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Columbia Business School Graham & Doddsville AT THE VERY CENTER OF SUS NESS An investment newsletter from the students of Columbia Business School Issue XXVI Winter 2016 Inside this issue: 25th Annual Craig Effron of Scoggin Capital Graham & Dodd Management Breakfast P. 3 Craig Effron P. 5 Craig Effron is the co-portfolio manager of Scoggin Capital Management, which he founded with partner Curtis Schenker in Jeff Gramm P. 19 1988. With approximately $1.75 billion in assets under management, Scoggin is a global, opportunistic, multi-strategy Shane Parrish P. 30 Craig Effron event-driven fund. Scoggin focuses on identifying fundamental Jon Salinas P. 39 long/short investments through three primary strategies including event driven equities with a catalyst, special situations, and distressed credit. Mr. Student Ideas P. 47 Effron began his career as a floor trader on the New York Mercantile Exchange and New York Commodity Exchange. Mr. Effron received a BS in Economics from the (Continued on page 5) Editors: Brendan Dawson Jeff Gramm '03 Shane Parrish MBA 2016 of Bandera of Farnam Scott DeBenedett Partners MBA 2016 Street Anthony Philipp Jeff Gramm manages Shane Parrish is MBA 2016 Bandera Partners, a the curator behind Brandon Cheong Jeff Gramm value hedge fund based Shane Parrish the popular in New York City. He Farnam Street MBA 2017 Blog and founder teaches Applied Value Eric Laidlow, CFA Investing at Columbia Business School of the Re:Think Workshops on MBA 2017 and wrote the upcoming book "Dear Innovation and Decision Making. (Contotsed on par I?) !Continued on page 30) Benjamin Ostrow MBA 2017 Jon Salinas '08 of Plymouth Lane Capital Management Visit us at: Jonathan Salinas founded Plymouth Lane in April 2013 and acts www.csimaAnfo as sole portfolio manager to the Fund. Prior to founding Plymouth Lane, Jonathan worked as an analyst at Marble Arch Heilbrunn : Investments, a long/short hedge fund manager. Before joining IurGraham&Docks Jon Salinas Marble Arch, Jonathan served as a consultant at ZBI Equities, a INO long/short hedge fund manager operated by Ziff Brothers Investments. Prior to ZBI, he was an analyst at Festina Lente Investment Management, a concentrated, value-oriented investment manager, and csima CI UMBIA SI UUL N I INVESTMENT worked as an analyst in capital markets and research divisions at UBS AG. !footnotd on page 39) MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION EFTA00300912  Page 2 Welcome to Graham & Doddsville We are pleased to bring you the walks through current Ideas investing. This year's breakfast 26th edition of Graham & including Famous Dave's featured a conversation with Doddsydre. This student-led in- (DAVE) and Star Gas Part- Philippe Laffont of Coatue Man- vestment publication of Colum- ners (SGU). agement moderated by Profes- bia Business School (CBS) is co- sor Bruce Greenwald of Co- sponsored by the Heilbrunn Shane Parrish discusses the lumbia Business School. Center for Graham & Dodd origination of Famam Street Investing and the Columbia Stu- and his focus on becoming a Lastly, we are proud to bring dent Investment Management better learner, as epitomized you pitches from current stu- Association (CSIMA). by Warren Buffett and Charlie dents at CBS. We feature final- Munger. Shane explains how ists from the Darden at Virginia Meredith Trivedi, the In this issue, we were fortunate these learnings apply to becom- Investing Competition. Colum- Heilbrunn Center Director. to speak with three investors ing a better investor and shares bia Business School's inaugural Meredith skillfully leads the and the founder of the popular his hopes for Farnam Street CSIMA Stock Pitch Challenge, Center. cultivating strong blog Farnam Street. and its readership. and Alpha Challenge at UNC relationships with some of Kenan-Flagler. the world's most experi- Craig Effron of Scoggin Capital Jonathan Salinas '08 of Plym- enced value investors. and Management discusses the evo- The three finalist ideas from outh Lane Capital discusses his creating numerous learning lution of his firm and his invest- our classmates include: Marc experiences with varied invest- opportunities for students ment approach from commodi- ment approaches and mentors Grow '17, Benjamin Ostrow interested in value invest- ties to the stock market. Craig and how his background lead- 'I?, and Evan Zehnal '17 — ing. The classes sponsored offers insights into his risk man- ing up to founding Plymouth Dexcom Inc (DXCM) Short; by the Heilbrunn Center agement mentality, challenges Lane has contributed to the Nielsen Fields '17, Joanna Vu are among the most heavily facing the investment manage- firm's world view and how he '17, and Adam Xiao '17 — demanded and highly rated ment community, and creative seeks to invest Jonathan also Quest Diagnostics (DGX) classes at Columbia Busi- ways to express investment shares current ideas DHX Short and Justin Hong '17, ness School. theses while managing against Media (DHXM) and Sequential Zachary Rioter '17, and Cristo- downside risk. He shares recent Brands Group (SQBG). bal Silva '17 — XPO Logistics case studies in the event-driven (XPO) Long. space and