DOJ-OGR-00000133.pdf

--- Page 1 --- **Document Image Text Extraction** The following is a verbatim extraction of the text from the provided document image: **Page 70a** conduct charged in the S1 superseding indictment. The Court could stop here. However, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to these charges. At Langgraf's second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past conduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. "[A] statute has presumptively impermissible retroactive effects when it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past." Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 56 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 290). Thus, applying a new statute of limitations to previously time-barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect. Enter: Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. Applying it to conduct for which the statute of limitations has not yet expired does not. Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995). Maxwell concedes that these offenses were within the statute of limitations when Congress enacted the PROTECT Act. Thus, the Act did not deprive her of any vested rights. Maxwell contends that it is unfair to allow the Government to prosecute her now for conduct that occurred more than twenty years ago, but there is no dispute that Congress has the power to set a lengthy limitations period or no limitations period at all. It has done so here, judging that the difficulty of prosecuting these offenses and the harm they work on children outweighs a defendant's interest in repose. Maxwell's fairless argument is a gripe with Congress's policy judgment, not an impermissibly retroactive application of the statute. The Court concludes that § 3283 allows her prosecution now. **Footer** DOJ-OGR-00000133