EFTA01464308.pdf
dataset_10 PDF 3.5 MB • Feb 4, 2026 • 105 pages
Deutsche Bank
Markets Research
Global
Foreign Exchange
FX Spot
Date
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives
FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Oliver Harvey
Macro strate ist
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1. MICA(P)
054/04/2013.
EFTA01464308
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Table Of Contents
Currency
Forecasts
The Big Picture:
FX and the Financial Transaction Tax 5
Monitors:
G10 FX Valuation Monitor: Lines in the sand 18
Capital Flows and Basic Balances 25
Commodity Price and Currency Monitor 34
U.S. Trade
Balance 39
Central Bank Reserves Currency Composition Monitor 46
Page 2
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464309
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Currency Forecasts
Industrialized Countries
Currency
US $ Exchange Rates
U.S.
Euro
DB USD Index
EUR/USD
(Fwd. Rates)
Japan USD/JPY
(Fwd. Rates)
U.K.
Asia
Spot
3M 6M 12M
70 71 74 76
- --1.33
1.26 1.20 1.18
- 1.33 1.33 1.33
98 102 110 112
- 98 98 98
GBP/USD 1.53 1.47 1.41 1.40
(Fwd. Rates)
- 1.53 1.53 1.53
Canada USD/CAD 1.03 1.00 1.02 1.04
(Fwd. Rates)
- 1.03 1.03 1.04
Australia AUD/USD 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.95
(Fwd. Rates)
- 0.91 0.91 0.90
N.Z.
NZD/USD
(Fwd. Rates)
SwitzerlandUSD/CHF
(Fwd. Rates)
Euro Cross Rates
Japan EUR/JPY
U.K.
(Fwd. Rates)
EUR/GBP
(Fwd. Rates)
SwitzerlandEUR/CHF
Norway
Sweden
(Fwd. Rates)
EUR/NOK
(Fwd. Rates)
EUR/SEK
(Fwd. Rates)
EFTA01464310
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.77
- 0.80 0.79 0.78
0.93 0.99 1.04 1.06
- 0.93 0.93 0.93
130 129 132 132
- 130 130 130
0.86 0.86 0.85 0.84
- 0.86 0.86 0.87
1.23 1.25 1.25 1.24
- 1.23 1.23 1.23
7.86 7.35 7.25 7.15
- 7.88 7.91 7.97
8.58 8.25 8.05 8.00
- 8.60 8.62 8.66
Source: Datastream, Reuters, Bloomberg Finance LP, DB forecasts
Emerging Europe
Currency
Czech Rep. EUR/CZK
(Fwd. Rates)
USD/CZK
(Fwd. Rates)
Hungary EUR/HUF
Latin America
Currency
Argentina USD/ARS
(Fwd. Rates)
Brazil USD/BRL
(Fwd. Rates)
Chile USD/CLP
(Fwd. Rates)
Colombia USD/COP
(Fwd. Rates)
Spot
3M
6M 12M
5.49 5.60 5.98 6.62
- 4.63 4.87 5.33
2.26 2.12 2.15 2.17
- 2.31 2.35 2.44
509 505 502 500
- 516 521 531
1887 1910 1930 1950
- 1907 1924 1960
Mexico USD/MXN 12.7 12.6 12.1 11.9
(Fwd. Rates)
- 12.812.913.1
Source: Datastream, Reuters, Bloomberg Finance LP, DB forecasts
Poland
(Fwd. Rates)
USD/HUF
(Fwd. Rates)
EFTA01464311
Spot
3M
6M
12M
25.9 25.8 25.6 25.3
- 25.9 25.8 25.8
19.5 20.5 21.3 21.5
- 19.5 19.5 19.4
299 285 279 275
- 301 304 308
224 226 233 234
- 227 229 232
EUR/PLN 4.214.134.004.00
(Fwd. Rates)
- 4.24 4.26 4.31
USD/PLN 3.183.283.333.40
(Fwd. Rates)
- 3.20 3.21 3.25
Russia USD/RUB 32.8 31.8 31.8 32.0
(Fwd. Rates)
Turkey USD/TRY
(Fwd. Rates)
South Africa USD/ZAR 9.789.909.709.50
(Fwd. Rates)
Source: Datastream, Reuters, Bloomberg Finance LP, DB forecasts
- 30.3 30.9 31.5
1.921.941.951.98
- 1.96 1.99 2.07
- 9.90 10.04 10.32
Currency
Spot
3M
6M
12M
China USD/CNY 6.13 6.13 6.15 6.07
(Fwd. Rates)
- 6.17 6.20 6.25
Hong Kong USD/HKD 7 76 7.77 7.80 7.80
(Fwd. Rates)
USD/INR
India
(Fwd. Rates)
- 7.75 7.75 7.75
59.3 57.0 55.0 55.0
- 60.6 61.8 63.9
Indonesia USD/IDR 10278 10500 10500 10000
(Fwd. Rates)
Philippines USD/PHP 43.3 42.6 42.3 41.7
(Fwd. Rates)
- 10723 11000 11412
Malaysia USD/MYR 3.243.173.153.13
EFTA01464312
(Fwd. Rates)
- 3.26 3.27 3.30
- 43.3 43.4 43.6
Singapore USD/SGD 1.27 1.27 1.28 1.30
(Fwd. Rates)
- 1.27 1.27 1.27
South Korea USD/KRW 1112 1130 1120 1130
(Fwd. Rates)
- 1118 1122 1127
Taiwan USD/TWD 29.9 30.0 29.6 29.7
(Fwd. Rates)
- 29.9 29.8 29.7
Thailand USD/THB 31.1 30.5 30.0 30.0
(Fwd. Rates)
- 31.3 31.4 31.7
Source: Datastream, Reuters, Bloomberg Finance LP, DB forecasts
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc
Page 3
EFTA01464313
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
G10 FX Forecasts: End of Quarter
Spot 2013
2014
2015
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q4
USD-crosses
EUR/USD 1.331.261.201.191 181.171.151.10
USD/JPY
GBP/USD 1.531.471.411.391.401.401.391.38
USD/CAD 1.031.001.021.031.041.041.051.10
AUD/USD 0.920.980.980.970.950.930.900.85
NZD/USD 0.800.800.800.790.770.750.720.68
USD/CHF
0.930.991.041.051.051.061.071.12
USD/SEK 6.486.716.886.836.786.796.877.05
USD/NOK 5.935.836.046.056.066.076.136.23
EUR-crosses
EUR/JPY
EUR/GBP
EUR/CHF
EUR/SEK
Source: Deutsche Bank