opportunities he cur- This issue also highlights pho- rently see in distressed credits tos from the 25th Annual Gra- As always, we thank our in Puerto Rico and energy. ham & Dodd Breakfast, held on interviewees for contributing October 9th, 2015 at the their time and insights not only Jeff Gramm '03 of Bandera Pierre Hotel in New York. This to us, but to the investment Partners discusses his book on event brings together alumni, community as a whole, and we activism "Dear Chairman: students, scholars, and practi- thank you for reading. Boardroom Battles and the Rise tioners for a forum on current of Shareholder Activism" and insights and approaches to - G&Dsville Editors Professor Bruce Greenwald. the Faculty Co-Director of the Heilbrunn Center. The Center sponsors the Value Investing Program. a rigor- ous academic curriculum for particularly committed stu- dents that is taught by some of the industry's best practi- tioners. HeilbrunriCen:er I, g-Graham&Dockl Keynote speaker Philippe Laffont Attendees gather at the 25th Annual addresses attendees at the 25th Annual Graham & Dodd Breakfast Graham & Dodd Breakfast csima (c‘ukto.A SIJt,:ta INVIESTPACNT MWAIMEINT ASKICIAIION EFTA00300913  Page 3 25th Annual Graham & Dodd Breakfast— October 9, 2015 at The Pierre Hotel Mario Gabelli '67 at the Graham & Dodd Breakfast with Professor Bruce Greenwald with Philippe Laffont at the keynote speaker Philippe Laffont Graham & Dodd Breakfast Sid and Helaine Lerner speak with Heilbrunn advisory Heilbrunn advisory board members David Greenspan '00, board member Tom Russo William von Mueffling '95, and Jenny Wallace '94 EFTA00300914  Page 4 +Columbia Business School The Heilbrunn Center for Graham & Dodd Investing GABELLI FUNDS SAVE THE DATE FORTHE 7th ANNUAL "From Graham to Buffett and Beyond" Dinner Friday,April 29, 2016 6 . to 9 . The Omaha Hilton 1001 Cass Street • Omaha, Nebraska Tickets will go on sale in March at EFTA00300915  Page .5 Craig Effron (Cononued (mm page 0 Wharton School of try my hand at trading right. Business of the University commodities. I said that if I of Pennsylvania. didn't do well, I would go to After about a year of managing law school a year later. I did Paul's money and these other Graham & Doddsville well. I learned a lot about life accounts. I realized that I liked (=): Could you tell us and about commodities and doing this more than trading about your background and trading. And I was fairly good commodities. I left and told how you came to investing? at it. everybody I was going to put together a fund called Scoggin Craig Effron (CE): It's The problem with with my partner Curtis important. because I am not commodities trading is that it Schenker, who is still my the traditional hedge fund ends at 2:30 in the afternoon. partner. Craig Effron story. I didn't work two years When you're 24 years old you in investment banking and then can get into a lot of trouble if Here's a key element of our go to Harvard Business School. you're done at 2:30pm unless partnership and how Curtis I went to Wharton for you have something to do. I and I complement each undergrad. I did not get into decided to start learning the other—it's an important fact NYU Law, but I got into Duke. stock market. I had gone to about Scoggin. Curtis was my I went down to Duke for a Wharton for undergrad and best friend before we started weekend with my parents and somewhat thought I knew Scoggin. He's my best friend everybody there was 6'4" and what I was doing. but I didn't still. Curtis and I keep each blonde. I said. ". not going to really know how to invest. other grounded. We realize do very well here. Socially, I About five years into trading we caught a 30 year bull cannot go here." My parents on the COMEX. I started market. We weren't that said. "I tell you what, take a doing risk arbitrage. smart. We happened to have year off, defer, and then money under management, and reapply to NYU a year later That was the heyday of Mike it worked out. Curtis and I and hopefully get in." Milken. I thought I was a genius don't take ourselves too because every time there was seriously. He has always been During that year. I met up with a deal announced. Mr. Naysayer. and Mr. It's- two buddies for a card game at automatically—within a Always-Bullish. Penn. They were playing for week—there would be a stakes that I had never even topping bid. Then there would He's the guy who kept us in known existed. I said, "What be a third bid; it was crazy. business a lot because I do you guys do for a living?" Everyone on the floor knew would've been a lot more One said, "We trade about my success trading aggressive during the commodities. On the floor, we stocks. They all gave me their technology bubble. He said. buy and sell gold and silver. It's money, as my friends, to run "Craig. leave it alone. This is really fun and you should come for free. I did that for a year not what we do. We don't check it out." and it was fun. I had about 30 know what that means. We're accounts and I was doing it for not doing that." And of course I had been working at EF free. later technology blows up. Hutton. which was big in That's why it works, and that's everything, but they went Paul Tudor