041.pdf
ia-court-doe-no-3-v-epstein-no-9ː08-cv-80232-(sd-fla-2008) Court Filing 1.1 MB • Feb 13, 2026
Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 Page 1 of 10
JANE
DOE
NO.
3
Plaintiff,
V.
JEFFREY
EPSTEIN
Defendant.
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
SOUTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
FLORIDA
CASE
NO.:
08-CV-80232-MARRA-JOHNSON
I
-----------
DEFENDANT'S,
EPSTEIN,
MOTION
TO
DISMISS
AND
MOTION
FOR
MORE
DEFINITE
STATEMENT
DIRECTED
TO
PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Defendant,
JEFFERY
EPSTEIN,
by
and
through
his
undersigned
counsel,
moves
to
dismiss
and
for
more
definite
statement
of
Plaintiff
JANE
DOE
NO.
3's
Amended
Complaint.
Rules
12(b)(6},
and
12(e)
and
(f},
Fed.R.Civ.P.
(2008).
In
support
of
his
motion,
Defendant
states:
Introduction
Defendant
is
filing
similar
motions
to
dismiss
and
for
more
definite
statement
directed
to
the
Amended
Complaints
filed
against
Defendant
in
this
Court
in
JANE
DOE
NO.
2,
JANE
DOE
NO.
3,
JANE
DOE
NO.
4 and
JANE
DOE
NO.
5.
The
motions
are
directed
to
the
Counts
for
"Sexual
Assault
and
Battery,"
and
"Coercion
and
Enticement
to
Sexual
Activity
in
Violation
of
18
U.S.C.
§2422"
in
each
of
the
respective
complaints.
However,
there
are
distinctions
in
the
four
motions
filed
based
on
the
complaint
allegations.
For
example,
Defendant
challenges
the
Plaintiffs'
allegations
as
to
assault
in
all
four
actions,
and
challenges
the
battery
allegations
in
JANE
DOE
NOS.
2 and
3,
but
not
in
JANE
DOE
NOS.
4 and
5.
Defendant
moves
to
dismiss
the
§2422
count
in
all
four
actions.
Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 Page 2 of 10
Case
No.
CV-80232-Marra-Johnson
Page
No.
2
Motion
1.
Counts
I
and
Ill
of
the
Amended
Complaint
are
required
to
be
dismissed
for
failure
to
state
a claim
upon
which
relief
can
be
granted.
Rule
12(b
)(6).
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
allege
sufficient
factual
allegations
in
the
Counts
and
instead
alleges
labels
and
conclusions,
and
an
attempted
formulaic
recitation
of
the elements
in
each
Count.
2.
In
the
alternative,
Defendant
seeks
more
definite
statement
of
Count
I
and
Ill.
In
Count
I,
the
Plaintiff
is
required
to
more
definitely
allege
what
was
done
to
her;
what
EPSTEIN
said
and
did,
if anything,
to
create
fear
and
apprehension
in
Plaintiff;
what
was
the
intentional
offensive
or
harmful
contact
in
pleading
the
elements
of
assault
and
battery.
In
Count
Ill,
Plaintiff
is
required
to
more
definitely
state
the
underlying
factual
allegations
to
support
her
claim
as
set
forth
in
the
statute,
18
U.S.C.
§2422(b)
and
§2455.
Rule
12(e).
See
discussion
of law
below
herein.
3.
Also,
Plaintiff's
reference
in
Count
Ill
to
28
U.S.C.
§2255,
pertaining
to
habeas
corpus
proceedings
is
required
to
be
stricken
as
immaterial.
Rule
12(f).
Plaintiff
is
required
to
more
definitely
state
what
statutory
provision
she
is
relying
on.
Rule
12
(e).
WHEREFORE,
Defendant
respectfully
requests
that
this
Court
dismiss
Counts
I
and
Ill,
strike
the
immaterial
statutory
reference,
and
require
Plaintiff
to
more
definitely
plead
the
underlying
elements
of
her
claims.
Supporting
Memorandum
of
Law
Standard
on
Rule
12(b){6)
Motion
To
Dismiss
As
established
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
Bell
Atlantic
Corp.
V.
Twombly,
127
S.Ct.
1955
(2007),
a motion
to
dismiss
should
be
granted
if the
plaintiff
does
not
plead
"enough
facts
to
state
a claim
to
relief
that
is
plausible
on
its
face."
Id,
at
1974.
Although
the
complaint
need
not
provide
detailed
factual
allegations,
the
basis
for
relief
Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 Page 3 of 10
Case
No.