98 102 110 111 113 114 115 120
130 129 132 132 133 133 132 132
0.860.860.850.860.840.840.830.80
1.231.251.251.251.241.241.231.23
8.588.458.258.138.007.957.907.75
EUR/NOK 7.867.357.257.207.157.107.056.85
Page 4
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464314
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
T. In February 2013, the European Commission published a detailed proposal
of a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) to be implemented based on an
'enhanced cooperation' agreement between 11 participating EU member
states.
T. The proposal will tax transactions in securities at 0.1% of notional value
and derivatives at 0.01%. The FTT will be levied on all transactions
involving financial institutions where one of the counterparties is
established in a participating member state and/or where the financial
instrument is issued in a participating member state.
The FTT would have wide ranging implications for the FX industry. While
FX spot transactions will not be taxed, forwards, swaps, NDFs and options
may be taxed. Transactions in these products would be taxed at the rate
for derivatives.
In its current form, the FTT would dramatically increase transaction costs
for FX market participants. This could result in the effective closure of the
non-spot FX market in participating member states.
T. The FTT would translate into substantial costs for the real economy. It
would be passed on to end users of FX derivatives, reducing corporate
competitiveness and acting as a tax on extra-EMU exports. The FTT would
also drain liquidity from markets, impair market efficiency and widen
bidoffer
spreads.
T. The design of the FTT may be incompatible with existing global efforts in
financial reform. By discouraging forms of financial intermediation, the FTT
appears to run counter to the goals of US and European legislation, which
are designed to encourage greater clearing and margining of transactions
in order to reduce credit risk.
The Bottom Line
On 22nd January 2013 the European Council gave the go ahead to 11 EU member
states to negotiate a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT).1
The European Commission
originally proposed an EU-wide FTT in September 2011. The three stated
objectives of the FTT were to avoid the fragmentation of the internal market
for
financial services, enhance the contribution of the financial services
sector to the
tax base and discourage financial transactions inconsistent with efficient
market
functioning. 2
After EU finance ministers failed to reach unanimous agreement on the
original
proposal, it was decided that progress would be made through a limited group
of
1 Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
2 A number of Eurozone states, including France and Italy, have already
introduced financial transaction
EFTA01464315
taxes at a national level. The goal of the European Commission was to
harmonize these efforts and
prevent an uncoordinated multi-approach system in Eurozone financial markets.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 5
EFTA01464316
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
member states. In February 2013, the European Commission published its
detailed
proposal of the FTT under the aegis of an enhanced cooperation agreement.3
The proposal closely mirrors that of the September 2011 original.
Transactions in
securities will be taxed at 0.1% of their notional value, transactions in
derivatives at
0.01% of their notional value. Financial institutions will be captured by
the tax with
a few exemptions. Non-financial institutions are not directly liable to pay
the FTT.
However, financial entities will be liable to pay when undertaking
transactions with
non-financial entities. Any trade involving a counterparty established in,
or a
financial instrument issued in a participating member state will be captured.
The FTT would have wide ranging implications for the FX industry. While FX
spot
transactions will not be taxed, forwards, swaps, NDFs and options may be
taxed.
These products currently make up nearly two thirds of FX market turnover.4
Transactions in these products would be taxed at the rate for derivatives.
While the
FTT is only being introduced in 11 member states, the extra-territorial
impact of the
FTT under the current proposal is wide, and would have a significant effect
on all
major global trading centres of foreign exchange.
