045.pdf

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JANE DOE NO. 2, CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. ____________________________________/ JANE DOE NO. 3, CASE NO.: 08-CV-80232-MARRA/JOHNSON Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. ____________________________________/ JANE DOE NO. 4, CASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRA/JOHNSON Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. ____________________________________/ JANE DOE NO. 5, CASE NO.: 08-CV-80381-MARRA/JOHNSON Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. ____________________________________/ Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/31/2008 Page 1 of 11 JANE DOE NO. 6, CASE NO.: 08- 80994-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. ____________________________________/ JANE DOE NO. 7, CASE NO.: 08- 80993-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. ____________________________________/ PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS Plaintiffs, Jane Does 2-7, by and through undersigned counsel, file this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss, pursuant to S.D.Fla.L.R. 7.1(C), as follows: I. Introduction and Summary Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss and for More Definite Statement filed in each of the above- captioned cases pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(e) essentially concede that Plaintiffs have alleged the elements of the claims asserted in Counts I and III of each pleading, but contend that more factual allegations are necessary for these claims. The pleadings at issue contain a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the Plaintiffs are entitled to relief in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The specific facts sought by Defendant may properly be the subject of discovery, but are not necessary for purposes of pleading. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motions are without merit and should be denied in their entirety. 2 Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/31/2008 Page 2 of 11 II. Facts Plead The pleadings in these six cases are all similarly structured and assert the same claims. In the section entitled “Factual Allegations” each describes the plan and scheme of Defendant Epstein to recruit underage girls to his Palm Beach mansion for “massages”. (Jane Doe No. 2 Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11; Jane Doe No. 3 Amd. Comp. ¶ 10-11; Jane Doe No. 4 Amd. Compl. ¶11-12; Jane Doe No. 5 Amd. Compl. ¶ 10-11; Jane Doe No. 6 Amd. Compl. ¶11-12; Jane Doe No. 7 Amd. Compl. ¶ 11-12). The pleading then alleges that, consistent with this scheme, the Plaintiff was lured to Epstein’s Palm Beach mansion to give a massage for monetary compensation. (Jane Doe No. 2 Amd. Compl. ¶ 12; (Jane Doe No. 3 Amd. Compl. ¶ 12; Jane Doe No. 4 Amd. Compl. ¶ 13; Jane Doe No. 5 Amd. Compl. ¶ 12; Jane Doe No. 6 Amd. Compl. ¶ 13; Jane Doe No. 7 Amd. Compl. ¶ 13). The Plaintiff was directed up a flight of stairs to a room where Epstein instructed the Plaintiff to remove her clothes and give him a massage. Epstein then masturbated and sexually assaulted the Plaintiff during this massage. (Jane Doe No. 2 Amd. Compl. ¶12; Jane Doe No. 3 Amd. Compl. ¶12; Jane Doe No. 4 Amd. Compl. ¶13; Jane Doe No. 5 Amd. Compl. ¶12; Jane Doe No. 6 Amd. Compl. ¶13; Jane Doe No. 7 Amd. Compl. ¶13). Count I of the pleading in each case alleges a claim of sexual assault and battery. Count II alleges a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which Defendant does not seek to dismiss in his Motions before the Court. Count III alleges a claim for coercion and enticement to sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422. Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss seek dismissal of Counts I and III for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or alternatively move for a more definite statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) on these Counts. As discussed below, Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently plead, and Defendant’s Motions should be denied in their entirety. 3 Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/31/2008 Page 3 of 11 III. Argument A. THE STANDARD UNDER FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) DOES NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL The gravamen of Defendant’s Motion is that Plaintiffs’ have not pled sufficient facts in support of their claims in Counts I and III. According to Defendant, the pleadings in this case do not satisfy “the standard of pleading” established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). In making this argument, Defendant would extend Twombly well beyond its intended scope. Twombly was an antitrust conspiracy case, in which the Court abrogated the longstanding pronouncement first made in Conly v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), that a complaint should not be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” 127 S.Ct. at 1969. The Court noted that it did “not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id . at 1974 (emphasis supplied). The antitrust conspiracy claim before the Court was dismissed “[b]ecause the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. . . .” Id. Since Twombly , courts and commentators have grappled with the case’s meaning and scope. Courts within the Eleventh Circuit have held that Twombly did not alter the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in the typical case. See , e.g., CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Goodmail Systems, Inc., 529 F.Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Coughlin v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP, 2008 WL 2704381 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Capaz v. Whitaker, Weinstraub & Grizzard, M.D.S, P.A. , 2007 WL 1655473 (M.D. Fla. 2007). In CBT Flint Partners , the Court warned against reading the decision in Trombly too broadly: 4 Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 45 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/31/2008 Page 4 of 11 In my view, Trombly did not radically alter the elementary rules of civil procedure that have governed litigation in the federal courts for the past seventy years. The Court’s forced retirement of Conley v. Gibson’s “no set of facts” language does not change the fundamental command of Rule 8 as to what a valid complaint must look like. Indeed, the Court made clear that it was not imposing a heightened pleading standard. As a general matter, I am loath to assume that the Supreme Court circumvented the normal channels for amending the Federal Rules. The Court’s “new standard” was merely a specific way to articulate a solution to what it perceived to be a specific pleading problem, in a specific area of law that inflicted a high cost upon antitrust defendants. It was not a broad based new license for federal courts to ramp up pleading requirements. 529 F.Supp. 2d at 1379 (citations omitted). The standard for pleading in the federal courts remains controlled by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), which “only requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Capaz , 2007 WL 1655473 at *1. While the scope of Twombly may not be entirely clear, it plainly cannot be read to turn pleadings into a discovery device, as Defendant advocates here in seeking dismissal for failure to plead detailed factual allegations. In Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), the Court reviewed and analyzed in depth Twombly’s “conflicting signals”