Epstein Files

EFTA00222134.pdf

dataset_9 pdf 1.4 MB Feb 3, 2026 8 pages
Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 68-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/0212009 PRg iel f gf 8 703 So.2d 1076 Page 1 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly 1)169 (ate as: 703 So.2d 1076) District Court of Appeal of Florida, 307Ak31 k. Relevancy and Materiality. Fifth District. Most Cited Cases Kimberly BALAS and Teresa Shumate, Petitioners, Party may be permitted to discover evidence that v. would be inadmissible at trial, if it would lead to Marjorie A. RU2ZO, and Exec., Inc., etc., Re- discovery of relevant evidence. West's F.S.A. RCP spondents. Rule 1.280(b)(1). No. 97.82. PI Pretrial Procedure 307A e=36.1 Oct. 10, 1997. As Modified on Grant of Clarification Jan. 2, 1998. 307A Pretrial Procedure . oker.‘e rl t s So. Zd 2'B t• no 307A11Depositions and Discovery Plaintiffs brought action against alleged house of \ann. 307All(A) Discovery in General prostitution for, inter alia, coercion of prostitution. 307Ak36 Particular Subjects of Disclos- we The Circuit Court, Brevard County. Frank Pound, 307Ak36.1 k. In General. Most Cited J., granted in part defendants' motion to compel dis- Cases covery. Plaintiffs filed petition for writ of certior- Evidence of plaintiffs past prostitution and their ari. The District Court of Appeal, W. Sharp, J., held revenues relating to such activities, including activ- that evidence of plaintiffs' past prostitution and ities with alleged house of prostitution against their revenues relating to such activities was dis- which they had filed suit, was discoverable, where coverable. plaintiffs brought action not only for coercion of prostitution, but also for battery, false imprison- Petition denied. ment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of their civil rights, Harris, J., concurred specially and filed opinion. and racketeering. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 40302, 42 U.S.C.A. § West Headnotes 13981; West's F.S.A. §§ 772.014, 796.09; West's F.S.A. RCP Rule 1.280(b)(1). (1) Pretrial Procedure 307A te=;•31 *1076 Richard E. Johnson and Heather Fisher Lind- say, of Spriggs & Johnson, Tallahassee, for Peti- 307A Pretrial Procedure tioners. 307AI:I Depositions and Discovery 307A11(A) Discovery in General Mark S. Peters of Amari, Theriac & Eisenmenger, 307Ak31 k. Relevancy and Materiality. P.A., Cocoa, for Respondents. Most Cited Cases Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to subject matter of case and must be admissible or reason- W. SHARP, Judge. ably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. West's F.S.A. RCP Rule I .280(b)(1). Batas and Shumate petition this court for a writ of certiorari to review certain portions of the lower [2) Pretrial Procedure 307A €=.31 court's order which granted, in part, a motion to compel discovery filed by respondents Ruzzo and 307A Pretrial Procedure Exec., Inc. Petitioners argue that those portions de- 307A11Depositions and Discovery part from the essential requirements of law and will 307A11(A) Discovery in General cause them irreparable harm because they will be © 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Oov. Works. A r( EXHIBIT 41 littp://web2.westlaw.com/printlprintstream.aspx'?sv=Split&prft=HTMLE8dfin=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00222134 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 68-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04'02/2009 WM& 8 703 So.2d 1076 Page 2 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly 1D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 (Cite n: 703 So.2d 1076) compelled to disclose intimate details of their sexu- titioners against their will. Count IV alleges that re- al history. We decline to issue the writ of certiorari. spondents' actions constituted an invasion of peti- tioners privacy. Count V is a claim for the inten- Bales and Shumate filed suit against Ruzzo and Ex- tional infliction of emotional distress. Count VI al- ec, Inc., doing business as "The Boardroom." Ac- leges a civil rights action-that respondents have vi- cording to Batas and Shumate, The Boardroom op- olated petitioners' right to be free from crimes of vi- erates ostensibly as *1077 a leisure spa but actually olence motivated by gender within the meaning of is a house of prostitution. Batas worked at The 42 U.S.C. section 13981. Finally, count VII seeks Boardroom from December 1993 until February civil remedies for criminal practices or racketeering 1996; Shumate worked there from October 1992 pursuant to section 772.104, Florida Statutes. The until March 1996. Ruzzo, the sole officer and petitioners claim that they suffered emotional pain, shareholder of Exec, Inc., collected about fifty to anguish, humiliation, insult, indignity, loss of self- sixty percent of each employees earnings from per- esteem, inconvenience, hurt and emotional distress. forming sexual acts. They seek an award of general and punitive dam- ages, among other relief. According to Bain and Shumate, Ruzzo exerted mental and emotional control over her employees The discovery to which the petitioners are being re- and thus she was able to exploit them as prostitutes. quired to respond is as follows: Ruzzo required ha employees to pay her substan- tial sums of money to attend "metaphysical wait- shops" conducted by Ruzzo or persons associated 1. with her. At the work place, the employees were re- quired to participate in