The European Commission's proposal still has some way to go before it is
agreed,
let alone implemented. The eleven member states will continue to debate the
proposal until it achieves unanimous agreement. In recent weeks there has
been
speculation over the future of the FTT after participating member states
wrote to
the European Commission
for
acknowledged that implementation by the target date was unlikely.5
In its current form, the FTT would dramatically increase transaction costs
for FX
markets with the likely result of effectively closing the non-spot FX market
in
Europe. Indirect impacts would include changes to market structure, shifts
in the
behaviour of investors and hedgers and the relocation of global liquidity
hubs
In research carried out for the Global FX Division of the Global Financial
Markets
Association, Oliver Wyman estimated that the FTT would result in price
EFTA01464317
increases
of up to 1790% at the short end of the FX swap market (1 week EUR/USD swap)
and 270% at the long end (6 month EUR/USD swap). 6
transaction costs for FX swaps in recent years, the impact of the FTT would
be
comparable to the rise in transaction costs around the Lehman liquidity
crisis.
These costs would be magnified further by the FX market's high turnover and
deal
velocity. Many market participants roll shorter-dated FX forwards and swaps
for
liquidity management, asset-liability matching and short-term funding
purposes.
Each transaction would be captured by the FTT, while the impact on short-
dated
instruments is far higher than long-dated instruments.
The effective rate of the FTT would also be higher than the headline rate.
This is
because the FTT would apply to every step and, where applicable, leg of a
transaction. By definition, swaps and forwards trade with multiple legs and
often
3 The Enhanced Cooperation procedure allows member states to proceed with
integration within the
structures of the EU but without the participation of all member states.
4 BIS Triennial FX Survey, September 2010
50n 30th
May 2013 spokesperson for EC Tax and Customs Algirdas semeta acknowledged
that
implementation by the 2014 target date was 'unlikely.'
6 Proposed EU Commission Financial Transaction Tax Impact Analysis on
Foreign Exchange Markets,
Oliver Wyman January 2012
Page 6
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc
clarification on key details and EC officials
Looking at the average
EFTA01464318
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
involve very large notional amounts. The FX market is also intermediated,
with
several potential stages between client and ultimate liquidity provider.
We are concerned that the FTT would result in higher costs for end users of
FX
markets. Transactions between non-financial entities (e.g. corporate
clients) and
their dealers are not exempt from the FTT and higher transaction costs
incurred by
liquidity providers may have to be passed down. While non-financial entities
are
not primarily liable for payment, where the FTT goes unpaid both
counterparties
are jointly and severally liable, potentially introducing a new risk to
corporate
hedging decisions where none previously existed. A less liquid FX market
would
also mean non-financial
research suggests that financial transaction taxes lead to wider bid-offer
spreads.7
Since the stated purpose of policymakers in introducing the FTT is to
increase the
tax contribution of the financial sector in the interests of a level playing
field with
the non-financial sector, we think it is surprising that the proposal
contains no
exemption for transactions involving non-financial entities. As well as
being counter
to the goal of the proposal, this risks reducing the competitiveness of
European
companies. We calculate below that the FTT would impose a direct cost of
between EUR 1 to 2.4bn per year on German exporters and importers. The FTT
would, therefore, involve a significant direct cost for the real economy.
We believe the European Commission's proposal poses significant risk to
liquidity
and efficiency in the foreign exchange market. Historical examples of
financial
transaction taxes show significant declines in deal volume shortly after
their
introduction, while academic literature suggests that they impair market
efficiency
and liquidity.
We are also concerned that the proposal may offer market participants
economic
incentives that run counter to post-2008 international efforts at financial
reform. By
discouraging financial intermediation, the FTT flies in the face of mandatory
clearing rules introduced in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Were the
FTT to
EFTA01464319
apply to the exchange of margin, it would discourage some market participants
from collateralizing trades, hindering efforts to reduce counterparty credit
risk.
An understanding of how the FTT will apply to FX transactions is the key to
determining the impact on the FX market. We therefore begin our discussion
with
an outline of the current proposal.
How the Financial Transaction Tax Will Work
The FTT would be charged on all security transactions at a rate of 10bp and
all
derivative transactions at a rate of lbp. FX products which are eligible for
taxation
are FX forwards and swaps, NDFs and FX options. FX spot is excluded. The
European Commission had previously noted that a 'Tobin Tax,' on FX spot
transactions could run counter to EU law by restricting the free movement of
capita1.8
The Commission appears not to have extended this consideration to FX
swaps and forwards although there are questions as to whether they also
represent 'capital flows.'
entities have access to poorer pricing, as academic
7 Pomeranets and Weaver, Security Transaction Taxes and Market Quality, Bank
of Canada Working Paper,
November 2011
8 European Commission, Staff Working Document, Innovative Financing at a
Global Level, 1st
April 2010
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 7
EFTA01464320
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
The FTT would apply to all financial institutions. Financial institutions
are defined as
investment firms, trading platforms or exchanges, insurance companies,
pension
funds, alternative investment funds, special purpose entities (SPEs) and
special
purpose vehicles (SPVs) and any other entity for which the average annual
value of
financial transactions constitute more than fifty percent of overall net
turnover.9
There are limited exceptions. Non-financial entities are not required to
pay, but
financial institutions transacting with non-financial entities are.
Moreover, nonfinancial
entities would be held jointly and severally liable if a financial
institution
fails to pay. Transactions with Central Counter Parties (CCPs), Central
Security
Depositories (CSDs) and International Central Securities Depositories
(ICSDs),
national debt management offices, member state central banks, the ECB and
other
international organizations do not fall under the FTT. The FTT would also
not be
charged on primary market transactions, or underwriting
The proposal envisages a broad territorial reach of the FTT. It would apply
to all
financial entities established in participating states. It would also apply
to all
financial entities transacting with a counterparty based in the
participating states.
