EFTA01146583.pdf
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Subject: J.P. Morgan Macro Skinny: China: this is not what a hard landing looks like
Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 11:07:24 +0000
Attachments: 2012-09-12_China-pdf.zip
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September 12, 2012
China: this is not what a hard landing looks like
I/ Chinese activity seems to be stabilizing at weak levels, but not free-falling. Yet most of the street is still
assigning a relatively high probability of a hard landing scenario, predicated on a severe real estate bubble
collapse. The housing market has admittedly lost steam since late last year, but more recently, momentum has
turned positive again. Indeed residential prices and home sales are pointing up (left chart), while cement and
steel production are far from suggesting a free-fall scenario (right chart). Importantly, housing momentum is
turning without any direct fiscal or monetary help. When true bubbles (like the US, Spanish and Irish ones) were
'ready to explode', nothing could stop them from doing so. The stabilization in Chinese housing markets
rejects the bubble hypothesis and the hard landing case along with it.
EFTA01146583
Housing prices and sales stabilizing
Sq. meters, YoY % change 70-city index
110
100
Secondary
80 market real
estate prices
60 105
40
20
100
0
-20 Sales transaction volume
-40 95
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: CNBS, CEIC, J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Data as of August.
Show me the freefall
mn tons produced, seasonally-adjusted (both axes)
200 Cement
180
160
140
120 Meet Forced steel
plant shutdowns
100
"re--- Lehman shock
80
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: CNBS, J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Data as of August.
2/ Recent announcements of several infrastructure projects totaling I tm RMB, and the urgency in which these
policies were communicated, are a clear indication that the government is willing to use fiscal policy to put a
floor on economic growth'. Infrastructure investment growth is already showing up in the data (left chart) and
the recent improvement in bank credit suggests that more spending in this area is underway (right chart)2. More
infrastructure investment won't help the ongoing imbalance between investment and consumption, but more
importantly for financial markets, it will support the medium-term growth outlook. Monetary policy also has
more room to ease, although the authorities will likely move more slowly on this front. On balance, while fiscal
and monetary policy won't ease as aggressively as in the past, we anticipate the easing will be sufficient to
stabilize growth at a 7%-handle.
EFTA01146584
Fiscal policy lifting infrastructure investment...
YoY % change, 3-month moving average
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Sou ce: China National Bureau of Statistics, J.P. Morgan Private Bank.
'Infrastructure is defined as power, gas, water, andtransportation. As of Aug
consistent with a pickup in credit growth
YoY % change in RMB loans
20
20
19
19
18
18
17
17
16
16
15
Jun-2010 Dec-2010 Jun-2011 Dec-2011 Jun-2012
Source: People's Bank of China. Data as of August.
3/ With the housing market stabilizing, the bears are now using the manufacturing slowdown as 'new evidence'
for the hard landing case. But this is misleading: China's recent manufacturing slowdown was largely triggered
by weakness in Europe, not by domestic forces. Indeed, a closer look at the data shows that the services sector
has done better than manufacturing, and within manufacturing, export-related industries worsened more than
housing-related industries (left chart). Now that the ECB is getting better at managing the European crisis,
we expect global manufacturing sentiment to improve from here, including in China (right chart).
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Renewed export demand, a boost to China's 'light' industries?
Real gross value added.YoY % change
20
18
Heavy industry
16 (housing-related)
14
12
10
8
Mar-2010 Sep-2010 Mar-2011 Sep-2011 Mar-2012 Sep-2012
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics. Data as of August.
Manufacturing activity in developed markets is stabilizing
Manufacturing PMI, 50+=expansion
62
60
58
56
54
52
50
48
46
44
42
2010 2011 2012
Source: ISM, Markit. Data as of August
4/ The household sector is another area where stabilization is apparent. Aside from the pickup in housing
demand, retail sales growth has stabilized, thanks to a moderate rebound in auto sales. The resilience of the labor
market is another sign that household activity is not falling off the cliff. This is partly because service sector
hiring was strong enough to offset the weakness in manufacturing-related employment. Consumer spending is
by no means strong, but here too, activity is forming a bottom.
5/ To be sure, structural impediments are pulling China's trend growth gradually lower. But the policy agenda
for the new generation of leaders is likely to be bold - especially in labor, product and financial markets'
Importantly, the new leadership is realizing that the reform dividends from the past 29 years have been largely
exhausted and that new supply-side reforms are needed, over and above the current `band-aid' of fiscal and
monetary stimulus.
6/ Despite the apparent stabilization in economic activity, equity markets (both on-shore and off-shore) are
still assigning a very high probability of a bad outcome. The Shanghai A share market, which has the longest
trading history, is trading at its lowest valuation ever, lower even than in 2008-09 (measured by trailing price to
book). We believe the divergence between markets and the real economy will likely narrow over the next year or
so as the eventuality of a soft landing becomes clearer.
Michael Vaknin
Chief Economist, J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Fan Jiang
Chief Investment Strategist - Asia, J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Dong Chen
China Economist, J.P. Morgan Private Bank
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[I] Some of these projects (highways, subways and energy-saving projects) were already brought up in the past, but a lot more items
were added and the news was boldly telegraphed and timed just before President Hu's speech on infrastructure, which by itself, is an
odd topic for the president. All of these signals stress the urgency of the government to stave off downside growth risks from here.
[2] Infrastructure spending is likely to overshoot as Chinese municipalities still have much to catch up on beyond these programs. The
recent flood in Beijing showed how underdeveloped the sewage system is even in the most "urbanized" case.
[3] For example, under the new chairman of CSRC (China's SEC), there have been more deregulation and market friendly regulation
measures in the past 6 months than the past 5 years. China is also gradually, but consistently, deregulating oil prices -- China just raised
oil prices again this week.
Acronyms:
CNBS — China National Bureau of Statistics
CSRC — China Securities Regulatory Commission
ECB — European Central Bank
ISM - Institute for Supply Management
PMI — Purchasing Manager's Index
RMB — Renminbi/Chinese Yuan
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EFTA01146587
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