religious and quasi-religious Interrogatory 8: Please advise how long have you "circles," rituals and incantations. These practices been engaged in prostitution.... were allegedly designed to break down the person- alities of the women who worked for Ruzzo and to foster dependency and loyalty to herself. At one II. time when the earnings of a new employee were missing and believed to be stolen, Ruzzo required Interrogatory 22: State with specificity the man- that the petitioners be strip searched and body cav- ner in which the acts as described in your Com- ity searched. Ruzzo caused the petitioners to be- plaint have materially affected how you interact lieve their continued employment was dependent on with your husband, boyfriend, fiancee' [sic) or their submission to these searches and that they any other individual of the opposite sex. might be arrested on felony charges if they refused to submit to the searches. Bales and Shumate's second amended complaint against Ruzzo contains seven counts. Count I is an Request for Production 30: A copy of any photo- action for coercion of prostitution pursuant to sec- graphs, movies or videotapes in which you per- tion 796.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioners allege the formed sexual acts and/or simulated sexual acts requirement that they perform sexual acts to retain in exchange for money or other consideration. their employment constitutes inducement and coer- cion to engage in prostitution. Count II is a claim for battery for the unwanted and offensive touching IV. of the petitioners' bodies. Count III is a claim for false imprisonment for physically confining the pe- Interrogatory 16: Please list the names, addresses, telephone numbers and rates of pay for all em- ployers for which you worked, including the O 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Oov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspOsvi.Split&prft=HTMLEacifin-NotSet&nit... 3/26/2009 EFTA00222135 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 68-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PArge (1 "gf 8 703 So.2d 1076 Page 3 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Ha. L. Weekly D169 (Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) nature of the work, during the five years immedi- nature, custody, condition, and location of any ately preceding the date of employment with the books, documents, or other tangible things and Boardroom and from the date of your termination the identity and location of persons having know- with the Boardroom to the present, providing the ledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground names of your immediate supervisors at each for objection that the information sought will be place of employment and the reason for your inadmissible at the trial if the information sought leaving each place of employment. appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis- covery of admissible evidence. V. Nonetheless, the discovery of certain kinds of in- formation may cause material injury of an irrepar- Interrogatory 26: Please state your total income able nature. This includes the "cat-out-of-the-bag" while employed at the Boardroom, and state the material that could be used to injure another person source of that income including any income from or party outside the context of the litigation, materi- other employment or *1078 income earned from al protected by privilege, trade secrets or work prostitution other than at the Boardroom. product. Discovery was never intended to be used as a tactical tool to harass, embarrass or annoy one's adversary. Rather, pretrial discovery was im- VI. plemented to simplify the issues in a case, to elim- inate the elements of surprise, to encourage the set- Request for Production 34: Business records from tlement of cases, to avoid the cost of litigation, and any selfemployment or owned business ventures to achieve a balanced search for the truth to ensure in the last 5 years, including any records or list of a fair trial. Elkins v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla.1996). customers, "special customer lists" or "sugar daddy's list." Here the petitioners argue that the information sought to be discovered regarding prostitution and 11)(21 Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to their sexual activities was propounded solely to em- the subject matter of the case and must be admiss- barrass them and to invade their right to privacy. ible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible The petitioners also claim that this information is evidence. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Langston, privileged under section 796.09 and is not calcu- 655 So.2d 91 (Fla.1995); Amente v. Newman, 653 lated to lead to evidence which would be admiss- So.2d 1030 (Fla.1995); Russell v. Stardust Cruis- ible at trial. ers, Inc., 690 So.2d 743 (Ha. 5th DCA 1997). The concept of relevancy is broader in the discovery Section 796.09 provides a person with a civil cause context than in the trial context and a party may be of action for compensatory and punitive damages permitted to discover evidence that would be inad- against anyone who coerces that person into prosti- missible at trial, if it would lead to the discovery of tution, who coerces that person to remain in prosti- relevant evidence. Allstate; Amente. Florida Rule of tution, or who uses coercion to collect or receive Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(1) delineates