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ISAS Working Paper No. 152 —12 July 2012 NUS National University of Singapore National University of Singapore Singapore 259770 i SAS Institute of South Asian Studies Tel: Fax: Email: Website: www.isas.nus.edu.sg Iran's diplomacy towards Afghanistan: A stabilising factor ? Didier Chaudetl Abstract Iran is often seen only as a 'rogue state' by the United States (US) and its Western allies. But the idea that one of the oldest civilisations is now ruled by 'mullahs' with no rational vision of international affairs is rather simplistic. The fact is that, even if some in the Iranian political elite can be seen as 'hawks' or leaden of a nationalist 'neoconservative' movement, Tehran is rather pragmatic in international affairs. Of course, the Islamic Republic can be protectively aggressive if it is provoked or feels threatened, but itsfirst goal is to protect itselfas a regime and as a nation. The best example ofthis can be seen when one takes a close look at the Afghanistan-Iran relationship. What can be seen in the recent past as well as in the post-9/1I period is that the Iranian thinking towards its neighbour is dictated by a sense of realism. In that perspective, Iran can be a force for stability in Afghanistan immediately after 2014... if old wounds and Washington's tensions with Tehran do not come in the way. Didier Chaudet is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies us research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be contacted atilialla The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those ofISAS. EFTA_R1_02206604 EFTA02722007 Introduction Iran has reasonable credentials for being treated as a regional power. It has the necessary demography (population, 77.8 million), a pivotal geographic location (between the West Asia, Central Asia and South Asia), and a strong and ancient identity that makes an impact on Iran's environment more than likely.2 This can only feed a sense of nationalistic pride in the country. But does pride mean an 'aggressive' or 'destructive' foreign policy? Its immediate regional environment could entice Iran to be assertive. Its neighbours can mostly be considered weaker at several levels.3 And there is this point of view, especially in the West, that the Iranian regime is always guided by an ideological approach. Such a view, especially by American thinkers and policy-makers, would portray Iran as an 'aggressive' West Asian nation. This is what former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed during a lunch organised by the Financial Times: Iran has to choose 'whether it is a nation or a cause'.4 But Tehran is not necessarily tempted to act like the purveyor of a 'cause' overseas: certainly, not the way Iran was perceived in the West immediately after 1979. Admittedly, internally, the Iranian regime has certain ideological claims, as it defines itself as an 'Islamic Republic'. And indeed, this regime has had external ambitions. Ayatollah Khomeini's programme in diplomacy was called Mashru al-Thawra a!-Iraniyah, the 'Project of the Iranian Revolution'. In religious terms, the project was very ambitious: to make of Iran the centre of the Muslim World and to make the leader of the Iranian Revolution 'Commander of the Faithful'. But, when one does not get impressed by such religious language and focuses on the concrete consequences of the project, it looks like a very realist foreign policy of any ambitious power. The goal of this policy has been, first and foremost, to cultivate groups that would help project Iranian influence wherever it is in Tehran's interest? Besides, after the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) and the death of Khomeini, Iran moved towards what has been called the 'second Republic'. From that time, the Iranians understood their political and military limits, and focused on protecting their interests rationally overseas. Tehran has continued to see Israel and the US as enemies or competitors in the Middle East, but stopped seeing terrorism as an efficient tool in foreign affairs and avoided antagonising its Arab neighbours.6 2 Long-term history is part of everyday life for Iranians. In general discussions, references to great Persian/Iranian poets are not as rare as one might think. In some regard. one could argue that the pride of Iranians about their culture, history and their claim for influence in the regional environment is not dissimilar to American exceptionalism. See Michael Axworthy, Iran, Empire of the Mind. A Historyfrom Zoroaster to the Present Day, New York: Penguin, 2008, pp. xiii to xv. On this subject, see Roland Dannrcuthcr, 'Bridging the Gulf? Iran, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf', The Review ofInternational Affairs, Vol. 2, Number 4, Summer 2003, pp.32-33. 4 Stephen Graubard, 'Lunch with the Fr: Henry Kissinger', Financial Times, 24 May 2008. http://www.fLeorrdintllerns/s/0/6d4b51b8-285a-1 I dd-8fle-000077b07658.htmlikumlvle5QutM. Accessed on 15 May 2012. Hala Saber, Hcbollah. Born with a vengeance, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p.109. 6 Robert BAER, Iran : !Irresistible Ascension, Paris : JC Lanes, 2008, pp.126-127. (French translation of the book The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iran Superpower). 