A lot of the stuff he's doing internationally is aided by his level of access."
Bill Clinton's international diplomacy also has benefitted Obama, although
the White House has been careful to control the spotlight. One rough
moment occurred in 2009, when Clinton flew to North Korea to negotiate
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the release of two captive journalists, Euna Lee and Laura Ling. Ling's
sister Lisa had worked closely with Clinton and with the Obama
Administration to obtain the women's release. In the sisters' subsequent
memoir about the ordeal, "Somewhere Inside: One Sister's Captivity in
North Korea and the Other's Fight to Bring Her Home," they expressed
surprise that Clinton wouldn't be stepping off the plane with Lee and Ling
as they greeted their families in front of reporters; the White House had
asked him to remain on board. "We feel strongly about this decision," Lisa
was told in a conference call with a White House official. Once the plane
was on the ground, however, a State Department aide assured her that
Clinton would leave the plane with the former captives, and he did. Obama
called Clinton a few minutes afterward and thanked him for the mission. It
was the first time the two Presidents had spoken in quite a while, Lisa was
told.
Throughout 2008 and 2009, Obama rarely contacted Clinton, a decision
that the Clinton circle attributes to Obama's loner personality. A Democrat
deeply familiar with the relationship complained that the press has often
made it seem that Clinton harbored "lingering resentments" from the
primary battle: "It's always sort of implied that it's Clinton's fault." The
truth, he added, "is that Obama doesn't really like very many people." He
ticked off the names of some of Obama's longtime friends: the Whitakers,
the Nesbitts, Valerie Jarrett. "And he likes to talk about sports. But other
than that he just doesn't like very many people. Unfortunately, it extends to
people who used to have his job."
Aides in both camps continue to air old grievances. Clinton's circle
complains that for months the White House ignored a 2009 memo from
Clinton about energy policy. When a meeting was arranged, on July 14,
2010, it turned out to be a perfunctory event with business leaders. The
Obama side says that requests for help from Clinton always seemed to
come with strings attached, and that Clinton sometimes seems intent on
upstaging Obama. There was momentary panic at the White House when,
in 2011, it was learned that Clinton was soon going to publish a book on
policy. Former top Clinton aides who went to work for Obama were left
feeling, as one of them put it, like children of divorce.
Still, a turning point came after the 2010 midterm elections. Obama had
promised, during his campaign, to build a politics of consensus rather than
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of partisan conflict, but that approach wasn't working against an
increasingly right-wing Republican Party set on his defeat. Pollsters
deemed Obama the most polarizing President in history, and he was
rejected in 2010, much as Clinton had been in 1994. Meanwhile, the
approval ratings for Clinton, who was focussed on international projects,
had soared. The balance of power in the relationship began to shift as the
Administration saw that enlisting Clinton might solve more than one
problem.
In December, Obama negotiated a compromise tax deal with Republicans
—a two-year extension of all the Bush-era tax cuts in return for some
economic stimulus—that many House Democrats deplored. Liberals
complained about the deal, much as Obama had criticized Clinton before
2008. What had happened to boldness? On December 10th, Clinton met
alone with Obama in the Oval Office for seventy minutes, one of their
longest sessions to date. Afterward, they sauntered into the briefing room,
surprising reporters. Clinton gave a forceful defense of the tax deal, which
helped quell the liberal uprising.
By early 2011, the White House was turning its attention to reelection. Jim
Messina, the deputy chief of staff, moved to Chicago to manage the
campaign, and he took charge of the Clinton account. Messina hadn't
worked for Obama during the Democratic primaries in 2008 and had no
interest in the old conflicts. "Jim Messina just cares about getting two
hundred and seventy electoral votes—period," the knowledgeable
Democrat said. "And he knows Bill Clinton helps him along that path. He
doesn't care what he said in South Carolina in 2008."
Clinton, Messina told me, is one of the few people who can make the case
for Obama among voters who still haven't made up their minds. "They're
looking at this through an economic framework, and he's going to be
incredibly important to that discussion," Messina said. "He's now effective
with almost every demographic. I mean, he's in the sixties now"—meaning
that more than sixty per cent of Americans view him favorably. "The
current two political figures in America who have those numbers are Bill
Clinton and Michelle Obama."
In November, not long after the round of golf, Messina and Axelrod made
a pilgrimage to Clinton's Harlem office. Messina brought a PowerPoint
slide show and briefed the former President on campaign strategy. At the
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time, the Obama team was alternating between two arguments about
Romney. One presented him as an inveterate flip-flopper, the other as a
right-wing ideologue who would return the country to a pre-New Deal
dystopia. Clinton advised them to stick with the second argument. It would
help with fund-raising, he said; liberal donors would be more motivated to
fight a fierce conservative. If they defined Romney as a flip-flopper,
undecided voters might think that he could return to his moderate roots
once he was in office. "They tried to do this to me, the flip-flopper thing,"
Clinton said, according to someone in the room. "It just doesn't work." He
told the Obama aides that voters never held the flip-flopper attacks against
him because they felt that he would simply do what was right.
