EFTA02384038.pdf

From: Office of -rage Rod-Larsen Sent: Monday, October 21, 2013 1:01 PM Subject: October 21 update 21October, 2013 Article 1. The National Interest Understanding Iran's Nuclear Breakout Options Thomas Saether<http://nationalinterest.org/profile/thomas-saether> Article 2. Financial Times Iran's diplomacy shows a recognition of its decline Katerina Dalacoura Article 3. Politico Iran's diplomatic thaw with the West Joel Rubin Article 4. NYT China's Arms Industry Makes Global Inroads Edward Wong<http://topics.nytimes.com/topireferenceitimestopics/people/w/edrard_wong/index.html> and Nicola Clark<http://topics.nytimes.comitopirefere=ceitimestopics/people/c/nicola_clark/index.html> Article 5. NYT An Exit Strategy From Afghanistan Editorial<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/opinionieditorialboard.html> Article 6. NYT Yes, Economics Is a Science Raj Chetty Article 1. The National Interest Understanding Iran's Nuclear Breakout Options Thomas Saetherchttp://nationalinterest.org/profile/thomas-saether> EFTA_R1_01401465 EFTA02384038 October 21, 2013 -- In the UN General Assembly on October 1, Israeli prime =inister Benjamin Netanyahu described Iran's strategy as to retain "suffi=ient nuclear material and sufficient nuclear infrastructure to race to the=bomb at a time it chooses to do so." In general, there are three main co=ditions that will need to be present in order for Iran to develop a nuclea= weapon. First, Iran would need the technical capacity to produce a critic.' mass of the uranium isotope U-235 (about 25 kg of uranium enriched to 90=) or the plutonium isotope Pu-239 (about 8 kg of weapons-grade plutonium),=develop a detonation mechanism, and a delivery method. Secondly, Iran woul= need to make a political decision to militarize the nuclear program. And =hird, no external actor must succeed with halting, delaying or destroying =he nuclear program with neither military nor other means. The U.S. and Isr=el are the only two countries that have signaled willingness to conduct a =ilitary operation against Iran's nuclear program. Given the first two conditions, one critical question should be examined to=derive Iran's strategy to "race to the bomb at a time it chooses to do s=": How can Iran reduce the probability that a military operation would s=cceed (or even undertaken) after it has made the decision to break out for=the bomb? Iran can reduce the expected time frame between when the militarization pro=ess begins and when a nuclear bomb is produced, thereby reducing the time =vailable to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western interligence agencies to detect the militarization and for political decision m=kers to undertake actions to stop it. Iran can reduce the time frame neede= to acquire critical mass of enriched uranium to a minimum by stockpiling = large amount of uranium enriched to a level of near 20% and install more =dvanced and effective centrifuges. A small time frame would also have an i=ternal effect on the Iranian decision-making and decision-undertaking. Whe= the time from breakout to bomb is large, it is difficult to keep knowledg= of the breakout secret within a limited group. It would then be time avai=able for oppositionists in the regime (or workers at the facilities) to mo=ilize against the decision (or alert external actors). The opposite would =e the case when the time frame is limited. A successful Israeli military operation would in part rely on the ability t= achieve surprise. However, since an Israeli operation might be triggered =y the breakout itself, Iran would be able to dictate the terms. By reducin= the time needed to produce critical mass of enriched uranium and coordina=e the breakout with a larger military exercise, Israel's ability to achiev= the element of surprise would be reduced—and Israel would thus have an =ncentive to launch an attack before the breakout. Iran can also reduce the utility of an intervention by finishing the heavy-=ater reactor in Arak and start operating it. A fully operational plutonium=producing reactor would be a politically sensitive target for any interven=ionist, since the civilian—and thus political—costs of bombing such a =eactor would be quite large. If a military operation would leave the Arak =eactor intact and only focus on the three other critical facilities in Nat=nz, Fordow and Isfahan, Iran could use the reactor for producing material =or a nuclear bomb in the aftermath of the attack. In practice, this means =hat if a military operation is to be deployed, it should be conducted befo=e the Arak reactor is operative. The attack on the Syrian al-Kibar reactor=was reportedly triggered by similar concerns. Given the prize of achieving=the immunizing effect of an operative reactor, Iran might be willing to te=porarily suspend the enrichment program (or part of it) if a military inte=vention seems probable. In particular, a negotiated agreement where Iran i= required to suspend its enrichment activity in Natanz and Fordow might be.acceptable for the regime as long as the construction of the heavy water r=actor in Arak is allowed to continue. An agreement of this kind might also=provide Iran with more time to continue possible research concerning a det=nation