2 EFTA_R1_02206605 EFTA02722008 In fact, what has best defined the Iranian foreign policy, at least since the end of the 1980s, is the word maslehat, which in Farsi (Persian) means expediency. Pragmatism makes everything possible in Iranian diplomacy, as long as it is convenient for the regime and suited to the Iranian national interest, from the point of view of prominent specialists of the Islamic Republic.? And this word is what defines most accurately the Iranian relationship with Afghanistan, as this paper will show. Contrary to what some think, the Iranian regime is not eager to commit collective suicide by pursuing an imprudent foreign policy towards its neighbour. It is highly realistic, and focuses first on the interests of the Iranian nation. Does it mean that Iran could be a force for stability for its neighbour? In order to give a credible answer to such a question, one needs to focus on two aspects: first, on what the Afghan problems prior to 9/11 meant (and often still mean) for Iran, and how the latter reacted when it got a real chance to help fix its 'failed' neighbour; second, on Iranian foreign policy towards Afghanistan today, through the knowledge one can have, thanks to open/verified sources (above all), as much as possible.* What a Chaotic Afghanistan Meant for Iran before the 2001 :American Campaign: (1): Drugs and Refugees The best way to understand what instability in Afghanistan means for Iran is to think about the pre-9/11 period, more precisely the 1990s. At that point in time, Afghanistan became more important than it used to be for Iranian diplomacy. It was a consequence of the Iran-Iraq war: the eastern part of Iran developed itself economically and demographically, as it was away from the frontlines. The northeast became strategically important, upgrading at the same time Iran's interest in post-Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan.9 But immediately after the Iran-Iraq war, Afghanistan became a source of constant problems for Iran. Its troubled neighbour has begun to be a source of many issues for the Iranians — from social, political and economic points of view from the 1990s. And most of those pre-9/11 problems are pretty much alive, with a sense of urgency that makes Iran a proponent of authentic stability in Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan, immediately after the end of the Cold War (forgotten by the US and the rest of the world), became an important source of drugs. It has had dramatic consequences for Iran to this day. At the end of 2009, around one million Iranians were addicts. And the 7 Such an approach is true even on difficult subjects like the relationship with Israel. Sec Mohscn M. Milani, 'Reflections on Iran's Policy towards Iraq' in Amin Tarzi (ed.), The Iranian Pu=le. Understanding Iran in a Global Context, Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2009. p.60. a Unfortunately, nowadays, scholarship associated with Iranian foreign policy is often based on guesswork and leaked sources that cannot be verified. In this paper priority is given to open sources and sources that can be verified or that have been proven by multiple other sources. Erfan Efegil and Leonard Stone, 'Iran's interests in Central Asia: a contemporary assessment', Central Asian Survey. 2001. Vol.20, n.3. pp.353-354. 3 EFTA_R1_02206606 EFTA02722009 Iranian police chief at the time,10 Esmail Alunadi-Moghaddam, explained during an interview that 130,000 more people were becoming addicts each year." Because of this situation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has had to wage a real 'War on Drugs'. And the said `war' should not be seen as a mere catch-phrase here: more than 3,700 security officers were killed during clashes with smugglers,12 and walls were built at the Afghan-Iranian border as shootouts have been happening regularly in this area. The Iranians have spent at least US$600 million a year to deal with this threat. Ten per cent of its conscripts are mobilised to secure the border with this problematic neighbour.13 Seen from a comfortable distance, the anti-drugs laws and actions of Tehran can look severe (death penalty for trade or possession of more than five kg of opium or 30g of heroin, for example).14 But, with the numbers of addicts being so big, with the social and economic consequences of trafficking being real, and with the source of the problem (Afghanistan) being so close, Tehran's 'repressive' approach is somewhat understandable. However, Tehran can truly deal with this issue only if Afghanistan itself is stabilised by the establishment of a viable state — integrated again with the international community, and being strong enough to fight drug trafficking in collaboration with its neighbours. The situation is already slightly better in the post-Taliban period, of course. Afghanistan is not a totally `failed' or `rogue' state any more, and there has been better cooperation in the fight against trafficking between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. An example of this relative improvement is the cooperation resulting in simultaneous operations in 2009 and 2010. Seventy-four drug dealers and a few tons of hashish, opium and heroin were seized. I But all this does not change the fact that Iran's pre-9/11 problem, traceable to drugs from Afghanistan, is still an important concern for Teheran today. As long as the Afghan territory is not truly stabilised under the control of one internationally recognised authority, these anti- drug-menace victories will be of little consequence, even in the short term. The Afghan areas that are not under the control of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces produce the bulk of the poppy farm yields. And the Taliban has profited from this situation, to say the least, collecting at least US$125 million a year in opium production in 2009, at a time when I° Still, with the same responsibilities, as of May 2012. 11 Hashem Kalantari, Fredrik Dahl, 'Iran has 130,000 more addicts each year: report', Reuters, 15 November 2009, http://www.reuters.comtarticleJ2009/11/15/us-iran-drugs-idUSTRE5AE0Z020091115, accessed 18 March 2012. 12 This number is from the end of 2009. 