After Clinton agreed to appear at several fund-raisers, Obama turned him
into a leading character in his stump speech. "All we're asking is that we
go back to the same tax rates that we paid under Bill Clinton," Obama said
in Boone, Iowa, recently, using a line that he repeats in most campaign
speeches these days. "And you know what? That was a time when our
economy created nearly twenty-three million new jobs, the biggest budget
surplus in history, and millionaires did pretty good, too."
Obama had found a way to capitalize on an unusual political development.
In an effort to sell deficit reduction, many Republicans have been extolling
the former President's legacy. Even Mitt Romney has presented Clinton as
a responsible centrist and a champion of welfare reform, unlike Obama.
"Almost a generation ago, Bill Clinton announced that the era of big
government was over," Romney said earlier this year, trying to magnify
divisions between the two Presidents. "President Obama tucked away the
Clinton doctrine in his large drawer of discarded ideas, along with
transparency and bipartisanship. It's enough to make you wonder if maybe
it was a personal beef with the Clintons, but really it runs much deeper."
Former Representative Anthony Weiner, whose wife, Huma Abedin, is a
top aide to Hillary Clinton, expressed surprise that the = has conceded
this ground. "Swing voters volunteer that under Clinton we had a big
surplus," he said. "So Clinton provides this perfect signpost in history for
Obama. What's fascinating to me is that the Republicans have seen it
coming, understand it, and basically stipulate it. It's one of those
interesting moments when both sides aren't fighting about whether it's
true."
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On April 29th of this year, Obama attended the first of the joint fund-
raisers, in suburban Virginia, at the home of Clinton's good friend Terry
McAuliffe. The event had the feel of a first date. "If it were an indie
movie," a former Clinton aide said, "the premise would have been these
two guys are set up to go out and all their friends are there trying to see if
they hit it off or not." As Obama stood on a stage in the back yard with
Clinton and McAuliffe, waiting to be introduced, he looked uneasy, with
his arms crossed and his head occasionally down. "You could just tell he
felt like `Wow, . in the belly of the Clinton beast—Terry McAuliffe's
house!" the former aide said. "If I had to put a thought bubble above
Obama's head while Clinton spoke, it would be `What's he going to say?"
Clinton started his remarks with a humorous appreciation of McAuliffe, a
fervid Democratic partisan. "I love poor Terry McAuliffe," Clinton said.
"He's so laid back and repressed; he just can't express himself. I worry
about him. But, I tell you what, if we had a hundred more like him we
wouldn't lose as many elections." When it came to Obama, Clinton had
some facts to convey. He told the donors that he hoped they would
remember them and pass them along to their friends. That it takes ten years
to recover from a financial crisis rooted in a housing collapse, and, by that
historical standard, Obama was "beating the clock, not behind it." That
Obama's stimulus plan had shaved two points off the unemployment rate.
That Obama's restructuring of the auto industry had saved one and a half
million jobs. That Obama's health-care law will bring consumers and
employers $1.3 billion in refunds from insurance companies.
Clinton seemed at home. Obama looked coiled and reticent when he
stepped forward. "Let me just say this—and I think Bill will agree with
me," he said, near the end of his speech. "There's nothing more humbling,
actually, than being President. It's a strange thing. Suddenly, you've got all
the pomp and the circumstance and you've got the helicopters and you've
got the Air Force One and—and the plane is really nice. It really is. I mean,
Bill may not miss being President, but he misses that plane. Let's face it, he
does. It's a great plane. And I'll miss it, too." A voice from the audience of
donors suddenly interrupted the President: "But not yet!" Obama paused
briefly. "But not yet," he replied, with a smile. The crowd cheered and the
tension in the yard finally seemed to lift.
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On June 7th, Messina went to a meeting in Chicago of the Clinton Global
Initiative to make another presentation. Clinton and Messina engaged in a
detailed discussion of the politics of swing states. "We talked about each
one of them in depth," Messina said. "And he has a history in all of them.
It was amazing. He knew counties, he knew media markets. This is a guy
who has won two Presidential elections."
There was a price for Clinton's general involvement. At the end of 2011,
Hillary Clinton still had a quarter of a million dollars in campaign debt left
from 2008. Obama had agreed to retire it, in order to secure her
endorsement after the primary contest ended; he had to make good on that
promise. Eventually, Matthew Barzun, Obama's national finance chair and
a former Ambassador to Sweden, raised the money, but it was a scramble
—"a logistical challenge," one Democrat told me—to drum up donors
amid the Obama campaign's own efforts to raise money. On July 25th,
Obama, who was flying back from New Orleans, called Clinton, in Boston,
and asked him to speak during prime time at the Convention, in Charlotte.
The quasi-friendship between Clinton and Obama resembles the
transactional relationship between most living Presidents. People in
Clinton's orbit portray his campaign work for Obama as that of a man
going through the motions—speeches, photographs, rope lines.