Jones, who stood why we're still best friends and bankrupt in the '80s. I had next to me in the ring, was a still partners. gotten a job there right after good buddy of mine and said. school and worked there for a "You know what? Run my Part of this Scoggin charm. if few months. But, then I played money, as well. But one caveat: you want to call it that, is that in this card game and, I want you to charge me a fee." we still are friends first and afterward, went down to the I asked, "Why do you want me partners second. I think it sort floor with my friends. I to charge you a fee?" And. of flows through the whole thought, "Wow, this looks like being as smart as Paul is, he office. The average tenure of a lot of fun." Somehow. I said. "Because if you charge me my analysts here is 10 to 12 convinced my parents to lend a fee, you will pay attention to years. There are a few new me forty thousand dollars to my account first." He was dead guys who are two or three (Continued on page 6) EFTA00300916 Page 6 Craig Effron years but basically I have 12 could get involved in distressed lose." I had to go through this analysts, and six or eight of credit. spin-offs, and whole process for my them have been here since restructuring—anything that investors explaining why they before 2000. It's a very nice has an event. We went from shouldn't pull their money out. feeling to know that I can go running $3 million to running A lot of them did a year later. on vacation and know that $3 billion by the late 2000s. We blew up after redemption not going to have someone We sort of stopped raising dates so the investors had to blow me up. money because I liked my life wait to redeem. We made and I didn't want to be a most of the money back in Incidentally, the name manager of people; I wanted to 2009, but they were all so "Scoggin" comes from a camp be a manager of money. And, stunned about what had that Curtis and I went to in mostly. I wanted it to be my happened that we lost about Maine. I met him there and we own money. 25% of our capital through reunited at Penn. We started redemptions in 2009. That was Scoggin together with these 30 Then '08 happened. We had a learning experience for me. accounts. Curtis's money, and no losing years until 2008. We You don't ever want to have my money. It was about $3 had twenty years where every people think you are what you million in total and that was year we made money. At that are not Then the Madoff thing how we started in 1988. To point we were up 17.5% net to happened the same year, so put it in perspective, as a investors. 2008 occurs and. they started saying. "Wait a hedge fund with $3 million in minute. Madoff didn't lose 1988. we were not even the money for 20 years either." I smallest while the biggest fund actually had to explain why "I realized how was about $80 million. not Madoff to my big investors. fleeting success can be They knew I wasn't yet they MI: At that point were you had to check the boxes to just focused on risk arbitrage? in a market, whether make sure I wasn't actually Madoff. CE: Yes, that's all we were it's a stock market or a doing at that point. We were Were they institutions? up a lot of money in '89 and in commodities market. September of '89 the biggest CE: Yes, they're my big guys. My whole perspective deal in history was United and they were worried that Airlines. The deal blew up and on investing has been, they were going to be fired everybody in my world went from their jobs. Imagine having out of business. We went from and hopefully will another fraud that you up 65% to up 20%, which is a invested in. A lot of institutions big draw down, but still up continue to be, not to were invested with Madoff. 20%. Before this, I had been competing to attract the best lose." The reality is that a lot of the talent, but I couldn't afford to fund is my money and Cunis's hire many of them. Now, they depending on which fund you money. If you do the math, we were working for free because look at we lost between 20% can do much better making they were all out of work. I and 30%. To my investors. I good returns on our own hired a restructuring analyst. a was known as a "Jewish T-bill." money than with management long/short analyst, and others This is a very bad thing to be fees. Except this year we are whom I could never have known as—not the "Jewish" losing money. It's the second afforded before that. part but the "T-bill" pan. time we're losing money since Because when you then have a 2008. We are down about That is when Scoggin was losing year, they say. "Oh my 10%. It's really nauseating really born because we could God, it's not a T-bill." Then because we have done a good now do things besides just get they start to realize, "Wait a job to be down 10%—that's lucky with Mike Milken doing minute, he's got risk after all. what's scary. We've done very topping bids. We could still do We thought you were really few things wrong. but those risk arbitrage, but now we safe. We thought you couldn't things we have done wrong (Continued an page 1) EFTA00300917  Page 7 Craig Effron have been fatal in 2015. market. My whole perspective come back from it, but not on investing has been, and typically. You're given