13 George Gravilis, 'Harnessing Iran's Role in Afghanistan', Expert Brief - Council on Foreign Relations, 5 July 2009, hup://www.cfr.org/iranrnarnessing-irans-role-afghanistan/p19562, accessed 29 April 2012. 14 On this subject see Faraz Sanei, 'Don't Praise Iran's War on Drugs', The Guardian, 5 August 2011, http://www.guardian.co.ukkommentisfreeJ2011/aug/05/iran-war-on-drugs-international-law, accessed on 2 May 2012. 13 UNODC, 'Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan strengthen anti-drug trafficking initiative', 25 November 2010, http://www.unodc.org/unodden/frontpage/20IWNovember/afghanistan-iran-and-pakistan-strengthen-unodc- brokered-anti-drug-trafficking-initiative.html, accessed on 3 May 2012. 4 EFTA_R1_02206607 EFTA02722010 its involvement in the high-end value aspects of the heroin industry was still in its infancy.16 Besides, the foreign forces in Afghanistan have focused mainly on their fight against the Taliban, explaining why drug trafficking flourished again in 2011 despite having suffered from a plant infection in 2010.17 Nowadays, Afghanistan accounts for 85 per cent of the world's heroin. It provides an income to half a million families. The smugglers and criminals offer an 'alternative welfare system' to Afghans who do not have the chance to ask for any support from their state. And yet, the drug menace was not part of the formal agenda of the 20 May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago.'8 Tehran, like other regional victims of Afghan drug trafficking,19 seems to be part of a minority in the international community that understands the need to deal with a problem which looks like a plague from an Iranian perspective. Moreover, Afghanistan has been also a source of refugees, an important problem for Tehran. Along with Pakistan, Iran has been the country having the most to deal with the consequences of the Afghan issue from this point of view. In the two cases, it has been a consequence of the Afghan instability since the 1980s. At this period the Iranians found themselves to deal with around two million refugees.2° In 1991-92 there were nearly three million. But the two countries have had different policies towards the Afghan refugees: Islamabad confined them to refugee camps. It gave the Pakistanis a better political control over those foreigners but made the latter totally dependent on international aid. The refugees in Iran found themselves in a better situation to some extent, especially during the first years of their exile, despite the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran received little external help.2I The Iranians were focusing on their war against Iraq and were not able to control the Afghan refugees politically. The Iranians limited their attention to organising the Hazara refugees, unifying those Shiites around the group Hizb-1 Wandat•22 But as the Iranian authorities needed more manpower to do this, they let the Afghan refugees work anywhere in Iran. Such a situation turned those refugees into economic competitors in Iran after the end of its war with Iraq. As for the Afghans who settled in Iran or who saw in this country a chance for better life, they 16 Joshua Partlow, 'UN Report Cites Drop in Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan', Washington Post, 2 September 2009, http://mvw.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/01/AR2009090103223 .html 12 Pamela Constable, 'As opium prices soar and allies focus on Taliban, Afghan drug war stumbles', Washington Post, 14 January 2011.,h0p://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/conterWarticle/2011/ 01/13/AR2011011306738.html, accessed on 3 May 2012. 18 Nigel Inkster, 'Drugs: A war lost in Afghanistan', AfPak Channel - Foreign Policy. 29 May 2012, http://afpalc.foreignpolicy.corn/posts/2012/05/29/drugs_a_war_lost_in_afghanistan. Accessed on 30 May 2012. 19 Like Tajikistan. 28 Number given by Human Rights Watch, Crisis ofImpunity. The Role ofPakistan. Russia andIran infueling the civil war, July 2001, http://www.hnv.org/reports/2001/07/01/crisis-impunity-role-pakistan-russia-and- iran-fueling-eivil-war-afghanistan, accessed on 1 May 2012 E1 To understand the difficulty of the task the Iranians had to deal with in the last three decades, one needs to have in mind the fact that Iran has been hosting one of the most important refugee populations in the world. 72 'Party of Unity' 5 EFTA_R1_02206608 EFTA02722011 did not perceive themselves as refugees and were not necessarily eager to go back to Afghanistan once the Taliban fell 23 Hence, this pre-9/11 problem is still pretty burdensome for Iran. The numbers given by the UN are proof: In 2009, as many as 954,000 Afghans were in the Islamic Republic of Iran legally, about 1.5 million illegally. From the Iranian point of view, it had a social and economic impact that made the presence of those refugees difficult to deal with. Xenophobia has been on the rise against them, an unfortunate but all-too-predictable situation. The term 'Afghani' has become pejorative in Iran. And the state had to take into account that section of the Iranian population which was most unhappy with the presence of the Afghans, even though Tehran had first done quite much to help them since the 1980s. For example, in the last few years, the children of recent illegal immigrants have no access to public schools anymore.24 And during the 13ih day of the celebration of Nowruz (Persian New Year)25, the city of Isfahan banned the Afghans from entering the city's park, in order to protect Iranian citizens against 'insecurities' 26 If Iran has been and continues to be a source of opportunities and education for Afghans, the pressure of migration on the country is also a source of tensions between the two nations. And those tensions have been a social issue difficult for Iran, even if the Afghan refugees have become part of the Iranian society, the most intellectual circles included, and even if numerous Iranians have also been sympathetic to Afghan sufferings.27 Besides, Iranian economy is weak enough as it is, and life is difficult for the average Iranian, making the burden represented by the refugees even more difficult to accept.28 It has been evaluated that an Afghan worker is costing the Iranian government two US dollars a day, regardless of whether the refugee is residing in Iran legally or illegally. And deportations cannot change the situation. In 2009, 937 illegal migrants a day were deported. 