Epstein Files

041.pdf

ia-court-doe-no-3-v-epstein-no-9ː08-cv-80232-(sd-fla-2008) Court Filing 1.1 MB Feb 13, 2026
Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 Page 1 of 10 JANE DOE NO. 3 Plaintiff, V. JEFFREY EPSTEIN Defendant. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: 08-CV-80232-MARRA-JOHNSON I ----------- DEFENDANT'S, EPSTEIN, MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT DIRECTED TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT Defendant, JEFFERY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves to dismiss and for more definite statement of Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 3's Amended Complaint. Rules 12(b)(6}, and 12(e) and (f}, Fed.R.Civ.P. (2008). In support of his motion, Defendant states: Introduction Defendant is filing similar motions to dismiss and for more definite statement directed to the Amended Complaints filed against Defendant in this Court in JANE DOE NO. 2, JANE DOE NO. 3, JANE DOE NO. 4 and JANE DOE NO. 5. The motions are directed to the Counts for "Sexual Assault and Battery," and "Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422" in each of the respective complaints. However, there are distinctions in the four motions filed based on the complaint allegations. For example, Defendant challenges the Plaintiffs' allegations as to assault in all four actions, and challenges the battery allegations in JANE DOE NOS. 2 and 3, but not in JANE DOE NOS. 4 and 5. Defendant moves to dismiss the §2422 count in all four actions. Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 Page 2 of 10 Case No. CV-80232-Marra-Johnson Page No. 2 Motion 1. Counts I and Ill of the Amended Complaint are required to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b )(6). Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient factual allegations in the Counts and instead alleges labels and conclusions, and an attempted formulaic recitation of the elements in each Count. 2. In the alternative, Defendant seeks more definite statement of Count I and Ill. In Count I, the Plaintiff is required to more definitely allege what was done to her; what EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff; what was the intentional offensive or harmful contact in pleading the elements of assault and battery. In Count Ill, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state the underlying factual allegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 U.S.C. §2422(b) and §2455. Rule 12(e). See discussion of law below herein. 3. Also, Plaintiff's reference in Count Ill to 28 U.S.C. §2255, pertaining to habeas corpus proceedings is required to be stricken as immaterial. Rule 12(f). Plaintiff is required to more definitely state what statutory provision she is relying on. Rule 12 (e). WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Counts I and Ill, strike the immaterial statutory reference, and require Plaintiff to more definitely plead the underlying elements of her claims. Supporting Memorandum of Law Standard on Rule 12(b){6) Motion To Dismiss As established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), a motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id, at 1974. Although the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 Page 3 of 10 Case No. CV-80232-Marra-Johnson Page No. 3 in the complaint must state "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id, at 1965. Further, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. On a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded allegations of plaintiffs complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist.,446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir.2006). Significantly, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly abrogated the often cited observation that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove not set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme Court rejected the notion that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery." Id. As explained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp., supra at 1664-65: While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b )(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, ibid.; Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation"). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) ("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 Page 4 of 10 Case No. CV-80232-Marra-Johnson Page No. 4 doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (" Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . .. dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely"). Pursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading "is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response." The motion is required to point out the defects and the desired details. Id. Count I - "Sexual Assault and Battery" is subject to dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to

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court-records/ia-collection/Doe No. 3 v. Epstein, No. 9ː08-cv-80232 (S.D. Fla. 2008)/Doe No. 3 v. Epstein, No. 9ː08-cv-80232 (S.D. Fla. 2008)/041.pdf
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Feb 13, 2026