the proper any part of that person's earnings derived from scope of discovery: prostitution. In the course of litigation under this section, any transaction about which a plaintiff test- In General. Parties may obtain discovery regard- ifies or produces evidence does not subject the ing any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to plaintiff to criminal prosecution or to any penalty or the subject matter of the pending action, whether forfeiture. In addition, any testimony or evidence or it relates to the claim or defense of the party any information produced by the plaintiff or wit- seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft=1.ITMLE&ifm-NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00222136 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 68-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 Pgicile (41-Of 8 703 So.2d 1076 Page 4 703 Sold 1076, 22 Pla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 (Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) ness for the plaintiffs cannot be used against the arrested. plaintiffs or witness in any other investigation or proceeding, except one for perjury. Under section 796.09, the petitioners' prior involve- ment in prostitution and their earnings from prosti- Section 796.09(5) specifically provides that it is not tution would be irrelevant. Hence discovery should a defense that the plaintiff was paid or otherwise not be permitted because such information would compensated for prostitution, that the plaintiff had not be admissible at trial nor would it be reasonably engaged in prostitution prior to any involvement calculated to lead to evidence ultimately admissible with the defendant or that the plaintiff made no at- at trial. Even though the scope of discovery is gen- tempt to escape from the defendant. Section erally quite broad, section 796.09 is designed to en- 796.09(6) provides that convictions for prostitution courage prostitutes to sue their pimps. Thus the or prostitution-related offenses are inadmissible for usually broad scope of discovery may be constric- the purpose of attacking the plaintiffs' credibility. ted so that prostitutes will not be embarrassed, har- assed or hindered in their actions. This legislation was the result of the Florida Su- preme Court Deader Bias Study Commission, [3] Had the petitioners brought their lawsuit against which conducted an extensive investigation of pros- Rano and The Boardroom only under section titution in this state. The Commission's activities 796.09, evidence of petitioners' past prostitution, included interviews with law enforcement and cor- including with the Boardroom, and their earnings rections personnel,*1079 judges, public defenders. relating to such activities, may not have been dis- prosecutors, drug rehabilitation counselors, social coverable. However, the petitioners filed a multi- workers, medical personnel, prostitutes, clients and count complaint for compensatory and punitive pimps. The Commission found prostitution to be damages, alleging numerous causes of action prevalent and uniform throughout the state and law against the respondents. These other causes carry enforcement largely unable to deter it under pre- no such protection from discovery. Since the in- vailing social attitudes and judicial practices. The formation sought by discovery may be relevant or Commission further found that prostitutes are often may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in victims of economic, physical, and psychological one or more of these other causes of action or to coercion, that most persons do not chose to become determination of damages, we cannot conclude that prostitutes, but do so to survive, and that ninety the trial court departed from the essential require- percent of street prostitutes, both adult and chil- ments of law in granting this discovery. See Smith dren, are controlled by pimps who use a variety of v. TM Bank of the Keys, 687 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d coercive methods to maintain this control. The DCA 1997) (by alleging fraud as well as breach of Commission determined that clients and pimps are contract, purchaser placed at issue her reliance on rarely prosecuted and, when prosecuted, receive venders' assertions, the veracity of financial docu- light sentences; whereas prostitutes, who are mainly ments she submitted to the vender, and the state of females, are frequently prosecuted and receive her mental health, including memory problems she harsher treatment in the courts. The Commission was experiencing at the time of the alleged tortious recommended changes in the methods of interven- conduct, thus deposition questions concerning her tion in prostitution from punitive to therapeutic, state of mind were relevant). changes in the law to require more equal treatment by the courts of the prostitute in relation to the cli- Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED. ent and the pimp and to lessen the incentive to traffic in human flesh by giving the prostitute ac- THOMPSON, J., concurs. cess to the judicial system without first having to be HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opin- ion.HARRIS, Judge, concurring specially: © 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Oov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&prft-HTMLE&ifm—NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00222137 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 