23 It is important to keep in mind that after three decades in Iran, more than half of the Afghan refugees are in fact those born in Iran itself. Sec Bruce Kocpkc, 'The Situation of Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran Nine Years After the Overthrow of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan', MEI-FRS, February 2011, p.3. Downloaded through http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pd003_koepke.pdf. Accessed 5 May 2012. 24 Underground schools have been created to take care of those kids. See Hamid Sadeghi, 'Photos: Underground School for Afghan Children in Kerman. Iran', Payvand Iran News, 13 November 2011, http://www.payvand.cominewstIl/nov/1129.html. Accessed 6 May 2012. 25 The time usually spent outdoors S6 A decision that was not accepted by all Iranians, some being very critical of this choice to cave in to pressures coming from the xenophobic part of the electorate. See Dan Geist and Ali Chenar, 'News: Efforts to Shield Essential Imports from Feeble Rial; "I Am Also an Afghan"', 3 April 2012 hnp://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontlineitehranbureaw2012/04/news-efforts-to-shield-essential-imports- from-enfeebled-rial-i-am-also-an-afghan.html . Accessed 6 May 2012. 27 One only needs to turn to poetry to get proof of such a fact. One of the most well-known poems in modern Persian literature, 1111a:ghast-, 'The Return', has been written by an Afghan poet, Kazem Kazemi, talking about the sufferings of Afghan refugees in Iran going back to his country. The verses of this poem are widely known, in Iran as in Afghanistan. See Aria Fani 'One Tongue, No Tongue: "Return" and 'Afghan-Iranian Dialogue', Tehran Bureau, 13 May 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontlineitehranbureau/2012 /05/poetry-one-tongue-no-tongue-retum-and-its-story-of-cultural-dialogue.html. Accessed 14 May 2012. 28 See on this subject, for example, Hussain Askari, 'Ahmedinejad shuns a brighter future', Asia Times, 16 September 2010, http://waatimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/L116Ak.02.html. Accessed I I May 2012. 6 EFTA_R1_02206609 EFTA02722012 In 2010, the figure was 785 a day. But each day, nearly as many Afghans have been trying to cross the border illegally in order to work in Iran.29 The economic difficulties in their country, as well as security-related issues, explain their desire to migrate. Such a situation will prevail, unless the potential refugees have actually a chance to have the better life, which they seek, in their own country. And it will be possible, to paraphrase Seyyed Mohammad Reza Sajjadi, the Iranian Permanent Representative at the United Nations Office in Geneva, the potential Afghan refugees will remain in their homes only if there are 'secure and decent' conditions in the country.30 Again here, this burden, several decades old, makes of Tehran a political entity that cannot satisfy itself with wishy-washy declarations about Afghan stabilisation. For Iran, the instability of its neighbour has true economic and social consequences that could have a political impact, if a sizable part of the Iranian citizenry is unsatisfied with the way the authorities deal with this issue. What a Chaotic Afghanistan has Meant for Iran before the 2001 American Campaign: (2) The Taliban or Afghanistan as a 'Rogue State' For Iran, Afghanistan has been a source of troubles in terms of security issues since the Taliban came to power. At this period, from an Iranian point of view, the 'failed' Afghan state became a 'rogue' entity. At least, some leaders of the Taliban, particularly the ones influenced by an anti-Shia sentiment, were planning for a direct conflict with the Iran if their internal enemies could first be dealt with.3I From 1996, the new Afghan 'Emirate' made its intentions clear when it gave asylum to the Sunni Baluch and Turkmen activists from Iran. who were in violent opposition to Tehran.32 The Iranian concerns were kindled by such open hostility from the Taliban, so much so that Robert Baer33 reports that Iran was ready to go to war at one time to take control of Western Afghanistan. Tehran's aim was to prevent Taliban's control of the Afghan-Iranian border." Still, despite their anxieties, the Iranians seem to have thought that a deal could be made with Pakistan in order to stabilise Afghanistan in a way acceptable to all the countries in the region, Iran included, and without 29 Bruce Koepke, op.cit, p.5. 3° Press TV, 'Iran urges global support for return of Afghan refugees', 5 May 2012, http://www.pr esstv.ir/detaiLl239667.html, accessed I I May 2012. 11 The desire to have a hostile, aggressive policy towards Iran, including the use of brute force, was definitely in the mind of the ideological 'hawks' around Mullah Omar. See on this subject Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, New York: Penguin, 2004, p.340. 32 John Parker. Persian Dreams. Moscow and Tehran since the Fall of the Shah, Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009, p.178. 