Transactions involving securities issued within a participating member state
will
also be caught, irrespective of where the counterparties to the deal are
based. This
'issuance principle' is designed to strengthen anti-relocation provisions of
the FTT,
by making less desirable for entities established in participating states to
move
trading activities abroad. The issuance principle would apply to instruments
like
bonds and stocks. It is uncertain as to whether it would apply to the euro
currency.
Euros are issued by the ECB, an EU-established entity. It is not clear
whether eurodenominated
derivative contracts traded on an organized platform will be subject.
The proposal anticipates that the broker or settlement agent would be liable
for the
calculation for the FTT. For electronic transactions, collection and payment
EFTA01464321
is
assumed to be immediate. For other types of transactions, the proposal
suggests
that a period of three working days is an appropriate time period within
which the
FTT should be paid. The proposal does not state which counterparty should be
held responsible for paying the FTT, but that in the event the tax is not
paid, both
counterparties would be held jointly and severally liable.
Headline versus Effective Costs
The headline rates established by the European Commission are 10bp for
securities transactions and lbp for derivatives. However, the effective
rates for
financial transactions are higher. This is because the FTT is levied on a
gross basis,
at every stage of the transaction. This approach would cause a 'cascade
effect,'
whereby the effective tax rate increases in a linear fashion with the amount
of
intermediation in the deal.
The draft proposal distinguishes between financial institutions that are a
'party' to a
financial transaction and those that act on an 'agency' basis. 'Parties' are
required
to pay the FTT, while those acting on an 'agency' basis will not be caught.
There is
still a lack of clarity over which entities would fall under each definition
(for
example, whether the tax would capture a prime broker executing a 'give up,'
since the prime broker bears credit risk for the transaction). The FTT would,
however, appear to capture entities acting independently that facilitate a
single
9 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive, Implementing
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area
of Financial Transaction Tax, 14th
February 2013
Page 8
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464322
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
transaction. For example, where a dealer provides liquidity to a financial
entity and
simultaneously hedges the same transaction with a third counterparty, all
three
entities are likely to be caught.
The FX industry would be impacted by this cascade effect. FX is an
intermediated
market, with several potential stages between the client and ultimate
liquidity
provider. These stages have evolved in response to demand for tighter
pricing and
a more efficient market. For example, in the case of an NDF transaction, a
dealer is
able to provide a better price for a client by being able to hedge that
transaction
through an offsetting one with a third counterparty. By discouraging this
kind of
intermediation, the FTT may result in dealers providing wider prices for
clients.
By definition many FX transactions also contain multiple legs, each of may be
subject to the FTT. For example, an FX swap is composed of two forward
transactions, meaning that the FTT could be charged twice. FX transactions
can
also involve very large notionals, which would increase gross costs.
As illustrated by the diagram below, a headline rate of lbp translates into
a much
higher effective rate once the multiple steps of a typical FX transaction is
taken into
account. In this case, the final cost for a USD/INR NDF potentially
increases up to
8bp, meaning the absolute cost for a USD 10,000,000 notional becomes USD
8,000.
Figure 1: The FTT 'Cascade Effect'
Source: Deutsche Bank
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 9
EFTA01464323
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
There are questions as to whether the FTT will be levied on the exchange of
collateral but at the moment there is no clear exemption. Given that many FX
transactions are regularly collateralized, in some cases with the exchange of
variation margin on a more than a daily basis, this could involve a
substantial
increase in transaction costs. If the FTT was levied on initial margin, this
would also
increase costs.
The FTT would dramatically increase current transaction costs for FX
markets. In
research carried out for the Global FX Division of the Global Financial
Markets
Association, Oliver Wyman estimated that the FTT would result in price
increases
of up to 1790% at the short end of the FX swap market (1 week EUR/USD swap)
and 270% at the long end (6 month EUR/USD swap).
These extremely large increases in transaction costs are the result of the
very
small bid-offer spreads quoted by liquidity providers. In the most liquid FX
swaps,
such as a 1 week EUR/USD swap, spreads are often lower than one tenth of a
basis point. The FTT would therefore introduce a permanent cost to
transactions
magnitudes higher than is typical for these markets. Indeed, looking over
average
transaction costs for FX swaps over recent years, the impact of the FTT can
be
compared to the Lehman liquidity crisis in terms of its impact on
transaction costs.
These costs would be magnified by the FX market's high turnover and deal
velocity. The BIS estimates the total daily turnover in the swaps and
forwards
market alone to be USD 2.24 trillion, more than seven times that of all
global equity
markets.
Much of this liquidity is concentrated in shorter tenors. According to the
BIS, more
than 40% of global market turnover is concentrated in tenors of 1 week or
less for
FX forwards. For FX swaps, this figure is 70%. FX swaps and forwards are
rolled
over on a daily or weekly basis by a wide range of market participants in
order to
meet a broad range of objectives. These include liquidity management,
assetliability
matching and short term funding. These transactions would be hit each
time by the tax. Additionally, the impact of the FTT on short-dated
instruments is
much greater than on long-dated instruments.