mechanism, warhead design, and delivery method. However, an interve=tionist would have an incentive to launch an attack before the reactor is =perational, which means that its start-up date might trigger an operation =gainst the other facilities as well. Iran's strategists are probably think=ng hard about how to make the reactor operative without anybody finding ou= until after its start-up date. Iran would have an incentive to delay the construction of a reprocessing fa=ility. Such a facility would be necessary to extract plutonium from the fu=l rods used in the reactor. Iran has currently no known such facility with=the capability to serve the Arak reactor, but would have an incentive to c=nstruct it after the reactor has gone critical. Constructing it now would =ust cause unnecessary friction with Western countries due to its probable =ilitary purpose. Iran would also have an incentive to delay the breakout if it expects new d=fensive military means to be acquired or developed within a certain time f=ame. New acquisitions would increase Iran's general defensive capacity, th=reby reducing an interventionist's ability to achieve a successful militar= operation. Iran has previously voiced its interest in the Russian-made S-=00 anti-aircraft battery, though the Russians chose to halt the transfer o= the system. Iran could be expected to delay the breakout if Russia would =ignal renewed interest in transferring this system or similar ones. 2 EFTA_R1_01401466 EFTA02384039 Lastly, Iran could choose to delay the breakout until the Syrian civil war =s stabilized. Hezbollah, its main proxy against Israel, is currently parti=ipating in the conflict on the regime's side. Should Israel undertake a mi=itary operation against the nuclear facilities at the current time, Iran w=uld need to decide whether Hezbollah should focus on the Syrian civil war =r a reprisal attack on Israel. By delaying the breakout until Hezbollah on=e again can focus its firepower on its southern enemy, Iran's deterrence v=s-a-vis Israel would be restored. If Iran's goal is to have the ability to produce nuclear weapons sometime i= the future, it has several incentives to make concessions in the ongoing =egotiations with the P5+1 countries. Careful thought should be given to wh=t Iran's breakout strategy might be—and how to obstruct it. Thomas Saether is a Norwegian security analyst specializing in Middle Easte=n affairs. He is a post-graduate of the MA program in Security Studies at =el Aviv University. Article 2. Financial Times Iran's diplomacy shows a recognition of its decline Katerina Dalacoura October 20 - Iran's positive attitude in its negotiations with the US, Br=tain, France, Germany, China and Russia over its nuclear programme marks a=clear shift in policy. This welcome development, seen during the past week in talks in Geneva, fol=ows Tehran's willingness to go along with the Russian-initiated deal on =hemical weapons in Syria — where Iran is backing the Assad regime. The l=lamic Republic appears to be softening its longstanding policies in favour=of a more conciliatory approach. The shift is caused by the country's lo=g-term decline in the Middle East — and Tehran's recognition that it m=st act on this decline. Iran's stance will hold the key to a number of i=terlocking regional conflicts, so identifying its cause helps shape policy=responses to it. High quality global journalism requires investment. Pleas= share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste t=e article. If an agreement with Iran does come to pass, many will argue th=t economic sanctions, imposed by the UN Security Council, the EU and the U=, have achieved their objective. President Hassan Rouhani was elected this=year with a mandate to ease the economic plight of his people. Ali Khamene=, the supreme leader, has at least partly conceded that the country needs =o achieve this by proffering an olive branch to the international communit=, and the US in particular. But the economic factor is only part of a bigg=r picture. Iran is slowly but perceptibly losing the struggle for power in the Middle =ast. The messages it has propagated in various forms since the 1979 revolu=ion are sounding tired and losing popularity at home and abroad. Its attem=ts to lead anti- western and anti-Israeli resistance fail to excite as they=used to. The Sunni-Shia conflict, which now seems to permeate the politics=of the region, has reduced Shia Iran to the status of a sectarian power. A=atollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution whose vision was o= Iran at the forefront of the entire Islamic world, would be turning in hi= grave. The Assad regime is being shaken to its foundations. If it falls, the core =f Iran regional policy — which rests on its decades-long alliance with S=ria — will disintegrate. Admittedly, Iran's position in Nouri al-Malik='s Iraq is assured — although that regime is being rocked by an almost=daily string of murderous attacks. But Iran's failing fortunes in the region should not be gauged only in ma=erial terms. Its bid for regional leadership has never rested solely on su=h crude measures. At its core was a self-appointed role as Islamic champio= of the anti- western camp, forged in the 1979 revolution. It