DOJ-OGR-00022074.pdf

Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 12 of 34 I. ARGUMENT A. Applicable Law Brady & Giglio The Government has an obligation under the Due Process Clause to make a timely disclosure of any exculpatory or impeaching evidence that is material and in its possession. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). "The rationale underlying Brady is not to supply a defendant with all the evidence in the Government's possession which might conceivably assist the preparation of his defense, but to assure that the defendant will not be denied access to exculpatory evidence only known to the Government." United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1973)). Impeachment evidence is material only "where the witness at issue supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime, or where the likely impact on the witness's credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case." United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1210 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly, "where the undisclosed evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to challenge a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable or is subject to extensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may properly be viewed as cumulative, and hence not material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 DOJ-OGR-00022074