31 Robert Baer is a former CIA case officer, specialised in the Middle East. and now an author, writing on US foreign policy, especially in the Muslim world. 34 And on this matter the Islamic Republic of Iran is following a policy that was already active under the Shah: to make sure that Western Afghanistan would never be in the hands of its enemies. See Mir H Sadat, James P. Hugues, 'US-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan', Middle East Policy Council. Spring 2010, Vol. XVII, Number I, http://w.mcpc.org/joumal/middle-east-policy-archives/us-iran-engagement4hrough- afg,hanistan?print. Accessed 12 May 2012. 7 EF TA_R1_02206610 EFTA02722013 unnecessary violence. After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, it appears that the Iranians tried to negotiate with Islamabad a peace deal that could be in their mutual interests. Iran's idea was to recognise the Pashtun political predominance in exchange for the safety of Afghan Shiites and recognition of their political stake and influence.35 The reasoning was to recognise that the ones closest to the Pakistanis in Afghanistan won and to obtain in exchange an acknowledgement of Iranian interests in that country. But the proposed deal was off before it could reach the Taliban. Indeed the hostility of the latter towards Iran was confirmed in August 1998, after the conquest of Mazar-e Sharif by the Taliban. Following this victory the Pashtun radicals killed nine Iranian diplomats living in the city. During the same period, they killed thousands of Hazaras.36 It was a clear insult to the Iranian state, as well as a veiled declaration of war on the Muslim sect it was supposed to represent. Those two events made the excuse given by the Taliban (i.e. the killing of the diplomats by 'renegade forces' who did not listen to the orders coming from the leadership) sound very unlikely.37 This last provocation brought Iran and Afghanistan very close to war. At that time, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, had put the army on alert and pressured Islamabad to stop supporting the Taliban; as for the 'Emirate', it threatened to strike at Iranian cities if the Iranian troops would dare to penetrate the Afghan territory.38 It was only the decisive action of Lakhdar Brahimi (the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General) that helped avoid a war that the Afghan 'hawks' clearly wanted. After these tensions, the more moderate or pragmatic Taliban wanted to improve the bilateral relationship. The idea found supporters among some foreign militants, like an important leader in the community of the Arab mujahedeen, Abu Walid al Masri. But Al Qaeda blocked their efforts, in spite of the inherent geopolitical rationality. The influence of the terrorist organisation was quite important if al Masri is to be trusted. He indeed said that he was able to convince Mullah Omar to improve relations with its main neighbours, Iran and Pakistan.39 The opposition of course was ideological in nature (the hatred against Shia Islam), but it was also linked to the mainstream 33 Asma Shakir Khawaja, 'Afghanistan: A Factor in Pak-Iran Relations', Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, 2004 - 15, p.203. 36 Who are Shia Muslims. 37 Even if the pragmatic or more moderate faction inside the Taliban appeared clearly afraid that the situation could evolve into a conventional war, it could not gain the upper hand. It explains why the Afghan Foreign Ministry asked the Pakistanis and the UN `to intercede' with Iran and to send representatives to Mazar-l- Sharif in order to understand better, by themselves, the cause of what was presented as an incident. See on this subject, for example, Douglas !eh', 'Iran Holds Taliban Responsible for nine Diplomats' Death', New York Times, II September I 998,http://www.nytimcs.com/1998/09/1 liworld/iran-holds-taliban-responsible- for-9-diplomats-deaths.html?pagewanted—all&src—pm. Accessed 21 May 2012. 38 Another proof that indeed the Taliban were in touch with Sunni extremists inside Iran. CNN World, 'Taliban threatens Retaliation if Iran Strikes', 15 September 1998. http://artielcs.cnn.com/1998-09- 15/world/9809_15_iran.afghan.tensions.02_ l_iran-attacks-iranian-diplomats-akil-ahmed?_s—PM:WORLD. Accessed 20 May 2012. J9 The idea of Pakistan totally controlling, or imposing its views on, the Taliban is indeed a gross misrepresentation of Afghan-Pakistani relations in the 1990s. If Islamabad had some level ofinfluence, it did not mean a lack of freedom for the 'Afghan Emirate' at the time. And Afghans and Pakistanis, at this time as also after the fall of the Taliban, could not see eye to eye on important matters like the question of the Durand Line. 8 EFTA_R1_02206611 EFTA02722014 Al Qaeda's own vision of the Iranian neighbour. Al Qaeda opposed any official relations with Tehran, an 'enemy' to be opposed all the time. The goal of Osama bin Laden's organisation was to have its own routes out of Afghanistan, independent of the Iranian authorities' influence.40 At the end of 1990s, Tehran had more than enough proof that the 'Afghan Emirate', whatever the circumstances, would never be a safe neighbour for Iran. Contrary to the issues presented above, on this matter, the Iranians had a chance to have a critical impact before 9/11. And they did so, as a rational actor eager to protect its interest and its security. Such a positive influence was possible because, between the end of 1990s and 2001, the US and Iran were converging politically on their respective analyses of the Afghan situation. At first, American and Iranian diplomats were working together through the six- plus-two talks, the forum dedicated to find a regional solution to the Afghan issue. And in fact, Tehran was much more implacable