is on this mo=t crucial ideological front that Iran is losing out. The Arab uprisings of 2011 revealed this most poignantly to anyone in Tehra= who cared to look. When the revolts broke out, the Iranian leadership hop=d that they signified a popular turn to Islamism as they understood it. Ho=ever, it soon became clear that the rebellious youth were neither driven b= an anti-western animus nor by a desire for an Islamist system. In Egypt a=d Tunisia, Islamist movements capitalised on the fall of presidents Hosni =ubarak and Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali. However, even in these countries (espe=ially Egypt), their popularity declined rapidly. As the impact of the Arab uprisings reverberated through the Middle East, t=e Islamic Republic continued to lose out. The Assad regime's brutal tact=cs have delegitimised it in the eyes of many in the region, even those who=had sympathised with its longstanding anti-western, anti-Israeli stand. Hi=bollah's support of the Assad regime has similarly dented its legitimacy= Gone are the days when Hassan Nasrallah, its secretary-general, was the h=ro of the Arab street — 3 EFTA_R1_01401467 EFTA02384040 Sunni and Shia — for his position at the forefront of the struggle against Israel. If anyone has taken over that role, at=least until recently, it is Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime ministe=. Iran's appeal has been tainted by the brutal tactics of its allies, in=Damascus and Beirut, who may remain strong materially but have lost out in=terms of image and ideas. The long-term decline of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East presents a= opportunity for peace in the region, particularly in Syria. However, when=it comes to the nuclear issue, it may prove a double-edged sword: opting f=r nuclear weapons can be seen as the only way to avoid being pushed into a=corner. Preventing this scenario depends on the skill of the negotiating t=ams in Geneva and, ultimately, on the ability of the administration of US =resident Barack Obama to overcome resistance by Congress and offer a meani=gful deal to Tehran. The writer is an associate professor of international relations at the Lond=n School of Economics. Article 3. Politico Iran's diplomatic thaw with the West Joel Rubin October 20 - Congratulations, Congress. Your Iran strategy is working. Now =hat? The diplomatic thaw between Iran and the West is advancing, and faster than=most of us had imagined. This is the result of years of painstaking effort= by the Obama administration and lawmakers to pressure the Islamic Republi= into deciding whether it's in Iran's interest to pursue diplomacy or =o continue suffering under crushing economic sanctions and international i=olation. Now that Iran has made a clear decision to engage seriously in di=lomatic negotiations with the West over its nuclear program, its intention= should be tested. Members of Congress should be open to seizing this oppo=tunity by making strategic decisions on sanctions policy. The economic san=tions against Iran that are in place have damaged the Iranian economy. A credible military threat — with more than 40,000 American troops in the Pe=sian Gulf — stands on alert. International inspectors are closely monito=ing Iran's every nuclear move. Iran has not yet made a decision to build=a bomb, does not have enough medium-enriched uranium to convert to weapons=grade material for one bomb and has neither a workable nuclear warhead nor=a means to deliver it at long ranges. If Iran were to make a dash for a bo=b, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that it would take roughly on= to two years to do so. Congress, with its power to authorize sanctions relief, plays a crucial rol= in deciding whether a deal will be achieved. This gives Congress the oppo=tunity to be a partner in what could potentially be a stunning success in =dvancing our country's security interests without firing a shot. Consider the alternative: If the administration negotiates a deal that Congress blocks, and Congress becomes a spoiler, Iran will most likely continue=to accelerate its nuclear program. Then lawmakers would be left with a sta=k choice: either acquiesce to an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program and=a potential Iranian bomb or endorse the use of force to attempt to stop it= Most military experts rate the odds of a successful bombing campaign low =nd worry that failed strikes would push Iran to get the bomb outright. Ira= and the United States need a political solution to this conflict. Now is =he time to test the Iranians at the negotiating table, not push them away. Congress is also being tested, but the conventional wisdom holds that lawma=ers won't show the flexibility required to make a deal. Such thinking mi=ses the political volatility just beneath the surface: Americans simply do='t support another war in the Middle East, as the congressional debate o=er Syria made crystal clear. Would they back much riskier military action =n Iran? Fortunately for Congress, President Barack Obama was agile enough =o seize the diplomatic route and begin to eliminate Syria's chemical wea=ons. These results are advancing U.S. security interests. And members of C=ngress breathed