EFTA01464324
Figure 2: The FTT Impact Similar to Global Financial Crisis on Transaction
Costs
Source: Deutsche Bank, * existing transaction costs are calculated as the
bid -offer spread for FX fonvard points expressed as a percentage of
the FX market rate. Data from Bloomberg Finance LP.
Page 10
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464325
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Figure 3: FX Forwards Percentage Global Turnover
Figure 4: FX Swaps Percentage Global Turnover
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
Up to 7 days
7 days -1 year
Source: Deutsche Bank, BIS Triennial Survey, September 2010
Over 1 year
Participating member states
Global
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0
Up to 7 days
7 days -1 year
Source: Deutsche Bank, BIS Triennial Survey, September 2010
Over 1 year
Participating member
states
Global
A Tax on the Real Economy
Many have noted that the proposed FTT would have wide-ranging negative
implications for financial markets, reducing trading volumes, disrupting
short
term funding markets and curtailing the profits of financial firms.10
The FTT would also have a significant impact on the real economy. The fact
that the proposal does not exempt transactions involving non-financial
corporations would result in costs being passed down to end users of
derivatives. This would make hedging financial risks more expensive and less
attractive, potentially increasing the volatility of firms' cash flow and
share
prices.
Non-financial corporations use FX derivatives to hedge cash flow and balance
sheet risks arising from currency fluctuations. As the largest economy among
the participating member states and one of the foremost proponents of the
FTT, a useful case study is the impact the tax would have on German importers
and exporters.
Surveys suggest that an overwhelming majority of German corporates use
EFTA01464326
derivatives to hedge FX risks.11
Using a simple approach based on German
trade and BIS data, assumptions about hedging ratios, hedge rollovers and
basis point cost per transaction, we calculate that the FTT would impose an
annual cost of anywhere between EUR 1 to 2.4bn on German importers and
exporters. Using export elasticities from the IMF we calculate that German
exports could be reduced by as much as EUR 3.3bn per year.
In recent years, German exports to outside the Eurozone have grown as the
economy has responded to weak demand in the single currency area.
Germany's relatively strong growth compared the rest of the Eurozone is in no
small part due to this flexibility, with exports to East Asia in particular
playing
an important role. The FTT would hamper Germany's export flexibility by
10 See, for example, International Capital Market Association report, 'The
Impact of the Financial
Transaction Tax on the European Repo Market, April 8th
2013
11Gordon Bodnar and Gunther Gebhardt, Derivatives Usage in Risk Management
by US and German NonFinancial
Firms, A Comparative Study, 1999
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 11
EFTA01464327
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Figure 5: Ex-Euro Area German exports have gained share
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
Jan-93 Dec-95 Nov-98 Oct-01 Sep-04 Aug -07 Jul-10
Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP
Euro-Area
Non-Euro Area
German exports,
mns. EUR
Figure 6: Two ways of measuring the FTTs impact on German trade
Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP, BIS Triennial FX Survey
September 2010
Page 12
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464328
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
imposing an effective tax on non-Euro area exports. Moreover, given our
economists' view that Eurozone growth is expected to significantly
underperform the rest of the world for some years to come, the opportunity
cost to German exporters is likely to be significant.12
As well as impacting non-financial corporations, the FTT would diminish
pensions, increase insurance premiums and may raise costs for retail
investors.
Despite extensive discussions with the European Commission, the pension
industry will not be excluded from the FTT. The European Commission
estimates that for actively managed pension funds the FTT could reduce final
pensions by as much as 8%.13
Market Impact
There have been numerous academic studies on the impact of financial
transaction
taxes on financial markets.
There is a broad consensus that financial transaction taxes reduce trading
volumes.
Schmidt (2007) estimated trading volume elasticities in foreign exchange
markets.
Based on a multilateral implementation of the tax which reduced the prospect
of
relocation of trading activities, he estimated an elasticity of -0.4 for the
world's four
most traded currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GBP).
Empirical studies have largely focused on securities rather than derivatives
markets. Froot and Campbell (1994) found that the impact of the Swedish
equities
transaction tax on trading volumes was relatively modest. However, the
impact of
a tax introduced on bonds and bills of between 0.2 and 3bp in 1989 was
significantly larger, with bond trading volumes falling 85% in the first
week.
The Froot and Campbell study illustrates an important characteristic of
financial
transaction taxes. Where
the opportunity to migrate trading
activities to
jurisdictions outside of the tax regime exists, or an effective substitute
to a taxable
product is available, trading volumes of the taxable products within the tax
jurisdiction experience significant falls. In the case of Sweden, Froot and
Cambell
found that offshore investors were able to access liquidity, tax-free, from
offshore
markets in the same equity securities. This resulted in a greater fraction
of the
trade in these securities taking place abroad. In the case of bonds and
bills, market
participants were able to substitute these products for non-taxable products
EFTA01464329
such
as forward rate agreements (FRAs) and variable-rate notes (VRNs).
This has important implications for FX markets. FX is a highly globalized
industry
with multiple global
liquidity hubs. The portability of those FX transactions
impacted by the tax is, therefore, likely to be high. This would involve
liquidity
seekers from non-participating states currently transacting with dealers
based in
participating member states relocating business,
and liquidity seekers of
participating member states relocating their trading activities to foreign
liquidity
hubs. This may have the impact of effectively shutting down the non-spot FX
market in participating states.
