DOJ-OGR-00019625.pdf

Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page18 of 37 12 has consistently ruled that protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged by the parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) ("We hold that this collateral protective order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ...."); United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996) ("To the extent that the [protective] order imposed restrictions on the parties' disclosure of materials exchanged in the course of pending litigation, it is not subject to appeal."); see also H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The district court's denial of modification [of a protective order] does not fall within the 'collateral order' doctrine of Cohen.") Because "a litigant does not have an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained through pretrial discovery," such protective orders do not amount to an impermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment. Caparros, 800 F.2d at 25. Even where a litigant raises a colorable argument that a protective order violates a litigant's right to release documents outside of criminal litigation, "adjudication of any such right can await final judgment on the underlying charges" because the "purported right at issue is not related to any right not to stand trial." Id. at 26. B. Discussion Maxwell's jurisdictional arguments run afoul of this Circuit's precedent and offer no justification for including the Order in the "small class" of decisions that constitute immediately appealable collateral orders. See Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 522. In her DOJ-OGR-00019625