one : Could you talk about hopefully will continue to be. chance to go out of business how you think about managing not to lose. and that's it in our industry. the downside in your You can't redo it. 2008 was portfolio? Relatively speaking, making different. People gave you a money is easy. It's avoiding free pass in 2008. Otherwise, if Matthew Baredes '17. Matheus Romariz '16. and CE: Let's go back to the floor losing that's important and you lose money of any real Nicholas Turchetta '17 experience. Managers you've much more difficult. This 10% size, you're out of business volunteer at the Graham & spoken to in the past and with down year is going to cost me pretty quickly. There's another Dodd Breakfast whom you will speak in the two years of money. I can tell smart guy down the street future are probably "traditional you next year will be a very who has done really well and analysts." They come from he will take your money. good schools, they learn at Morgan Stanley or Centerview : How much more Partners how to be an analyst. "I've learned that competitive is the hedge fund They start becoming investors people tend to give industry now compared with and that's their thing. I am when you started? totally different. I am a trader. I you a one-year grace am a risk manager. I was very CE: Here is a crazy scat: when successful on the floor because period. They realize I started business there were I didn't go out of business. 300 hedge funds in the world. that the is flat for There are now over 10.000. I remember when I was 23 or We were the 165th biggest in 24. there were the "Michael the year but the real 1990 with maybe $30 million. fordans" and the "Tom market is not. There 155th in 2000 at around $1 Bradys" of the floor. They billion. and we were 177th in were famous. They were the are 327 stocks down 2008 at $3 billion. No matter big traders who traded how big we got. we never got hundreds of lots.. there for this year out of 500 in any bigger relatively. It's about six to nine months and symptomatic of the issues a little baby trader at this the with a we're having now in our point. I get tapped on the business. There's too much shoulder by a veteran trader. handful money in it. He was one of the biggest outperforming." traders in gold. He taps me on The business was an amazing the shoulder one day and says, business when no one knew "Hey. can I talk to you? difficult year as well. In fact, if what it was. In my world, at wondering if I could borrow we fight back to even in two your age. mediocrity in my some money from you. I had a years I will be happy. The key business made you very little problem: I was short to our business, I've learned, is wealthy. People wanted to be gold." Gold went crazy and he this: don't go down. It's fatal to invested in hedge funds. They went out of business. a lot of firms. The average age didn't care if you were the of a hedge fund that goes out best. They wanted to be in a I said. "I don't have any money of business is seven years. hedge fund; that was the cool to lend you—. 23 years We're on our 27th year. That's thing to be in the '90s. If you old—but I appreciate that not by accident. We had 20 were just mediocre, making 8% thought." I said to myself. years of never losing. We had a year. people were delighted "Wow this guy was a 2008. we also lost 3% in 201 1. because they were doing it in a millionaire." He was looking and now this year: three losing hedge fund as opposed to for money because he went years out of 27. That's how doing it in a mutual fund. Now out of business. I realized how you stay in business. you're in a position where it's fleeting success can be in a not good to be a hedge fund market, whether it's a stock A lot of very good investors unless you're really good at it. market or a commodities have blown up. Some have (Continued co page 8) EFTA00300918 Page 8 Craig Effron People that were terrible were theoretically have catalysts. deal. Five days later they making tons of money on and that has been a horrible announce a deal with Marriott management fees. That all business this year. (MAR) at $70: a take-under. I changed in 2008: they went had not seen that in 25 years. out of business. Now, in our Did the catalysts not business, if you're not in the come through or did the Now obviously there's more top 20%. you don't make any catalysts not matter much? to the story. Maybe it's money. and that's the way it because something is going on should be. Like any business, CE: Some didn't come in the company that I don't you should be required to be through and some came know about. We thought, in the top percentile of through and ended up with bad "There are three buyers. We performers to remain in results. I'll give you a case in are going to make a lot of business. That's the new point which I find amazing. money." We lost 10% dynamic, the new normal in my Starwood Hotels (HOT) went overnight on that trade. That's world. If you aren't good at it, up for sale in June. The stock just one example of what is you actually are out of at the time was at $80/share. going on this year. business. Every year, I've got Everybody had a break-up to be good again because there value of