12 DB Focus Europe, Europe Outlook 2013, A false sense of security, 14th
December 2012
13 European Commission Technical fiche, Pension funds in the context of the
FTT proposal Case study of
Dutch pension fund market, assuming pension fund follows 'active' strategy,
turning over 90% of assets
twice a year, and hedging 90% of its assets four times a year.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 13
EFTA01464330
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
A stated goal of the FTT is to reduce transactions that do not contribute to
market
efficiency. One aspect of efficient market functioning is the rapid
incorporation of
news into asset prices, or price discovery. Liu (2007) examined how market
efficiency evolved in line with financial transaction taxes in Japan. He
measured
price discovery using the autocorrelation of returns in the Japanese
securities
market. In a more efficient market, new information should be incorporated
immediately into asset prices. This should, in turn, reduce the
autocorrelation of
returns. Lui found that reductions in the financial transaction tax in the
securities
market reduced the autocorrelation of Japanese stock price changes,
suggesting
that financial transaction taxes diminish price discovery.
A key feature of an efficient financial market is liquidity. This can be
briefly
summarized as the ability to transact when needed at a reasonable price. The
best
measure of liquidity is the bid-offer spread. We have already noted how bid -
offer
spreads would widen by the amount of tax that 'cascades' down the
transaction.
The FTT may widen bid-offer spreads still further through secondary effects.
Academic evidence suggests that financial transaction taxes result in wider
bid
offer spreads. Pomeranets and Weaver (2011) study New York State Security
Transaction Taxes on the NYSE and AMEX stock markets throughout the 20th
century. They found that
correlation to bid-offer spreads.
Figure 7: Historically, financial transaction taxes have led to wider bid -
offer
spreads
Percentage change in New
York State Stock Transfer
Tax versus changes on
bid-ask spread on sample
stocks, NYSE & AMEX
exchanges
2
Jun-33
1.5
Mar-32
1
0.5
Oct-81
Jan-45
EFTA01464331
-0.6% -0.4% -0.2%
Aug-78
Oct-79
0
Oct-80
-0.5
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8%
Changein tax
Source: Pomeranets and Weaver, Security Transaction Taxes and Market
Quality, Bank of Canada Working Paper, November 2011
Wider bid-offer spreads would result in higher transaction costs for all
market
participants. In their research, Oliver Wyman estimated that based on a 70%
fall in
volumes, the most liquid G10 derivative products could see spreads widen by
110%, while in less liquid G10 products spreads could widen by as much as
200%. It is worth noting that under the European Commission's initial
assessment a fall in derivative trading of 90% in
participating countries was
anticipated, suggesting that the Oliver Wyman estimates were conservative.
Page 14
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Jul-66
Aug-75
financial transaction taxes had a strong positive
impact
Change in bid-ask spread
EFTA01464332
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Global regulation and the FTT
A concern surrounding the FTT currently proposed by the European
Commission is that it offers economic incentives that conflict with existing
international efforts at financial market reform.
Because the FTT is imposed at every stage of a financial transaction it
discourages financial intermediation. Mandatory clearing rules introduced by
the Dodd Frank Act in the US and EMIR in Europe aim to reduce counterparty
credit risk by migrating OTC bilateral transactions to clearing houses. This
has
the effect of increasing transaction intermediation in cases where trades
were
bilaterally executed.
Central clearing is designed to reduce systemic risks in the financial
system.
The central counterparty (CCP) acts as buyer to every seller and seller to
every
buyer. In so doing, it is designed to centralize financial risks that were
previously dispersed between multiple counterparties. Central clearing
reduces
counterparty credit risk by requiring firms to post collateral against
potential
future losses on trades (initial margin) and the mark to market value of the
same trades (variation margin). Basel III rules are similarly designed to
encourage greater collateralization of OTC trades by imposing higher capital
requirements on banks for trades which are not collateralized.14
Many financial firms will be required to clear derivative transactions using
CCPs. Most non-financial corporations, however, will not. The FTT, therefore,
may discourage non-financial entities from centrally clearing derivative
transactions as doing so would incur higher transaction costs.
Under the current European Commission proposal, it is unclear whether the
FTT is to be applied to the exchange of collateral. If it were applied, this
would
clash with efforts to reduce counterparty credit risk. Again, financial
corporations are likely to be subject to prudential margin standards which
will
require them to collateralize trades even when they are not cleared.
Nonfinancial
corporations will likely not be subject to the same standards.
In the case of non-financial institutions that are not subject to prudential
margin requirements, a number of factors will determine whether they choose
to bilaterally margin uncleared derivative transactions, or trade via a
credit
value adjustment (CVA) approach where credit charges are incurred. These
include the cost of credit charges, the availability of high quality
collateral that
can be used as margin and the sensitivity to cash flow risk arising from
margining. If it were to tax the exchange of collateral, the FTT would
provide
an incentive for non-financial institutions to choose the CVA approach.
EFTA01464333
Other market efforts at reducing risk may be impacted by the FTT. For
example,
portfolio compression trades, where offsetting positions
are netted by
counterparties in order to minimize counterparty risk, may be subject to the
tax.