than Washington in opposing Mullah Omar's regime. Before 2001, however worrisome the situation in Afghanistan was, the US did not see Afghanistan as a top priority. As for Iran, already by the end of the 1990s, its goal was clearly to make sure that this neighbour would be neither a 'rogue' state nor a 'failed' entity. Tehran aimed at making sure that the chaos in Afghanistan and its harmful consequences for the region would be eradicated once and for all. Of course, after 1998, the Americans already began to understand the Iranian approach. After all, summer1998 witnessed not just the massacre at Mazar-e Sharif. For the Americans, it was precisely the period when Al Qaeda became a serious issue, after the bombings of the US Embassies in Dar es-Salaam and Nairobi. After having been ambivalent towards the 'Afghan Emirate', the Americans began to understand that Afghanistan was becoming a threat for its own interests. After 9/11, the US and Iran grew 'closer', reducing the six-plus-two talks to de facto bilateral consultations via what has been called the 'Geneva Contact Group'. The Iranians were particularly important for the Americans then. And in that sense, they were for a quick victory that could have meant a better future for Afghanistan, especially if the idea of stabilising that country had been the primary goal of the US from the beginning of the 'War on Terror'. For the US, the Iranians were, at first, the main bridge with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. For sure, Teheran was then the only external actor to have had true influence over this anti-Taliban coalition inside Afghanistan. After all, Iran had been the main backer of this anti-Taliban organisation after the events of 1998. Already, during the winter of 1999, Tehran was said to have given millions of US dollars worth of weapons to warlord Ahmad Shah Masud. Iran also helped to keep together a group that was highly divided. The Iranians 4° Leah Farrall, 'Interview with a Taliban Insider: Iran's Game in Afghanistan', The Atlantic (14 November 2011), http://www.theadantic.com/intemationaliarchive/2011/11/interview-with-a4aliban-insider-irans-gam e-in-afghanistan/248294fisingle_page=true. Accessed 8 May 2012. 9 EFTA_R1_02206612 EFTA02722015 went beyond the simple forms of support extended to Masud, with whom it had a complex relationship. Iran's support encompassed all the actors of this coalition. And this support was essential, as at the time divisions ran deep inside the group. The Iranians made sure that the Shiites in the Northern Alliance would always be strong enough to defend their interests.'" Iran also supported the Uzbek groups in the Alliance, at a time where they were divided between Rashid Dostum and Abdullah Malik.42 Indeed, Russia and India were also helping the anti-Taliban coalition, and the Russians seemed to have persuaded the Americans, after 9/11, to ally with Masud to better destroy the Taliban's regime. But the Iranians were by far the most active43 players and were the ones who were 'closer' to the US policy, without any particular `secret' agenda at the time.44 These strong links were essential to persuade the Northern Alliance that the Americans could be trusted allies. After all, Washington had, before 9/1 1, criticised Tehran for its support of the Northern Alliance. The Iranians were also of great help to the White House, when the Northern Alliance had to be convinced that it should work with those Pashtuns who were equally opposed to the Taliban.45 With such information, it seems clear that, without Iran, the initial US campaign against the Taliban could have run into many more obstacles, and Afghanistan could have been much more destabilised by the post-9/I I foreign intervention from the start. What confirms this line of argument is the fact that, during the American campaign against the Taliban, the Iranians have been very active in helping in the fight against the common enemy. For example they opened the Chah Bahar port to facilitate humanitarian help for the Afghans. They gave critical and very reliable intelligence to the Americans, offered access to Iranian airfields near the Afghan borders, and arrested numerous Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters who were trying to escape through Iran. These actions were proof of an Iranian foreign policy focus on regional stability above anything else, as Tehran did not make this support conditional on America changing its long-term policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact the Iranian elites were thinking, at the time, that such a responsible choice would dissipate the American preconceptions about Iran.34 / This responsible attitude, focusing on regional stability, explains Iran's positive policy towards Afghanistan at the very 4 On the weapons given and the work done by the Iranians to make sure the Hizb-i-Wandat received its 'fair amount' of arms, see Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Crisis ofImpunity. The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in fueling the civil war, July 2001, pp.35 to 39. http://www.hnv.org/report.s/200I htfghan2/Afghan070 l.pdf. Accessed 7 May 2012 tr Ahmed Rashid, 'Iran in Afghanistan: the Mission to Undermine Pakistan, CACI Analyst, 29 March 2000, http://www.cacianalyst.oreq-node/348. Accessed the 9th May 2012. i3 Barbara Slavin, 'Iran helped overthrow Taliban, candidate says', USA Today, 9 June 2005, http://www.usatoday.cominewsiworld/2005-06-09-iran-taliban_z.htm. Accessed 9 May 2012. 44 Something that the Russians seem to have done. See S. Frederick Starr. 'Russia's Afghan Gambit'. The Wall Street Journal. II December 2001. hap://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Russia's%20Ominous%20Afgha n%20Gambit.htm. Accessed 10 May 2012. 