DOJ-OGR-00005188.pdf
epstein-pdf-nov2025 PDF 785.3 KB • Feb 4, 2026
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**Document Header**
* **Case Number:** 1:20-cr-00330-PAE
* **Document Number:** 338
* **Filed Date:** 10/12/21
* **Page Number:** 10 of 22
**Handwritten Notes**
* Simply put, there was never any "in pari materia" between courtroom procedural rules and the statute of limitations. Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (in general). See United States v. McElaney, 54 M.J. 120, 126 ($2500(k) stands alone!). The second major problem with the Fifth Circuit's non-principled interpretation is that it is not "holistic." The fact 33283 defines itself (instead of using $3509(a)) and $3509(a) does not include either physical abuse or kidnapping was just ignored entirely. Also, ignefier was the misfiling, and the fact that $3282 has the odd quality of superceding other statutes of limitations. The Fifth Circuit found a definition of sexual abuse they felt could pass as including 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and that was the end of the analysis. To top it off, the Fifth Circuit had previously found, in an en banc hearing, $3509(a) (8) was not acceptable as a definition of sexual abuse. See Conde v. Hous., 754 F.3d 285 (5th Cir., 2014) (F.3509) is "directly contrary to the definitional method mandated in our Circuit." Citing United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541, 550 (5th Cir. 2013)).
**Biden's S.1965 (1990) Combined Stay Language with Limitation**
* Biden's S.1965 (1990) combined stay language with limitation.
**Footer**
* **DOJ-OGR-00005188**
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