The FTT would have broad implications for all major trading centers of
foreign
exchange. Many international dealers provide liquidity to clients based in
participating member states. For example, London, which provides the world's
largest trading hub of foreign exchange, would be particularly adversely
impacted.
14 We examine the impact of OTC derivative regulation on FX markets in more
detail in our report:
Exchange Rate Perspectives How Regulation will Reshape FX Markets, Part 2,
31st
July 2012
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc
Page 15
EFTA01464334
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
It is
also unclear as to whether the 'issuance principle' outlined in the
European Commission's proposal would apply to the euro currency and
eurodenominated
products. The ECB, which issues euro currency, is established in
Frankfurt, one of the participating member states. If it were, the FTT would
have far reaching effects across global financial markets given the euro's
status as the world's second most traded currency and the importance of
participating member states to the global economy.
Final thoughts
As of the time of writing, there is uncertainty surrounding the future of
the FTT.
In April, participating member states wrote to the European Commission to ask
for clarification on a number of key issues including how collection of
revenues
would work and how key terms such as 'purchase and sale' and 'netting and
settlement,' were defined.
The decision by the European Council to permit participating member states to
enact the FTT using 'enhanced cooperation' is now subject to a legal
challenge
by the UK government. In addition, a number of European policymakers have
expressed concerns over the tax, particularly concerning its impact on bank
funding and credit.15
Most recently, the media have reported that the FTT is
unlikely to be enacted in its current form. Last month, European Commission
officials have acknowledged that implementation of the tax by January 2014
now looks 'less likely.'16
In its current form, the FTT would have major adverse consequences for the FX
markets. It would dramatically increase transaction costs for market
participants. This could result in the effective closure of the non-spot FX
market in participating member states.
The FTT would result in substantial costs to the real economy. The tax would
be passed on to end users of FX derivatives, reducing corporate
competitiveness and acting as a tax on extra-EMU exports. The FTT would also
result in less liquid markets, impair market efficiency and widen bid -offer
spreads.
The design of the FTT may make it incompatible with existing global efforts
at
financial reform. By discouraging forms of financial intermediation, the FTT
potentially runs counter to the goals of US and European legislation, which
are
to encourage greater clearing and margining of transactions in order to
reduce
credit risk. Ultimately, we hope that policy makers will take note of these
considerations, and in particular take in the interests of non-financial
corporations, pension funds and the real economy in their decision making
process.
EFTA01464335
or examp e, un es ank President Jens Weidmann in a speech in Dresden,
24th
Banque de France Governor Christian Noyer, in remarks made to journalists
28th
16 Reuters Article, 'Europe Plans Major Scaling Back of Financial Trading
Tax,' 30th
Page 16
April 2013 and
May 2013
May 2013
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464336
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Legal Disclaimer: This article is intended to provide background information
only. Readers
should consult with their legal and compliance advisers as to the potential
impact of any
regulatory provisions noted in this article upon their respective businesses.
The author would like to thank Bilal Hafeez and Matt Holmes for their help in
writing this report.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 17
EFTA01464337
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
G10 FX Valuation Monitor: Lines in the Sand*
Figure 1: The euro looks expensive and the dollar cheap
10
20
30
40
-20
-10
0
Source: DB FX Research
29.0
25.8
19.8
15.0
12.0 10.5
7.0
-2.3
-8.5
-12.3
NZD AUD CHF CAD EUR NOK GBP SEK USD JPY
Source: DB FX Research
Figure 2: The dollar is 9% cheap to fair value
100
110
120
130
60
70
80
90
USDTWI
PPP USDTWI
20% Band
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
Figure 3: EUR/USD: The euro is expensive though
remains within the 20% threshold _
Figure 4: USD/JPY: _The yen is very cheap to fair value
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
EFTA01464338
1.6
EUR/USD
PPP EUR/USD
20% Band
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
100
150
200
250
300
350
50
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
20% Band
USD/JPY
PPP USD/JPY
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Source: DB FX Research
Figure 5: USD/GBP: GBP is expensive
Figure 6: USD/CHF: as well as CHF
0.25
0.35
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.75
0.85
0.95
20% Band
USD/GBP
PPP USD/GBP
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
0.25
0.35
0.45
0.55
0.65
EFTA01464339
0.75
0.85
0.95
0.8
1.3
1.8
2.3
2.8
3.3
3.8
20% Band
USD/CHF
PPP USD/CHF
0.7
1.2
1.7
2.2
2.7
3.2
3.7
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
*Our measure of relative PPP is calculated using long-term averages from
Jan-80 to Dec-04 and deflating by monthly CPI differentials. We refer to
current spot rates as "cheap" or "expensive" with explicit reference to this
measure of fair valuation; these statements are not intended in any way to be
"buy" or "sell" recommendations.
