DOJ-OGR-00021107.pdf

3283 should be read through a categorical rather than case-specific lens. See U.S. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)); Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 483 (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)); U.S. v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has—on multiple occasions—firmly held that a categorical approach must be employed to interpret statutes of limitation that bear striking resemblance to §3283. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that a proviso of the internal revenue laws, extending from three to six years the statute of limitations for prosecuting “offenses involving defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States,” applies only when “defrauding or an attempt to defraud the United States is an ingredient under the statute defining the offense.” U.S. v Noveck, 271 U.S. 201, 202-203, 204 (1926) (emphasis added) (quoting Act of November 17, 1921, c. 124, 42 Stat. 220, codified in its present version at 26 U.S.C. § 6531). Noveck held that this provision did not extend the statute of limitations for perjury, because fraud is not a required element of that crime. Id.; see also Scharton, 285 U.S. at 522 (same, with respect to tax evasion). Indeed, Noveck found this statute inapplicable even when the indictment specifically alleges fraud, because such fraud allegations are “mere surplusage,” not an element of the offense. 271 U.S. at 203.