DOJ-OGR-00021682.pdf

Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page35 of 93 22 global resolution' and other co-conspirators could have been prosecuted 'by any other [U.S. Attorney's] office in the country.')) Lacking support in the text of the NPA itself, Maxwell well attempts to show that the NPA applies here based on "the negotiations between defendant and prosecutor." Russo, 801 F.2d at 626. In particular, Maxwell claims that the negotiating history of the NPA shows that "[s]enior levels of Main Justice were directly involved in the negotiation and approval of the NPA, even to the extent that separate presentations were made to, and approval of the NPA was obtained from, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General." (Br.36). This assertion, however, mischaracterizes the record and further underscores the absence of any senior approvals in negotiating the NPA. The pages to which Maxwell cites describe activities after the NPA was signed, in which Justice Department officials in Washington refused to relieve Epstein of his obligations under the NPA. (Br. 36 (citing SA120-23, 129-44); A.143 ("The OPR report reflects that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General reviewed the NPA, but only after it was signed when Epstein tried to get out of it.")). Even then, however, those officials did not "approve" the NPA. (SA121 (statement by the Assistant Attorney General that she "did not review or approve the agreement either before or after it was signed"), 129 ("The Department, however, only reviewed the issue of federal jurisdiction and never reviewed the NPA or any specific provisions.")). Maxwell also cobbles together instances in which the USAO-SDFL and the FBI in Florida enlisted the assistance of other components of the federal government or considered acting outside DOJ-OGR-00021682