a collective sigh of relief as well as they didn't have =o either vote to undercut the commander in chief on a security issue or st=ck a finger in the eye of their constituents. The same can happen on Iran. By pursuing a deal, Obama can provide Congress=with an escape hatch, where it won't have to end up supporting unpopular=military action or have to explain to its constituents why it failed to bl=ck an Iranian bomb. A verifiable deal with Iran that would prevent it from=acquiring a nuclear weapon would require sanctions relief from Congress. B=t that's an opportunity to claim victory, not a burden. And it would mak= Congress a partner with the president on a core security issue. Congress =ould then say, with legitimacy, that its tough sanctions on Iran worked =97 and did so without starting another unpopular American war in the Middl= East. 4 EFTA_R1_01401468 EFTA02384041 Isn't it time Congress had a win, for once? Joel Rubin is director of policy and government affairs at the Ploughshares=Fund. Article 4. NYT China's Arms Industry Makes Global Inroads Edward Wong<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/w/ed=ard_wong/index.html> and Nicola Clark<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/refere=ce/timestopics/people/c/nicola_clark/index.html> October 20, 2013 -- Beijing — From the moment Turkey announced plans two =ears ago to acquire a long-range missile defense system, the multibillion-=ollar contract from a key NATO member appeared to be an American company=92s to lose. For years, Turkey's military had relied on NATO-supplied Patriot missiles= built by the American companies Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, to defend i=s skies, and the system was fully compatible with the air-defense platform= operated by other members of the alliance. There were other contenders for the deal, of course. Rival manufacturers in=Russia and Europe made bids. Turkey rejected those — but not in favor of=the American companies. Its selection last month of a little-known Chinese=defense company, China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corp<http://cmc.g=nertec.com.cn/enk oration<http://cmc.genertec.com.cn/en/>, stunned the mi=itary-industrial establishment in Washington and Brussels. The sale was especially unusual because the Chinese missile defense system,=known as the HQ-9, would be difficult to integrate with existing NATO equi=ment. China Precision is also subject to sanctions from the United States =or selling technologies that the United States says could help Iran, Syria=and North Korea develop unconventional weapons. A State Department spokesw=man said this month that American officials had expressed to the Turkish g=vernment "serious concerns" about the deal, which has not yet been sig=ed. Industry executives and arms-sales analysts say the Chinese probably beat o=t their more established rivals by significantly undercutting them on pric=, offering their system at $3 billion. Nonetheless, Turkey's selection o= a Chinese state-owned manufacturer is a breakthrough for China, a nation =hat has set its sights on moving up the value chain in arms technology and=establishing itself as a credible competitor in the global weapons market. "This is a remarkable win for the Chinese arms industry," said Pieter W=zeman, a senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research l=stitute<http://www.sipri.orgh, which tracks arms sales and transfers. In the past, Chinese companies have been known mainly as suppliers of small=arms, but that is changing quickly. From drones to frigates to fighter jet=, the companies are aggressively pushing foreign sales of high-tech hardwa=e, mostly in the developing world. Russian companies are feeling the great=st pressure, but American and other Western companies are also increasingl= running into the Chinese. "China will be competing with us in many, many domains, and in the high e=d," said Marwan Lahoud, the head of strategy and marketing at European A=ronautic Defense and Space<http://www.eads.com/eads/int/en.html>, Europe=92s largest aerospace company. "Out of 100 campaigns, that is, the comme=cial prospects we have, we may have the Chinese in front of us among the c=mpetitors in about three or four. They have the full range of capabilities= and they are offering them." The Stockholm institute released a report this year on global weapons trans=ers that found the volume of Chinese conventional weapons exports — whic= included high-end aircraft, missiles, ships and artillery — jumped by 1=2 percent from 2008 to 2012, compared with the previous five years. Pakist=n is the leading customer. The institute now estimates that China is the f=fth-largest arms exporter in the world, ahead of Britain. From 2003 to 200=, China ranked eighth. China's foreign arms sales are also rising fast in dollar terms. Accordin= to IHS Jane's<http://www.janes.comh, an industry consulting and analys=s company, Chinese exports have nearly doubled over the past five years to=$2.2 billion, surpassing Canada and Sweden, and making China the world's=eighth-largest exporter by value. The total global arms trade revenue in 2012 was estimated to be $73.5 billi=n, and the United States had a 39 percent share, according to IHS