DOJ-OGR-00019352.pdf

Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page10 of 24 States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 2007). In over 70 years since Cohen was decided, despite "numerous opportunities" to expand the doctrine, Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799, the Supreme Court has identified only four types of pretrial orders in criminal cases as satisfying the collateral-order doctrine: an order denying a bond, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); an order denying a motion to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); an order denying a motion to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); and an order permitting the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In contrast, the circumstances in which the Supreme Court has "refused to permit interlocutory appeals" in criminal cases have been "far more numerous." Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799. 13. As to the third Van Cauwenberghe criterion, "[a]n order is 'effectively unreviewable' where 'the order at issue involves an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.'" United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1989)). "The justification for immediate appeal must . . . be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes." Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009). A ruling that is burdensome to a party "in ways that are only 9 DOJ-OGR-00019352