somewhere between Also, Mylan (MYL) was trying are many options out there. $90 and $105. On June 15th. to buy Perrigo (PRGO) this Whether it's another hedge when Starwood announced year. It was a big deal. Mylan fund or a quant fund, there are that the company was up for came in hostilely and Perrigo so many options that people sale, the stock was up a little had no defenses. They went say. "Look, we love you as a bit that day. Then the market down to the last week, where person. but you're making no they needed 50.1% of the money for me." votes to vote "yes" for the deal from Mylan. If you vote Now for 2015. we are down "There are a lot of "yes," you make $20; it's that between 10% and I I% at this simple. If you vote "no," the things out there that point, and we have had very stock will go down and you few redemptions. I've learned are scaring me. But, lose $15. There's a $35 that people tend to give you a differential. In the history of one-year grace eriod. They ■ paid to play, and the world, I've never seen realize that the is flat for people vote without their the year but the real market is that's what I do. But I pocketbooks under not. There are 327 stocks consideration. Not only did it down this year out of 500 in don't play with not go through. but also the the with a handful deal lost by a lot. leverage." outperforming. What I learned was that Those are companies people like making money, but like Google and Amazon? blew up and the stock was there are things they like down into the $60s. By the more. In this case, they liked CE: Out of those stocks that time the market came back the CEO of Perrigo so much are up, it's about six that make about a month later, the stock that they felt badly for him. a difference. That's not what I was at $75. They said, "Let this guy try to do. I don't trade Google make it." They hated Mylan's (GOOG) and Amazon In the first week of November guy.. not saying I loved him. (AMZN). If I did, I wouldn't management announced there but he was offering me $20 need to be in this business. IN were three buyers. One is a more than where the stock doing things that are "tricky" Chinese buyer who owns The was trading. They chose not to or "clever." and not so much Waldorf; one is Hyatt Hotels take the $20 and lose $15 this year. obviously. It's not (H): and one was an instead. I thought it was a no- just me. Because, as you know, undisclosed name. The stock brainer. It was the biggest my world is getting destroyed. goes from $75 to $78 because position on the street and We are trading on events that it's going to be an awfully good people got destroyed. Who (ConSued an page 9) EFTA00300919 Page 9 Craig Effron would think that people would thought they would take the friends, and they're brilliant throw off $20 and take a $15 money, because everyone guys, who have four or five- loss? But, that's what we're takes the money. times leverage now, and I reading now. always wonder. "How do they That's what IN dealing with sleep at night?" If, God forbid. Did they think there this year. The events space has something happens out of the would be additional bidders? been a disaster, an unequivocal blue, the next day they're disaster. Unless you're long losing something like 15% or CE: No. we were already past Amazon and Netflix (NFLX) 20%. But look, that's how they that. We thought initially there and the Jim Cramer FANG were brought up. I was would be. Now it is the last stocks, you're having a really brought up a different way day: it's over. Either you take lousy year. If you're an energy- because I was a commodities the $20 or you table it. In all related guy. you're out of trader where leverage was a my years doing this business, business. Things are bad in bad thing. You could get blown I've never seen people not take retail, too. Macy's (M) is the away by being too big. the money. It was a big gold standard and it is down difference. Not like it was a $2 50% this year. Hospitals and For the last five years, it has premium. It was $20 on a $140 HMOs were obliterated the been fine because the Fed had stock. When things like that last two months, I don't know your back. It's been a very easy happen in my world, it's hard why. If you're in the wrong market until this year. Once to make money. make that sectors, you think it is a bear the Fed stopped QE the bet every day of my life. It's market like 2008 versus the market became difficult. So just how it goes. market being very quietly up what it really shows is that 1%. most of us have just been MI: Do you know anything gliding along because of the QE about the make-up of the wind at our backs. And now votes? "Don't be so big that QE's done. that's why the market has been flat. QE is CE: It was every arbitrageur. where your eyes are over and now we have the representing about 25% of the prospect of higher rates. There float. They voted "yes," bleeding and you've are a lot of things out there obviously. The indexers ended that are scaring me. But. up voting "yes." which had got to get out. Size paid to play, and that's what I been a big issue. When I heard your positions so that do. But I don't play with the indexers were going to be leverage. Now, we do use a voting "yes." I said, "This is you can withstand modicum of leverage, maybe going to be a no-brainer." 