DOJ-OGR-00006763.pdf

--- Page 1 --- The extracted text is: **Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE** **Document 452** **Filed 11/12/21** **Page 55 of 84** the elements of the crimes the Court provides them, so any assumptions the jury might make about United Kingdom law are irrelevant.14 See United States v. Vasquez, 82 F.3d 574, 577 (2d Cir. 1996) (appropriate to reject defense request for an instruction if it does not "represent[] a theory of the defense with a basis in the record that would lead to acquital"). And the proposed jury instruction that the sexual activity involving Minor Victim-3 "cannot be considered 'illegal' or 'criminal' or 'unlawful' for purposes of the crimes charged in the indictment" (Def. Mot. 4 at 15), is wrong on the law. The sexual activity involving Minor Victim-3 can be considered criminal for purposes of the crimes charged in the Indictment, because it is probative proof of the defendant's guilt of those crimes. The instruction the defense proposes, in contrast, creates serious risk that the jury will think the Court is telling them that the conduct is lawful and therefore irrelevant to the case. It is not irrelevant: it is direct evidence of the crimes charged, and it should be put before the jury. **IV. There is No Basis to Preclude Co-Conspirator Statements at Trial** On October 11, the Government provided the defense with comprehensive Jencks Act material for trial witnesses and its exhibits, along with a letter telling the defense, consistent with the Court's order, the identities of the individuals the Government intends to argue are co-conspirators at trial. The defense nonetheless asks the Court to enter an order precluding the Government from introducing any co-conspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence **14 In the event the Court instructs the jury on the age of consent in the United Kingdom, the Government requests that the Court also instruct the jury that the United Kingdom's age of consent is irrelevant and they should not consider it.**