EFTA01127903.pdf
dataset_9 pdf 1.0 MB • Feb 3, 2026 • 7 pages
EXHIBIT D
Black Family Partners,' L.P.
ADJUSTED BOOK VALUE
AS OF JUNE 7, 2007
Assets
Aggregate Fair
Market Value
Apollo Operating Group Interests
$851,700,000
Apollo Management Holdings, L.P.
$81,200,000
Apollo Principal Holdings II, L.P.
$37,500,000
Apollo Advisors IV, L.P.
$59,000,000
Apollo Advisors V, L.P.
5105.800,000
Apollo Advisors VI, L.P.
$63,700,000
Apollo Advisors VI (EH), L.P.'
Apollo Advisors V (EH Cayman), LP $25,100,000
Co•Investor Interests
$7,800,000
Apollo NC Co-Investors, LLC
Apollo Co-Investors III, LLC $7,200.000
Apollo Co-Investors IV, LLC $7,600,000
Apollo Co-Investors V, LLC $17,700,000
Apollo Co-Investors V (EH), LLC $6,700,000
Apollo Co-Investors VI (A), LLC $30,700,000
Apollo Co-Investors VI (EH-A), LP $3,350,000
$660,000
Apollo SOMA Co-Investors, LLC
Apollo Value Co•Investors, LLC $2,920,000
Total Assets $1 308 830 000
Liabilities & Equity
Total Liabilities $0
Total Equity $1,308,630,000
Total Liabilities and Equity $1,308,630,000
Adjusted Book Value $1,308,630.000
Investment Company! Lack of Control Discount 5.0% ($65,431,500)
Freely Tradable Value $1243,198.500
Pm Rata, Non-Controlling Partnership Interest 1% $12.431,985
Discount for Lack of Marketability 25% (53,107.996)
$9,323,989
Pro Rata, Fair Market Value of 1% Partners Interest
$9,300,000
Pro Rata, Fair Market Value of 1% Partners Interest, rounded
•The Fair Market Value pinned for Apollo Ai:Maori VI (EH) L.P. includes a Class A Infant hi AAA Associates, LP
EFTA01127903
Carlyn McCaffrey, Esq.
October 19, 2007
Page 53
• The lack consistency of reporting by alternative asset managers of private
equity and capital market funds, exacerbated by the fact that the some of the
guideline companies report based on guidelines applicable to the London
Stock Exchange versus stock exchanges monitored by the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") in the U.S.;
I • The Apollo Operating Group is an arbitrary aggregation, an entity that does
not legally exist and therefore the aggregate MVIC may not be fully
I representative of the MVIC if an entity that aggregated the companies of the
Apollo Operating Group;
I • Historic revenues of alternative asset manager such as the companies of the
Apollo Operating Group and the guideline companies have high volatility in
their revenue stream, which include as a source carried interest, i.e.
investment performance, which is typically only paid if investment
I
performance hurdles are met.
In conclusion, based on a review of the reasonableness test information presented in
Exhibit C and the analysis presented above, the aggregate MVIC of the Apollo
Operating Group was considered reasonable. Therefore, the individual MVIC values
concluded in the various June 2007 Reports were considered reasonable. Further,
the fair market values of BFP's interests in the entities concluded in the June 2007
Reports derived from the respective MVIC values were considered reasonable and
I used in the determination of BFP's ABV, discussed below.
G. Adjusted Book Value of BFP
I As discussed, a willing buyer would typically assess the value of BFP's capital at
least partly on the basis of its underlying assets. Thus, it is reasonable to utilize
ABV as a valuation method. By definition, this methodology should be based on
going concern value, not on the assumption of business liquidation. In reality,
though, holders of minority ownership interests can only receive their pro rata share
of their company's assets if it is liquidated.
Book value, unadjusted, is another name for the shareholders' equity account as it
I appears on the balance sheet. Again, ABV as a willing buyer would assess it
involves determining the value of each of the ABV Entities bundle of assets, less
its liabilities, but before transaction costs.
This analysis began with the each of BFP's June 7, 2007 balance sheet. Each
asset and liability was assessed to determine its estimated market value as of the
Valuation Date. As of the Valuation Date BFP held the following assets:
I
EMPIRE1/A1 O,O111N COMUIIANTS
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Carlyn McCaffrey, Esq.