CV-80232-Marra-Johnson
Page
No.
3
in
the
complaint
must
state
"more
than
labels
and
conclusions,
and
a
formulaic
recitation
of
the
elements
of
a cause
of
action
will
not
do."
Id,
at
1965.
Further,
"[f]actual
allegations
must
be
enough
to
raise
a right
to
relief
above
the
speculative
level
...
on
the
assumption
that
all
the
allegations
in
the
complaint
are
true
(even
if doubtful
in
fact)."
Id.
On
a motion
to
dismiss,
the
well
pleaded
allegations
of
plaintiffs
complaint
are
taken
as
true
and
construed
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff.
M.T.V.
v.
DeKalb
County
Sch.
Dist.,446
F.3d
1153,
1156
(11th
Cir.2006).
Significantly,
the
Supreme
Court
in
Bell
Atlantic
Corp.
V.
Twombly
abrogated
the
often
cited
observation
that
"a
complaint
should
not
be
dismissed
for
failure
to
state
a
claim
unless
it appears
beyond
doubt
that
the
plaintiff
can
prove
not
set
of
facts
in
support
of
his
claim
that
would
entitle
him
to
relief."
Id,
(abrogating
and
quoting
Conley
v.
Gibson,
355
U.S.
41,
45-46,
78
S.Ct.
99,
102,
2 L.Ed.2d
80
(1957)).
The
Supreme
Court
rejected
the
notion
that
"a
wholly
conclusory
statement
of
claim
[can]
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss
whenever
the
pleadings
le[ave]
open
the
possibility
that
a plaintiff
might
later
establish
some
'set
of
[undisclosed]
facts'
to
support
recovery."
Id.
As
explained
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
Bell
Atlantic
Corp.,
supra
at
1664-65:
While
a complaint
attacked
by
a Rule
12(b
)(6)
motion
to
dismiss
does
not
need
detailed
factual
allegations,
ibid.;
Sanjuan
v.
American
Bd.
of
Psychiatry
and
Neurology,
Inc.,
40
F.3d
247,
251
(C.A.7
1994),
a plaintiffs
obligation
to
provide
the
"grounds"
of
his
"entitle[ment]
to
relief'
requires
more
than
labels
and
conclusions,
and
a formulaic
recitation
of
the
elements
of
a cause
of
action
will
not
do,
see
Papasan
v.
Allain,
478
U.S.
265,
286,
106
S.Ct.
2932,
92
L.Ed.2d
209
(1986)
(on
a motion
to
dismiss,
courts
"are
not
bound
to
accept
as
true
a
legal
conclusion
couched
as
a
factual
allegation").
Factual
allegations
must
be
enough
to
raise
a
right
to
relief
above
the
speculative
level,
see
5
C.
Wright
&
A.
Miller,
Federal
Practice
and
Procedure
§ 1216,
pp.
235-236
(3d
ed.2004)
(hereinafter
Wright
&
Miller)
("[T]he
pleading
must
contain
something
more
...
than
...
a statement
of
facts
that
merely
creates
a suspicion
[of]
a legally
cognizable
right
of
action"),
on
the
assumption
that
all
the
allegations
in
the
complaint
are
true
(even
if
Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 41 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 Page 4 of 10
Case
No.
CV-80232-Marra-Johnson
Page
No.
4
doubtful
in
fact),
see,
e.g.,
Swierkiewicz
v.
Sorema
N.
A.,
534
U.S.
506,
508,
n.
1,
122
S.Ct.
992,
152
L.Ed.2d
1 (2002);
Neitzke
v.
Williams,
490
U.S.
319,
327,
109
S.Ct.
1827,
104
L.Ed.2d
338
(1989)
("
Rule
12(b)(6)
does
not
countenance
.
..
dismissals
based
on
a judge's
disbelief
of
a complaint's
factual
allegations");
Scheuer
v.
Rhodes,
416
U.S.
232, 236,
94
S.Ct.
1683,
40
L.Ed.2d
90
(1974)
(a
well-pleaded
complaint
may
proceed
even
if it
appears
"that
a recovery
is
very
remote
and
unlikely").
Pursuant
to
Rule
12(e),
a party
may
move
for
more
definite
statement
of
a
pleading
to
which
a responsive
pleading
is
allowed
where
the
pleading
"is
so
vague
or
ambiguous
that
the
party
cannot
reasonably
frame
a response."
The
motion
is
required
to
point
out
the
defects
and
the
desired
details.
Id.
Count
I -
"Sexual
Assault
and
Battery"
is
subject
to
dismissal
as
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
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