Page 18
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464340
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Figure 7: USD/CAD: CAD overvaluation is being
unwound
Figure 8: USD/AUD: AUD is very expensive, beyond 20%
threshold
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
20% Band
USD/CAD
PPP USD/CAD
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.5
1.8
2.1
Source: DB FX Research
USD/AUD
20% Band
PPP USD/AUD
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.5
1.8
2.1
Figure 9: USD/NZD: .and so is NZD
Figure 10: EUR/JPY: The euro is very expensive against
the yen
0.5
1.0
EFTA01464341
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Source: DB FX Research
USD/NZD
20% Band
PPP USD/NZD
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
50
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
EUR/JPY
20% Band
PPP EUR/JPY
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Figure 11: EUR/GBP: Sterling is cheap against the euro
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Source: DB FX Research
EUR/GBP
20% Band
PPP EUR/GBP
EFTA01464342
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Figure 12: EUR/SEK: SEK is very cheap versus the euro
10
11
12
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
EUR/SEK
20% Band
PPP EUR/SEK
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
4
5
6
7
8
9
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 19
EFTA01464343
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Figure 13: EUR/CHF: CHF is expensive against the euro
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
EUR/CHF
20% Band
PPP EUR/CHF
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
Figure 14: EUR/CAD: CAD is close to fair value against
euro
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
EUR/CAD
20% Band
PPP EUR/CAD
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
Figure 15: AUD/NZD: NZD is fair value against AUD....
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
AUD/NZD
20% Band
EFTA01464344
PPP AUD/NZD
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Figure 16: CAD/NZD: ....and is expensive against CAD
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Source: DB FX Research
CAD/NZD
20% band
PPP CAD/NZD
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Figure 17: JPY/NZD: NZD is expensive against the yen
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
Source: DB FX Research
JPY/NZD
20% Band
PPPJPY/NZD
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Figure 18: GBP/JPY: JPY is very cheap against GBP
EFTA01464345
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0
73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05 09 13
Source: DB FX Research
GBP/JPY
20% Band
PPP GBP/JPY
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0
Page 20
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464346
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
FX Behavioral and Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates (BEER and FEER)*
Figure 1: USD-cross BEER and FEER valuations
10
20
30
40
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
29
24
20
15
10 10 8 8 7
-1
-5
-10
-15
-21
-26
-5
-6
11
8
4 2 2 1
2
-2 -2 -3 -4 -4 -4 -4
-1
-7 -9
-2
-6
-11 -11 -11 -12 -12 -13 -13 -14
-12
-21
-28 -28
-1
8 7
19
14
11
7
3
20
23
BEER
FEER
17
EFTA01464347
24
21
22
Source: DB FX Research
Figure 2: EUR/USD is a bit expensive vs. BEER FV
Figure 3: USD/JPY is now above fair value vs. BEER FV
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
EUR
BEER Fair Value
Spot
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
50.0
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: DB FX Research
8082848688909294969800 0204060810 12
Source: DB FX Research
JPY
BEER Fair Value
Spot
Figure 4: GBP/USD is very undervalued vs BEER FV
2.5
GBP
2.0
BEER Fair Value
Spot
Figure 5: USD BIS TWI is fair value vs. BEER FV
1.5
100.0
110.0
120.0
130.0
140.0
80.0
90.0
1.0
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: DB FX Research
Source: DB FX Research
*Sources: BIS, Bloomberg, Deutsche Bank. Notes: For details on model, see
Exchange Rate Perspectives, Jan-13. BEER model is relative PPP
adjusted for terms-of-trade and productivity effects.
EFTA01464348
(structural) surpluses/deficits. Over/undervaluation calculated off TWIs and
converted to USD-crosses using matrix algebra. EM graphs available upon
request.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 21
808284 86889092949698000204060810 12
BEER Fair Value
Spot
Relative FEER model is based on current account surpluses/deficits relative
to long-term
NZD
CHF
SGD
AUD
ILS
PHP
CAD
EUR
THB
CZK
BRL
MYR
IDR
HUF
COP
HKD
MXN
TRY
RUB
TWD
CNY
NOK
CLP
PLN
SEK
GBP
KRW
JPY
INR
ZAR
ARS
EFTA01464349
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Figure 6: USD/CAD is cheap vs. BEER FV
Figure 7: AUD/USD is quite expensive vs. BEER FV
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
CAD
BEER Fair Value
Spot
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: DB FX Research
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
AUD
BEER Fair Value
Spot
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: DB FX Research
Figure 8: NZD/USD is very expensive vs. BEER FV
Figure 9: USD/CHF is quite cheap vs. BEER FV
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
NZD
BEER Fair Value
Spot
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: DB FX Research
CHF
BEER Fair Value
Spot
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: Deutsche Bank
Figure 10: USD/NOK is a bit expensive vs. BEER FV
EFTA01464350
10.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: DB FX Research
NOK
BEER Fair Value
Spot
9.0
Figure 11: USD/SEK is expensive vs. BEER FV
12.0
SEK
BEER Fair Value
Spot
6.0
3.0
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: DB FX Research
Page 22
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
EFTA01464351
30 July 2013
Exchange Rate Perspectives: FX and the Financial Transaction Tax
Figure 12: EUR/USD is cheap vs. FEER FV
Figure 13: USD/JPY is very cheap vs. FEER FV
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
EUR
Relative FEER Fair Value
Spot
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
50.0
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: DB FX Research
8082848688909294969800 020406
Entities
0 total entities mentioned
No entities found in this document
Document Metadata
- Document ID
- 602e2e9d-0412-4e9f-8fd6-9f96b89bca8d
- Storage Key
- dataset_10/ceb0/EFTA01464308.pdf
- Content Hash
- ceb095b791ccadbb4f8e7d07b020121b
- Created
- Feb 4, 2026