Obama's circle offers a more diplomatic assessment. "Clinton still believes
that Obama doesn't take care of his donors as he should," a senior Obama
official said, referring to Obama's reluctance to woo his biggest financial
supporters. Yet, the official added, "Clinton has a lot of respect for how
honest and how supportive the President has been to his wife." Obama's
success with health-care reform, which the Clintons failed to achieve, also
resonates. "Health care means a lot to all three of those people—Hillary,
Bill, and Barack," the official said. "I think historic achievements matter to
historic figures like Bill Clinton."
As a Democratic President facing a resurgent conservative movement,
Obama doubtless has come to appreciate what he once criticized as
Clinton's focus on seemingly minor issues, such as advocating for school
uniforms in public schools. Although Obama once scoffed at Clinton for
his small-bore initiatives, more recently, according to White House
officials, he has come to realize that when a President doesn't control
Congress he must find solace in the often limited powers of his office.
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With many of Obama's senior political advisers—Axelrod, Messina,
Robert Gibbs, Stephanie Cutter, Ben LaBolt—now in Chicago working on
his reelection campaign, the Administration in Washington has taken on the
aura of a Clinton alumni association. Obama's chief of staff, Jacob Lew,
and his main economic adviser, Gene Sperling, were top Clinton aides.
Bruce Reed, formerly Clinton's chief domestic-policy adviser, and Steve
Ricchetti, Clinton's deputy chief of staff, now work at the White House, as
Biden's chief of staff and counsellor, respectively. The three top Obama
Cabinet positions are held by Clinton veterans: Secretary of State Clinton,
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.
It's only a slight exaggeration to say that the many staffing changes since
2010 have resulted in the Obama camp running the campaign while the
Clinton camp runs the government.
Given the political stalemate in Washington and the anemic economy,
turning the campaign into a choice between the Bush years and the Clinton
years makes strategic sense. And, after constant complaints by
Republicans, Obama has finally stopped blaming Bush for the poor
economy. Clinton can do that work instead. Embraced by both parties, he is
better equipped than Obama to make the case that Bush squandered the
good fortune and budget surpluses of the nineteen-nineties and left the
current President with multiple crises to clean up.
For Clinton, the politics are more complicated. His associates take it as a
given that he would like nothing more than to see his wife become
President. Hillary Clinton will step down as Secretary of State after the
campaign and begin the process of deciding whether she will run in 2016.
By some measures, a defeat for Obama in November would leave Hillary
the undisputed leader of her party and propel her toward the Oval Office
that much faster. At least one of Clinton's closest advisers seems to be
backing that strategy. According to two people with direct knowledge,
Douglas Band has said that he will vote for Romney. Band declined to
comment.
Now that Obama has turned the campaign into something of a referendum
on Clinton's sterling record on the economy, Clinton can hardly complain.
That may be part of Obama's strategy, too. Flattered by the attention,
Clinton now has an incentive to work hard for Obama, who seems to have
learned how to tame the former President. "In many ways, the President
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has been using Bill Clinton as an economic role model," the senior official
said. "I would guess that President Clinton views that as a compliment."
Spiegel
Was Yasser Arafat Poisoned?
Juliane von Mittelstaedt and Volkhard Windfuhr
9/03/2012 -- The mysterious circumstances of Yasser Arafat's death are
now the subject of a criminal investigation in France. But if it is true that
the Palestinian leader was poisoned, then who might have been behind his
killing?
Suha Arafat says she knew it all along. Someone like Yasser Arafat doesn't
die so easily because his body suddenly gives up, even if he was 75 years
old. Someone like him had to have been killed, poisoned or exposed to
radiation, whether from enemies or rivals. Though many have suspected
the same thing, there has never been any proof. Eight years after the death
of the legendary Palestinian leader, it looked like things would stay that
way.
But then, two months ago, the Institute of Radiation Physics based in
Lausanne, Switzerland, announced that it had found a potential
contamination with a fatal amount of polonium-210 on Arafat's underwear,
toothbrush and hat. The radioactive heavy-metal isotope is tasteless and
almost undetectable. A dose of 0.1 micrograms is already fatal.
Suha Arafat, his now 49-year-old widow, had submitted the test samples
with the assistance of al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based television network. Since
then, what had been for years merely a conspiracy theory has become a
bona fide criminal case -- especially since Suha Arafat lodged a criminal
complaint and French prosecutors launched a murder investigation last
week.
'We Will Finally Learn the Truth'
The women who put this all in motion is hard to locate. It even took the
taxi driver a long time to arrive via winding roads at Suha Arafat's home in
Malta, a half-hour by car from the capital city of Valletta. The unimposing
house on a hillside has a front garden which is too small for parties. A
compact Korean-made car is parked out front.
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Suha Arafat has lived here with her mother for over two years. Her 17-
year-old daughter, Zahwa, attends a boarding school in France.
The widow opens the door wearing a dress and flat shoes. She looks much
more like a housewife than the supposed she-devil the Palestinians have
hated since her husband, who they think should have only been wed to the
Palestinian cause, married her -- a Muslim convert who was born a
Palestinian Christian in Jerusalem and raised Catholic -- in 1990. But, more
than anything, she has been hated since 1995, when she moved from the
Gaza Strip to Paris because she found life there more comfortable.
Suha Arafat talks about the suspicion she has carried wit
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