DOJ-OGR-00023222.pdf

--- Page 1 --- **Document Text Extraction** The following text is extracted from the document image, preserving the original formatting and including headers, footers, page numbers, and any handwritten notes: **Header** No header is visible in the image. **Text** which Villafaña and Lourie believed that the state had intentionally failed to aggressively pursue a broader state indictment. One example illustrates this communication gap. In a September 20, 2007 email to Lourie asking him to read the latest version of the proposed "hybrid" federal plea agreement (calling for Epstein to plead to both state and federal charges), Acosta noted, "I don't typically sign plea agreements. We should only go forward if the trial team supports and signs this agreement. I didn't even sign the public corruption or [C]ali cartel agreements, so this should not be the first." (Emphasis added.) In his email to Villafaña, Lourie attached Acosta's email and instructed Villafaña to "change the signature block to your name and send as final to Jay [Lefkowitz]." (Emphasis added.) Villafaña raised no objection to signing the agreement. Acosta told OPR that he wanted to give the "trial team" a chance to "speak up and let him know" if they did not feel comfortable with the agreement. Villafaña, however, told OPR that she did not understand that she was being given an opportunity to object to the agreement; rather, she believed Acosta wanted her to sign it because he was taking an "arm's length" approach and signaling this "was not his deal." The fact that the top decision maker believed he was giving the line AUSA an opportunity to reflect and stop the process if she believed the deal was inappropriate, but the line AUSA believed she was being ordered to sign the agreement because her boss wanted to distance himself from the decision, reflects a serious communication gap. As another example, at one point, Villafaña, frustrated and concerned about the decisions being made concerning a possible resolution, requested a meeting with Acosta; in a sternly worded rebuke, Menchel rejected the request. Although Menchel told OPR that he was not prohibiting Villafaña from speaking to Acosta, Villafaña interpreted Menchel's email to mean that she could not seek a meeting with Acosta. As a consequence, Acosta made his decision about a state resolution and the term of incarceration without any direct input from Villafaña. Acosta told OPR that he was unaware that Villafaña had sought a meeting with him and he would have met with her if she had asked him directly. OPR did not find any written evidence of a meeting involving both Acosta—the final decision maker—and Villafaña—the person most knowledgeable about the facts and the law—before Acosta made his decision to resolve the case through state charges or to offer the two-year term, and Villafaña said she did not have any input into the decision. Although a U.S. Attorney is certainly not required to have such direct input, and it may be that Menchel presented what he believed to be Villafaña's views, OPR found no evidence that Acosta was aware of Villafaña's strong views about, and objections to, the proposed resolution. Two logistical problems hindered effective communication. First, the senior managers involved in the case—Acosta, Sloman, and Menchel—had offices located in Miami, while the offices of the individuals most familiar with facts of the case—Villafaña and, to a lesser extent, Lourie—were located in West Palm Beach. Consequently, Villafaña's discussions with her senior **Footer** No footer is visible in the image. **Page Number** The page number "184" is visible at the bottom of the image. **Handwritten Notes** No handwritten notes are visible in the image. **DOI** The DOI "DOJ-OGR-00023222" is visible at the bottom right corner of the image.