68-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02:2009 PO-Tge%f af 8 703 So.2d 1076 Page 5 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly 1)169 (ate as: 703 So.2d 1076) There is a temptation in cases such as this to inquire any part of that person's earnings derived from which, the pot or the kettle, is imbued with the prostitution. darker hue. Indeed that may ultimately be the ques- tion uppermost in the jurors' minds. But the issue The employees resist discovery of their past prosti- presently before us is simply whether the pot, in or- tution or their past or present earning experience on der to establish the parties' comparative complex- the basis of subparagraph 5 of section 796.09: ion, may discover the historical condition and the '5) It does not constitute a defense to a complaint inherent characteristics of the kettle. under this section that: We are here involved with panics that the limited a) The plaintiff was paid or otherwise compensated record before us indicates were co-conspirators in a for acts of prostitution; joint effort to violate Florida's laws against prosti- tution. The defendants are the owner/operators of a b) The plaintiff engaged in acts of prostitution pri- "social club" whose primary service is prostitution; or to any involvement with the defendant ... the plaintiffs are employees of the club who provide such services. The employees are suing the But the question before us is not whether prior acts owner/operators for, among other counts, taking ad- of prostitution (or the receipts of earnings there- vantage of their vulnerabilities ("coercing" them to from) which might be revealed by answering the in- be prostitutes) through manipulation and exploita- terrogatories could be used as a defense to the com- tion. In order to prepare a defense to the action, de- plaint, but rather whether evidence of such conduct fendants have filed certain interrogatories for the or such earnings would be relevant in determining employees to answer. These interrogatories*1080 whether the employees were, in fact, "coerced" into request such information as how long the employ- prostitution, into remaining prostitutes, or into shar- ees have been engaged in prostitution; how the em- ing the proceeds of their services with defendants. ployees have been affected by the defendants' con- The relevancy of this information depends, of duct; copies of photographs, movies, and video- course, on what constitutes coercion. tapes in which the employees have performs sexu- al acts or simulated sexual acts; the names of previ- If we apply the definition of "coercion" which is ous employers and previous rates of pay; and a commonly accepted, then the relevancy of the re- statement of income received from defendants. quested information is apparent and this appeal has These interrogatories survived the employees' ob- no merit at all. Webster defines "coercion" as: (I) jections. I agree certiorari should be denied. to restrain or dominate by force, (2) to compel an act or choice, or (3) to enforce or bring about by The employees primary cause of action is based on force or threat. In sexual battery cases, the legis- section 796.09(l), Florida Statutes, which provides: lature has adopted the common meaning of the word "coercion" and has even placed limits on it. It (1) A person has a cause of action for compensatory has provided that consent will not be recognized if and punitive damages against: submission is coerced by threats of force or viol- ence if the victim reasonably believes the perpetrat- ',a) A person who coerces that person into prostitu- or has the present ability to execute the threat.no tion; Consent also will not be recognized if submission is coerced by a threat of retaliation against the victim b) A person who coerces that person to remain in or another if the victim reasonably believes that the prostitution, or perpetrator has the ability to execute the threat in the future.F02 And in sexual battery cases, the le- 1,c) A person who uses coercion to collect or receive gislature has vitiated what might otherwise be con- O 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Oov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv-Split&prft-HTIVILE& i fm-NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00222138 Ptaize 6 of 8 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 68-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 Vage 6 of 8 703 So.2d 1076 Page 6 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Ha. L. Weekly 13169 Mite n: 703 Sold 1076) sideted as consensual if one exploits a known phys- 1) Promise of greater financial rewards. ical or mental weakness of the victim to achieve his or her goal or takes advantage of one who is phys- 3) Promise of marriage. ically helpless or involuntarily intoxicated." Therefore, even in sexual battery cases, before co- X Restraint of Speech or communications with ercion or exploitation will vitiate consent, the free others. will of the victim must be overcome by force or threat or some unfortunate circumstance suffered ) Exploitation of a condition of developmental by the victim. disability, cognitive limitation, affective disorder, or substance dependency. WI. Section 794.011(4)(b), Florida Stat- utes. :m) Exploitation of victimization by sexual abuse. PN2. Section 794.011(4)(c), Florida Stat- .,n) Exploitation of pornographic performance. utes. :0) Exploitation of human nods for food, shelter, FN3. Section 