43 See Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Pu=le. The Conflict Between America and the US, New York: Random House. 2005, pp.345 to 347. 46 See Barbara Slavin, 'A Broken Engagement', The National Interest, November-December 2007. http://www.nationalinterest.org/General.aspx?id=92&id2=16016 10 EF TA_R1_02206613 EFTA02722016 beginning of the 'War on Terror', at least as far as support to Kabul was concerned. In order to achieve some sort of stability in Afghanistan as quickly as possible, the Iranians did not hesitate to put some pressure on the Northern Alliance during the Bonn Conference. They made sure that their Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara allies would accept the leadership of Hamid Karzai, with whom they did not want to share power at first. On this issue again, the US and Iran were having the same vision: a more centralised Afghanistan in order to give the stabilisation of the country a better chance.07 Moreover, during the 2002 Tokyo conference, Iran was one of the most generous developing nations, as it pledged US$560million towards Afghan reconstruction.48 Hence, recent history tells us that chaos in Afghanistan has always meant direct or indirect problems for Tehran. It also shows that the Iranians do act rationally to ensure their neighbour's stability. Of course, it is possible to imagine that Iran would want to have some influence on a country that has been such a source of problems. But it can hardly be called 'Iranian imperialismi°9, rather a realist measure of self-preservation and preservation of its interests. This explains why Iran appeared to be part of the solution, and not part of the problem, when the Bush administration wanted to get rid of the 'Afghan Emirate'. At worst, Iran can be described, after the fall of the Taliban, as a realist state, eager to protect its national interest, and its national interest required stability in its neighbourhood. Iran Today: Good or Bad Neighbour? A General View With such recent history as the background, how can one define the Iranian policy towards Afghanistan after those promising beginnings? As already seen, it is difficult to imagine that Iran would have had the desire to create any problems for its neighbour, once it got rid of the Taliban. Probably more than any other nation, Iran wanted a stabilised neighbour that would be neither 'rogue' nor 'failed' in scope, i.e. a state that could be a source of opportunities rather than a curse. It explains why (former US President) George W. Bush's labelling of Iran as part of the 'Axis of Evil' (29 January 2002), shocked the Iranians who saw that as an unnecessary humiliation. Especially because of the company they found themselves in. They had no love for (former Iraq President) Alizcra Nadcr, Joya Laha, "Iran's Balancing Act in Afghanistan", RAND's Occasional Papers, 2011, p.7. 48 Shahram Akbarzadeh, 'Where the Islamic Republic of Iran heading'. Australian Journalfor International Affairs, Vol.I9, Number I, March 2005, p.34 48 The idea of the Islamic Republic is nevertheless promoted by some Western scholars and analysts, in particular those who have been close to the former Bush Administration. This is the case of Bernard Lewis, for example. See Gholamani Khoshroo, 'The Great Threat and Bernard Lewis' Nightmare', Iran Review, 7 March 201I, http://nw.iranreview.org/content/Documents/The_Great_Threat_and_Bemard_Lewis %E2%80%99_Nightmare.htm , accessed 10 May 2012 11 EFTA_R1_02206614 EFTA02722017 Saddam Hussein's regime, something that is understandable. But they also felt uncomfortable being associated with North Korea. Indeed at that time, Iran was more than slightly uneasy with Pyongyang's actions. Some in Iran even feared that, in a foreseeable future, hostile Middle Eastern countries could have access to North Korean nuclear weapons that could be used against Tehran.5° So, from an Iranian point of view, Bush's State of the Union speech, during which this notion of an 'Axis of Evil' was introduced, was seen as a break from the very encouraging evolution of the US-Iranian relations between 1998 and 2001. And this break was not inevitable. First it was justified, from an American point of view, by the Karine A scandal: A boat full of weapons was intercepted by Israeli forces, and Jerusalem said the cargo, coming from Iran, was destined for the Palestinian authorities. The only problem with this version was that it did not take into account the whole story that one could know from open sources — a section of the Israeli media, as well as, to some extent, the foreign journalists, who at least took the time to investigate the matter they had to report. Through their analysis, it appears that this shipment of Iranian weapons was not really approved by the Iranian central government; at best it was the work of a group of Pasdaransi or a rich religious foundation, an institution that could act outside of Tehran's control. And it seems that the despatch of those weapons by Karine A could have been a lucrative operation, organised by a group of smugglers eager to make money rather than to give any kind of political support.52 Hence, it could have been argued that, even if the incident was worrisome to the West, it should not have been an excuse for a rupture of relations between the US and Iran. After all, from 2003, the Afghan policy of Islamabad had been criticised, in the harshest terms, by Kabul and by Washington. But it did not translate into a breaking off of diplomatic relations or the designation of Pakistan as the principal enemy of the US.53 And such moderation on the part of the US could only be understood in terms of realpolitik, as the help rendered by Islamabad at that time was considered important enough for the Americans to overlook some uncomfortable issues.54 When one has in mind the criticism from the White 5° See Mark N. Katz. 