120% gross, but not 300% Every plain vanilla or Fidelity of what happens if you gross. the world had a one-on-one with the CEO on that are wrong." Could you go into a bit Thursday of the vote. And that more detail? guy pleaded. He said, "Guys, you are going to end up You don't use a lot of CE: Our average exposure is owning Mylan stock. He's a leverage. Was that a product about 120%. Our net is about criminal: he does terrible of 2008 or have you always 45% long. That's where we things. Perrigo has real brands. been more conservative? usually run. We go as low as Give me a year to make this up 80% gross and 20% long. to you. Just give me that year CE: No. it was a product of We're always long. You guys and, if I don't do something in me being on the trading floor should know one thing the that year, I'll get another and realizing what can happen. markets go up over time. buyer." They bought into it. All Leverage is a two-edged That's just how it is. If you try the institutions, which are the sword. It's wonderful when the to play the short game at the main voters, all voted his way, trade is going up, but you're wrong time, you'll lose money. and all turned on the day out of business quickly when it before the vote. We all had goes the other way. I have You don't want to be short (Continued on page In) EFTA00300920 Page 10 Craig Effron markets over a long period of the tax inversion. It was What students miss a lot is the time. We all watched the ten- because AbbVie was scared of practical matter of the stock year period from 2000 to getting yelled at by Obama. So For some of the short ideas, I 2010. That was a flat period. I they blew it up. They traded ask, "Do you realize the short had never seen that before. from $250 to $150. Settled interest in this thing?" They Remember, I saw gigantic around $180 for the next two realize there's not just a periods. The '90s grew at or three months, then went downside of losing X amount around 20% a year, the '80s back to $260. Now it's back to in an upside case. When you averaged 10% or 15% a year. $220. What we have learned and the whole world are short So 2000 to 2010 was an here is, "Don't be so big where a stock, you go out of business interesting period. But, yes, your eyes are bleeding and too many times. People your we're low-leverage guys. you've got to get out." Size age often don't understand your positions so that you can technical aspects of the Building on the topic of withstand what happens if you market. They understand that risk management, let's are wrong. In Perrigo, we only a stock is not worth $20—its consider a situation like lost 50 basis points on that only worth $10. Okay, that Perrigo where what you break, because I knew I didn't doesn't mean it's going to $10. thought would happen did not want to be selling it badly. It could go to $50 before it occur. Can you talk about how goes to $10 and does that you think about the next Normally, if been up for mean you made a good steps? the year we probably would decision or not? have risked 1.5% on that trade, CE: I've learned over my many that's how good I thought it Some people will say in years doing this that you never was. It was an overnight binary interviews that their best idea sell the first day of a bad event. bet. That is not a big bet if it was long Apple. I ask, "Ok, That is for amateurs because was 1.5%. But it is when you're when did you buy it and for there are guys that are so big making a bet on red or black. what price did you buy it? Ok, that their eyes are bleeding $220. Did it go up or down and they have to get out. If you =: How concentrated are first?" They usually say, "Well, look at where the stock is on your positions? it went down first." I say, "Oh, day one versus day 30, 99% of okay. Where did it go to?" If the time every sale you made CE: We have about 20, maybe he says, "To $85 or $90," that was bad. You wait a month and 30, positions, and our biggest guy is not getting hired then you can reassess. Perrigo are between 5% and 7%. We because he thinks that is okay. is no different. Perrigo opened have nothing smaller than 1.5% He lost half his money on the at $135.1 closed my eyes, I or 2%, and we average way to making three times his didn't do a thing. It's now probably 4%. We're very money. Well he's out of $150. Now we're getting out. focused on protecting against business at that point. There is We made our $15 back. So the downside, and that drives no more company. It's easy to now we broke even on the our risk management approach say, "Yeah, I owned Apple at trade, but we lost the $20 we and portfolio construction. $200." But there is a middle would have made. People have this view of hedge chapter there. It went to $80 fund guys, that they are like first, when Jobs was dying, then People that sold on day one magicians and that there is $600. I don't look at a good and day two and three, are voodoo going on. There is no investor as a guy who has lost kicking themselves. Last year, voodoo. You guys are as good half my money first; that's AbbVie blew up the big deal as I am at this. Your opinion is terr