794.011(4X40),(0). and (1), safety, or affection. Florida Statutes. The definition urged by the employees herein is the But then we get to the definition of "coercion" con- "promise of a greater financial reward." Whether tained in section 796.09(3): the requested information is relevant to the issue of coercion in this case will depend on what the legis- ,13) As used in this section, the term "coercion" lature intended by subsection (I) in the meaning of means any practice of dominion, restraint, or in- "coercion." ducement for the purpose of or with the reason- ably foreseeable effect of causing another person 1 agree with Judge Altenbernd's thoughtful analysis to engage in or remain in prostitution or to relin- in State v. Brigham, 694 So.2d 793 (1997): quish earnings derived from prostitution, and in- cludes, but is not limited to: There can be no dispute that the legislature's unusu- al definition of "percent" is not a common dic- X Physical force or threats of physical force tionary definition- This is perhaps an appropriate case in which to remind ourselves of Learned 30 Physical or mental torture. Hand's famous observation that a "mature and de- veloped jurisprudence" does not "make a fortress :c) Kidnapping. out of the dictionary." 01081 (d) Blackmail. But even so, one would expect some nexus between the commonly accepted meaning of a word and the ",e) Extortion or claims of indebtedness. definition of that word ascribed by the legislature. If, for example, the legislature defined "canine" as 3) Threats of legal complaint or report of delin- including cats, although one might, jurispruden- quency. tially speaking, expect to hear a meow emanate from a Great Dane, the courts should nevertheless ,'g) Threat to interfere with parental rights or re- closely examine the legislative history to see if that sponsibilities, whether by judicial or administrat- is really what the legislature intended. The court in ive action or otherwise. Young v. O'Keefe, 246 Iowa 1182, 69 N.W.2d 534, 537 (1955), stated this principle as follows: "But 30 Promise of legal benefit. stD 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx7sveSplit&prft".+ITMLE&ifm=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00222139 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 68-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 Prirge 16 8 703 So.2d 1076 Page 7 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 (Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) before a definition is construed so as to expand the of an opportunity to make a decision with the coer- meaning of a well-known word to include its ant- cion of that decision. But subsection (1) can also onym ..., the intention of the legislature to that ef- mean •1082 that the promise of a greater reward is fect must be clear." As Judge Campbell observed in coercion only if such promised reward is sufficient Catron v. Roger Bohn, D.C., P.A., 580 So.2d 814. to overcome one's natural revulsion to selling one's 818 (Fla. 2c1 DCA 1990: body for money. If there is no such revulsion, there can be no coercion. Becoming a prostitute only be- It is our primary duty to give effect to legislative cause one likes the hours and wages or "because it intent and, if a literal interpretation of a statute beats the heck out of working for a living" simply leads to unreasonable results, then we should ex- should not meet the test of section 796.09(1). ercise our power to interpret reason and logic to it. At oral argument herein, it was suggested without contradiction, that at least one of the employees has a college degree and gave up a well-paying, legit- Unfortunately, it is apparent that in enacting this le- imate job in order to engage in this profession for gislation, the legislature has, without redefining the greater reward. Section 796.09 does not appear the terms for the purposes of this legislation, of- to be a general prostitute's relief act. It is based on a ten used terms with commonly accepted mean- report by the Gender Bias Study Commission which ings for purposes at great variance from those recommended the equalization of treatment in rela- commonly accepted meanings. tion to the prostitute, the client and the "pimp." It is based on the premise thnt prostitutes are generally In our case, the legislature did define the term for victims of economic, physical. and psychological the purpose of the act. But because the term coercion and choose prostitution in order to sur- (coercion) as so defined can be interpreted two vive. Further, the Commission was concerned that ways-one consistent with the commonly accepted 90 patent of the street prostitutes are controlled by meaning and one at variance-we should not accept "pimps" who use a variety of coercive methods to the "antonym" unless such legislative intent is maintain control. It seems clear that the legislature clear. A free will decision, even if based on a hope was not intending to depart from the precepts of the of financial gain, is the opposite of a coerced de- commonly understood meaning of "coercion" and cision. to redefine it to include both free will decisions and compelled decisions.. The interpretation urged by The employees urge that the mere promise of a the employees seems at variance with the stated greater reward brings them within the act. But if the goal of the legislature and the Gender Bias Com- mere promise of a greater reward is sufficient to es- mission. tablish coercion, then anyone