DOJ-OGR-00007068.pdf

--- Page 1 --- **Document Header** * **Case Number:** 1:20-cr-00330-PAE * **Document Number:** 465 * **Filing Date:** 11/15/21 * **Page Number:** 17 of 127 **Text Content** 1. Fourth, the confrontation clause of the Sixth 2. Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 3. meaningful cross-examination of government witnesses at trial. 4. United States v. Figueroa, 548 F.3d 222, (2d Cir. 2008). 5. Indeed, cross-examination is the principal means by which the 6. believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are 7. tested. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, (1974). 8. With this legal framework in mind, and in light of the 9. parties' extensive briefing on these issues, I think the 10. admissibility of some of the proposed evidence can be 11. determined now, but the admissibility of other evidence will 12. require additional facts and the context of trial to decide, 13. but I think it's important for me to give guidance. 14. Based on the papers before me, I provide the following 15. guidance: First, the Court will preclude affirmative evidence 16. by the defense that goes to the thoroughness of the 17. investigation. Although evidence that goes to the thoroughness 18. of the government's investigation can in some cases be relevant 19. and may in some cases be admissible, it's not relevant or 20. admissible if not probative of the defendant's guilt of the 21. crimes charged. 22. In its briefing, the defense relies heavily on Kyles 23. v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 4 (1995), in which the Supreme Court held 24. that an informant's statements to police were material for 25. purposes of Brady disclosures because the statements could be **Footer Information** * **Southern District Reporters, P.C.** * **Phone Number:** (212) 805-0300 * **Case Number:** DOJ-OGR-00007068