October 19, 2007
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• The ABV Entities and DFE Entities, as described earlier in this report and
summarized in Table XIII above;
• A pro ram interest in AMH with a FMV of $851,700,000, as stated in
the AMH Report;
• A pro rata interest in APH2 with a FMV of $81,200,000, as stated in the
APH2 Report;
• A pro rata interest in AAIVLP with a FMV of $37,500,000, as stated in
the AAIVLP Report;
• A pro rata interest in AAVLP with a FMV of $59,000,000, as stated in
the AAVLP Report;
• A pro ram interest in AAVILP with a FMV of $105,800,000, as stated in
the AAVILP Report;
• A pro rata interest in AAVEHLP with a FMV of $25,100,000, as stated
in the AAVLP Report;
• A pro rata interest in AAVIEHLP with a FMV of $63,700,00019, rounded,
as stated in the AAVILP Report; and
• A pro ram interest in AC1V with a FMV of $7,600,000, as stated in the
ACIV Report.
BFP had no other assets or liabilities. Therefore, the ABV of the Partnership was
$1,306,730,000. This value represents a fully marketable controlling interest level
value in BFP. Therefore, considerations for issues of lack of control and lack of
marketability must be considered for a limited partners' non-controlling interest in
BFP. See Exhibit D.
H. Investment Company Discount for BFP
As discussed, the ICD is an adjustment that is typically appropriate because a
fractional equity owner has no ability to affect the investment decisions of his
holding company. The discount takes into consideration the portfolio risk of the
holding company. The ICD tends to be lower for a company with a diversified
portfolio of marketable securities. Higher discounts are generally found as
19 Includes AAVIEHLP's pro rata Class A ownership of AAAALP of $53,800,000.
EMPIRE VALUATION CONSULTANT%
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Carlyn McCaffrey, Esq.
i October 19, 2007
Page 55
diversification decreases. The highest level of 1CDs are associated with companies
which have portfolios comprised of non-diversified, high-risk, closely-held securities.
Again, the application of the ICD places BFP's members on a footing similar to
that of minority shareholders who own the voting shares of fully marketable closed-
end funds.
Therefore, to derive an 1CD for BFP's non-controlling partnership interests on a
fully marketable basis, a market approach (i.e., the guideline company method) was
utilized whereby a reasonably comparable group of publicly traded closed-end
investment funds was selected and the public pricing of these funds was used to
determine an ICD appropriate for BFP's non-controlling interests.
The samples were groups of: (1) CALY; (2) CAHY; (3) sector specific - private
equity and venture capital. The relevant statistics were presented in Table IV and
shown in more detail in Exhibits B-1 through B-3. BFP is most comparable to the
CALY sample which had a median implied ICD of 8.1%.
The table below presents a qualitative comparison of these investment companies
with BFP:
Table XV
Attributes of Closed-End Funds
Attributes of Closed-End Funds Ad ustment to BFP
Positive Negative Neutral
Portfolio Size X
Portfolio Diversification X
Liquidity of Underlying Investments X
Professionally Managed X
Summary Value: BFP as an investment holding company provides an addi ional
layer of investment management. BFP's LP's are therefore one additional step
removed from the underlying investment of any of the various Apollo funds and/or
fund management vehicles. Consideration was given to the fact that in deriving the
FMV of BFP's holding intermediate level ICD's were applied. Therefore,
concluding an ICD for BFP must be considered incremental. Based upon the above
analysis of BFP, a concluded ICD of 5% was selected as reasonable to use in
determining the aggregate marketable value of non-controlling partner's capital on a
fully marketable basis. See Exhibit D.
Using a 5% ICD, the aggregate marketable value of non-controlling partnership
interest in BFP is reasonably stated at $1,241,393,500 in aggregate [$1,306,730,000
EMPIRE VALUATION CONSULTANTS
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Carlyn McCaffrey, Esq.
October 19, 2007
Page 56
x (1 - 0.05)1 Therefore, a pro rata 1% non-controlling fully marketable
partnership interest in BFP was $12,413,935 ($1,241,393,500 x 1%). See Exhibit
D.
I. Discount for Lack of Marketability for BFP
.3 General discussions regarding lack of marketability were discussed in previous
sections with further supporting details provided in Addendum 4 and Addendum 5.