who makes a volun- tary and reasoned exercise of free will motivated by Since there is no cause of action provided for one the hope of economic gain has been coerced. This who makes a reasoned and voluntary exercise of definition removes the element of compulsion im- their free will to enter or continue in the profession plicit in the commonly accepted meaning of coer- solely for financial rewards (assuming "coercion" is cion and substitutes therefor the mere desire for fin- given the definition more consistent with its com- ancial gain. The employees herein assert that since monly accepted meaning and assuming that my in- they were offered "a greater financial reward" for terpretation of legislative intent is correct), coercion providing the services performed by them through becomes the critical issue in the trial of such action. defendants' establishment, they were coerced into The interrogatories propounded by defendants ap- their prostitution activities. This equates the giving pear relevant to the issue of coercion. O 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?swaSplit&prft=HTMLE&ifm=NotSettcmt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00222140 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 68-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PFWaegggf 8 703 So.24 1076 Page 8 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 (Cite as; 703 So.2d 1076) This is a case of first impression based on a relat- in the hospital) and which makes one who is a party ively new statute. As indicated, the legislative his- thereto, as the appellant in the instant case, guilty of tory of the new law suggests that the statute is de- a criminal act for entering into such an agree- mom") signed to assist those who were forced to enter prostitution in order to keep a roof over their heads We are not asked in this proceeding to rule on the or food on their table. It does not appear to be in- admissibility of the discovered information as evid- tended to aid those who voluntarily enter the pro- ence at the trial of this cause. We are to determine fession in order to drive a Mercedes instead of a only if the information might lead to admissible Ford. The limited record before us indicates that evidence. Even *1083 though we deny the Writ I even beginning employees of the defendants (those suggest we certify the following question: who do not have an established clientele) bring in $700 a day and can keep 50% of their earnings. DOES ONE, FREE FROM FORCE, INTIMIDA- Based on a five-day work week, this would reflect TION, OR DISADVANTAGEOUS CIRCUM- an income of $87,500 a year even with a two week STANCE, WHO MAKES A REASONED DE- vacation. And the employees herein are not begin- CISION TO BECOME OR REMAIN A PROSTI- ners. TUTE OR TO SHARE THE PROCEEDS THEREOF BECAUSE OF A PROMISE OF A There is no indication that the legislature intended GREATER FINANCIAL REWARD HAVE A to legalize prostitution or to make it a respectable CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION profession. It merely intended to place the prosti- 796.09(1), FLORIDA STATUTES? tute on the same footing with the client and the "pimp." If a prostitute voluntarily makes the de- cision to participate, free from force, intimidation, ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING. FOR CLARI- or disadvantageous circumstance, then he or she is FICATION, FOR CERTIFICATION, AND FOR RE- on the same footing as the other participants and HEARING EN BANC should be treated the same. W. SHARP, Judge. Although it might well serve a legitimate public Petitioners Batas and Shumate have filed motions purpose to permit the cannibalistic demise of such for rehearing, clarification and certification. We enterprises (and I am not unsympathetic with this deny the motions in full except for one regard. We view), that does not appear to be the policy behind delete the sentence in the last full paragraph of the the current statute. Therefore, in cases where coer- opinion which reads: "'These other causes of action cion is not present (and this may or may not be carry no such protection from discovery." one), the court should continue its tradition of not interceding in civil conflicts involving transactions Motion for Clarification GRANTED as stated that are either illegal or are against public policy. above; Motion for Rehearing and Certification See Weduler v. Novak. 157 Fla. 703, 26 So.2d 884 DENIED. (1946); Thomas v. Raiiner, 462 So.2d 1157. 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 472 So.2d 1182 HARRIS and THONIPSON,JJ., concur. (Fla.1985) ("An action may lie for interference with Fla.App. 5 Dist..1997. an unenforceable contract and even perhaps a void- Batas v. Rune able contract. No such cause of action lies for inter- 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly 1D2375, 23 Ma. ference with a contract void as against public policy I— Weekly D169 (another's representation of a client obtained by a doctor/lawyer's illegal personal injury solicitation END OF DOCUMENT O 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. littp://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv—Split&prft=1ITMLE&ifm=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00222141

Entities

0 total entities mentioned

No entities found in this document

Document Metadata

Document ID
10f3b5f7-554c-4ab4-8d8c-558e50169554
Storage Key
dataset_9/EFTA00222134.pdf
Content Hash
7052002b8e624ba163ad461aebc41286
Created
Feb 3, 2026