Jane's= 5 EFTA_R1_01401469 EFTA02384042 Xu Guangyu, a retired major general in the People's Liberation Army and d=rector of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, said in an i=terview that the push by Chinese companies to develop and sell higher-tech=arms was "a very normal phenomenon." "In arms manufacturing, China is trying to increase the quality and reduc= price," he said. "We're driven by competition." Mr. Xu said that besides pricing, Chinese companies had another advantage: =hey do not "make demands over other governments' status and internal p=licies." He added: "Our policy of noninterference applies here. Whoeve= is in the government, whoever has diplomatic status with us, we can talk =bout arms sales with them." Chinese officials know that China's encroachment on Western-dominated mil=tary markets raises concerns. When asked about the missile-defense sale to=Turkey, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said, "China's military=exports do no harm to peace, security and stability," and do not "inte=fere with the internal affairs of recipient countries." The largest Chinese arms production companies, all state-owned, declined in=erview requests. Their finances are opaque, though there are some statisti=s on their Web sites and in the state news media. The China North Industries Group Corporation<http://www.norinco.com/c1024/e=glish/>, or the Norinco Group, said on its Web site that its profits in 20=2 were 9.81 billion renminbi, or about $1.6 billion, a 45 percent increase=from 2010. Its revenues in 2012 were 361.6 billion renminbi, or about $59 =illion, a 53 percent increase over 2010. Another company, the China South =ndustries Group Corporation, or CSGC, said on its Web site that it had pro=its of about $1billion in 2011, on revenue of about $45 billion, both big=increases over 2008. China's investment has been heaviest in fighter planes — both tradition=l and stealth versions — as well as in jet engines, an area in which Chi=a had until now been dependent on Western and Russian partners, said Guy A=derson, a senior military industry analyst in London with IHS Jane's. "China has been throwing billions and billions of dollars at research and=development," he said. "They also have a strategy of using the gains t=ey get from foreign partnerships to benefit their industrial sector. So th=y should not have any trouble catching up with their Western competitors o=er the medium term, and certainly over the long term." He estimated that China was still a decade away from competing head-to-head=with Western nations on the technology itself. But Chinese equipment is pr=ced lower and could become popular in emerging markets, including in Afric=n and Latin American nations. "We are in an era of 'good enough' — the 90 percent solution that w=ll do the job at the best possible price," Mr. Anderson said. "In some=cases, that may even mean buying commercial equipment, upgrading it slight=y and painting it khaki." New customers for Chinese equipment include Argentina, which in 2011 signed=a deal with the Chinese company Avicopter to build Z-11 light helicopters =nder license. Mass production for the Argentine military began this year, =nd 40 helicopters are expected to be built over the next several years. Th= value of the contract has not been made public. Companies selling drones, another focal point in the Chinese arms industry,=are ubiquitous at arms and aviation shows. At an aviation exposition in Be=jing in late September, one Chinese company, China Aerospace Science and T=chnology Corporation<http://english.spacechina.com/n16421/index.html>, had=on display a model of a CH-4 reconnaissance and combat drone, with four motels of missiles next to it. Though the drone had been "designed for export," one company representa=ive said, there were no foreign buyers yet. The company was still being li=ensed by the government to sell the aircraft abroad. He added that the dro=e was not yet up to par with some foreign models, and that the engine was = foreign make, though other parts — including the missiles — had been =eveloped in China. The Aviation Industry Corporation of China<http://www.avic2.com/>, or AVIC,=had on display a model of a Wing Wong, the best-known Chinese drone expor=, which sells for about $1million, less than similar American and Israeli=drone models. An article in People's Daily said the export certificate f=r the Wing Loong, or Pterodactyl, was approved in June 2009, and it was fi=st exported in 2011. At the Paris Air Show in June, Ma Zhiping, president of the China National =ero-Technology Import and Export Corporation, told Global Times, another s=ate-run newspaper, that "quite a few countries" had bought the Wing lo=ng<http://theaviationist.com/2012/11/20/pterodactylM.Uml8gBCslBk>, which =esembles the American-made Predator. Clients were in Africa and Asia, he s=id. Two fighter jets made by Chinese companies are being closely watched by ind=stry analysts and foreign companies for their export potential. One is She=yang Aircraft's J-31<http://theaviationist.com/2012/09/16/j-31M.UmL9FhC=JBk>, a 6 EFTA_R1_01401470 EFTA02384043 fighter jet that Chinese officials say has stealth abilities. 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