DOJ-OGR-00021109.pdf

Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page62 of 113 alternative holding — "[a] further ground for [its] conclusion" —that, even in cases where “fraud” occurs, a categorical analysis precludes extending the WSLA to prosecutions for making false statements. Id. at 221-22. And in applying this categorical approach, Bridges looked, not to the legislative history of the WSLA, but to Scharton and Noveck (which involved a different statute). See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 222 (citing, inter alia, Scharton and Noveck). Here, Bridges, Scharton, and Noveck point the way. Because § 3283 employs the same “offense-involving” language as the statutes analyzed in those cases, compare 18 U.S.C. § 3283 with id. § 3287; 26 U.S.C. § 6531, a similar interpretation should govern. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005); Wasser v. New York State Off. of Vocational & Educational Servs., 602 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2010). The Court should apply a categorical approach and hold that § 3283 did not modify the statute of limitations for § 2423(a) violations. Nothing in the text of § 3283 indicates a contrary result. Indeed, Congress has shown that when it wants to tether a statute of limitations to conduct occurring in a particular case, it knows how to do so—and uses unambiguous wording distinct from § 3283. Notably, in 2001, Congress eliminated the statute of limitations for certain terrorism offenses in which “the commission of such offense resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily injury to