I In assessing the lack of marketability discount applicable to a non-managing
membership interest in BFP, a number of specific factors were considered, including
the following: (1) the impact of distributions; (2) information access and reliability;
(3) the potential of near-term liquidation; and (4) especially, any restrictions on
transfer and withdrawal.
I
• Impact of Distributions: Distributions are very important to an investor in
any closely-held company because they provide a means for him to receive
a return on investment without having to sell it. There is no guarantee of
distributions for tax purposes, and LPs would have no ability to influence
distributions. Distributions may be made in cash or in kind, with the value
I of in-kind distributions determined by the GP. The current situation
supports a higher lack of marketability discount.
• Information Access & Reliability: With regard to ownership rights, clearly
the GP has complete access to all pertinent information about the
Partnership's investments and prospects. Access to books and records is
I provided, but there is no requirement for annual statements to be prepared
and distributed. If prepared, there is no requirement that they be audited.
Furthermore, the Partnership's underlying assets, as well as the ownership
structure of the underlying assets, is complex. It is assumed, but not
specifically stated, that partners will be provided with information necessary
for income tax reporting purposes. Although information is available, the
I fact that no audited statements are required suggests that the reliability of
available information, and the ability of LPs to interpret it, is significantly
impaired relative to an investment in a publicly-traded company. These
I issues argue for a higher lack of marketability discount.
• Potential of Near-Term Liquidation: The chance of an LP recouping his
I investment through liquidation was not considered to be high during the near
future. Additionally, the Partnership did not have a specified term of
existence. The Partnership can only liquidate upon the occurrence of certain
events, which were previously detailed. Taking all of these factors into
EMPIREVALUATION CONSULTANTS
EFTA01127907
j
Carlyn McCaffrey, Esq.
October 19, 2007
Page 57
I account, the likelihood of BFP's near-term liquidation was not considered to
be great, thereby arguing for a higher discount for lack of marketability.
• Restrictions on Transfer & Withdrawal: BFP allows withdrawal from the
Partnership. The right of withdrawal tends to reduce a discount for lack of
marketability. However, the composition of BFP's assets is entirely
I privately-held companies and no cash or marketable securities. Not only
will the FMV of these assets need to be determined, but it is likely that
I assets will be distributed in kind. The fact that there is no market for
assets that would be distributed (i.e., not easy to convert to cash) could be
a material offsetting factor. There are no material restrictions on the
transfer of interests in the Partnership. Although consent of the GP is
required for a transferee to be admitted as an LP, the rights of an LP are
so limited that there does not appear to be much difference in owning an
I LP interest or an economic interest only. These restrictions support a lower
discount for lack of marketability.
In conclusion, some discount must be allocated against the pro ram fully marketable
I
value derived above in order to quantify the fair market value of non-managing
membership interests. After assessing all factors, it was determined that no less
than a 25% discount should be applied to the fully marketable value of a non-
managing membership interest in BFP. This is consistent with the fact that such an
interest lacks most voting rights and other elements of control, and its holder may
1 find it difficult, if not impossible, to transfer his interest in, or withdraw from, the
Partnership if such a course should become desirable.
I Therefore, in our opinion the pro rata fully marketable value of $12,413,935 for
the Interest should be reduced by 25% to account for the Interest's lack of
marketability under the terms of the BFP Agreement. This calculation results in a
I fair market value of $9,300,000, rounded, for a non-controlling partnership interest
in BFP ($12,413,935 x [1.00 - 0.25].) Again, please see Exhibit D.
I
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EMPIREVALUATION CMN,ULTANTS
EFTA01127908
I
Carlyn McCaffrey, Esq.
1 October 19, 2007
Page 58
I Valuation Summary
Given the foregoing review and analysis, and subject to the attached Statement of
1 Limiting Conditions, it is our opinion that the fair market value of a 1% non-
controlling limited partnership interest in Black Family Partners, L.P. is reasonably
stated as $9,300,000, as of June 7, 2007, for use by Leon Black for estate
I planning purposes.
Respectfully submitted,
Empire Valuation Consultants, LLC
I
I
David J. Thomps n
- Valuation Associate
I
I e
Andrea Hock, ASA
Managing Director
I r
Sco A. Nammacher, ASA, CFA
Managing Director
I
II
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EMPIREVAI UATJON CONStrl TAMS
EFTA01127909
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