'Iran and America: Is Rapprochement Finally Possible?', Middle East Policy. Volume 12, Number 4, Winter 2005, p.49 5I Also known as the Revolutionary Guards, they are the military backbone of the regime, and more and more over time, its real masters. But it would be a mistake to think that all the Pasdaran officials think alike. They are indeed becoming for Iran what the army is for the Pakistani state, but there are also strong divisions inside the corps. 32 The leading Israeli newspaper Haaretz made clear that the idea of Tehran being the mastermind behind the Karine A story sounded rather difficult to believe. Indeed, it is known that the shipment was obtained at night, from another ship near the Kish Island. A real Iranian governmental backing would have meant an easier loading of the cargo, from a port like Bandar Abbas. See Brian Whitaker. 'The strange affair of Karine A', The Guardian, 21 January 2002. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jan/21/israell. Accessed 12 May 2012. 53 Despite some pretty harsh comments sometimes. 54 Such a situation seems to be changing. See Shamila N. Chaudhary, 'The Patience Runs Out', Foreign Policy, 12 June 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.comfarticlest2012/06/12/the_patienctruns_out. Accessed 12 June 2012. 12 EFTA_R1_02206615 EFTA02722018 House against the Pakistanis today, the Karine A scandal looks like an issue that could have been overlooked for the greater good of Afghan stability. The second event that provoked the inclusion of Iran in the 'Axis of Evil' was more serious, as it was about the Iranian nuclear ambitions. But again, in a post-9/11 world, even if a regime in Tehran is often criticised in the West, the Iranians have shown that they could be trustworthy allies in the 'War on Terror', a struggle that was, after all, against the Sunni- supremacist, anti-Shia organisation called Al Qaeda. In the name of this 'War on Terror', Washington associated itself with unsavoury dictators, in the name of realpolitik, and also, at another level, with countries which became nuclear powers despite American disapproval (Pakistan, India)55. If the US had really focused on the limited but obvious need to see this 'War' as a fight against Osama bin Laden's organisation, its Taliban protectors, and more broadly speaking against what gave Al Qaeda a safe haven, i.e. chaos in Afghanistan, then even this revelation about the Palestine-bound consignment of weapons would not have put an end to the convergence of interests between the two states. Unfortunately at that time, Afghanistan was becoming less important, for the Bush administration, than Iraq. Middle Eastern geopolitics was already more important to deal with than the Afghan issue, which seemed to have been dealt with successfully, at least from an American point of view at that time. It was the time when Bush asked Jay Gamer, the first proconsul in Baghdad, if he wanted to do Iran after Iraq.56 Did this development mean that Afghanistan became a collateral victim of US opposition to Iran? With the past and the present in mind, it would be a gross misinterpretation to think so. Iran is, in a sense, doomed by geography: To use Afghanistan as a tool to put real pressure on the Americans could easily backfire on Iran. It explains why there was no real discontinuity in the Iranian foreign policy in the period 2001-2002. In December 2002, with this logic in mind, Iranians and Afghans signed a 'Good Neighbour Declaration'. It appeased the latter as the former made it clear that it was eager to respect Afghan territorial integrity. Between 2001 and 2009, the humanitarian help coming into Afghanistan from Iran was also very important. No less than US $600 million, a generous amount for a country with its own financial difficulties." Economically, broadly speaking, Iran is an important factor in Afghan reconstruction. The Iranian government itself is funding useful projects like the building of 63 From the beginning of the 'War on Terror', it seems that the US made the choice to prioritise their desire to stop Iran on the nuclear issue rather than to see Afghan stability. From the point of view of numerous specialists, to this day, this choice madc things more difficult for Afghanistan. Sec for example Viola Gienger, 'Afghanistan Needs Leeway on Iran Sanctions, Minister Says', Business Week. 3 April 2012, http://www.businessweek.cominews/20I2-04-03/afghanistan-needs-leeway-on-iran-sanctions-minister-says. Accessed 7 May 2012. S6 Bob Woodward, State of Denial, London: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p.224. 67 Muhammad Tahir, 'Iranian Involvement in Afghanistan', Terrorism Monitor — Jamestown Foundation, Vol.5. issue 1, http://www.jamestovm.org/programs/gtaisinglentx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D-1004&tx_ttne ws%5BbackPid%5D=118&no_cache=1. Accessed 15 May 2012. 13 EFTA_R1_02206616 EFTA02722019 roads or schools. There are no less than 2,000 Iranian firms in Afghanistan.58 Now, trade between the two countries represents USSI billion annually. It makes Iran the second-largest trade partner of Kabul after Pakistan59. The Iranians have made investments in Herat, Nimruz, and Farah in particular. So they are indeed investing heavily in Western Afghanistan, where they have strategic interests to do so. Until 2008, no less than US$500 million were invested in this area alone. Tehran helped pave the roads in Herat, give electricity to 350,000 Afghan citizens in this area, as well as build hospitals and schools. Even when the positive impact of Tehran is recognised, such a policy in the Afghan West mak