EFTA00864081.pdf

From: Andrea Pfanzelter <a> To: Teije Rod-Larsen a, JeffEpstein sleevacation@gmail.com> Subject: Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2015 23:47:23 +0000 Attachments: polio_feb_15.doc; ATT00001.htm Report by IN on 2 recent polio-related incidents, as requested: Note: IPI research began as usual, right after these incidents were 'aried in the Pak local media, IPIY data-base is kept updated on all such InddenN. 0) mob Balochistan: Zhob is of gee-strategic importance for the Taliban (both TTPakistan & TTAfghanistan) as it shares a border with South Waziristan. Dora Ismail Khan (& other trouble spots) as well as Afghanistan - & connects Balochistan with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & Punjab; Zhob is also important as a major landroute for goods transport between KP & Karachi port. nob Airpon was used by NATO 2009-2011. The bonier area is protected by Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps. Zhob is an important passageway for militants, smugglers & Afghan refugees. There arc a number of TTP "camps" in mob, with large caches of arms, ammunition, explosives. Hence fora number of years, security forces have earryied out repeated operations in the area (including helicopters). leading to increased kidnappings & terror actions by militant groups to protect their camps, including attacks on Levies chcckposts especially in /alpha Kibni. This makes mob a no-go + high-risk area. The polio-related kidnapping was most recently preceded by the kidnapping of six Pak Telecommunication Co. staff(including 2 engineers, all still missing). The most important political party in the Zhob area is the religion- based Jamiat Ulema c Islam (JUI). The important militant groups in Zhob are: TTP & some of its splinter groups: Jundallah - a militant group dating to pre-Taliban days. which has in recent years shown renewed terror activity: Jundallah claimed the 26 Nov 2012 attack (when it attacked a polio team in Eastern Bypass area of Quetta. killing 4 polio workers) & has in the past 12 months allied itself with other milhat groups such as Ti? & splinters, as well as the anti-sbiite Lashkar lhangvi. Polio Incident. On Friday 13 February 2015 ea. 23:00, the polio team (3 polio workers & 2 accompanying levies) was last in contact, on their way back. Pak security forces launched a searthrrescue operation (ca. 250 FC) in Toda KibrailMurgha Ritual area: during an exchange of Are. two suicide bombers blew thentsehes up on Sunday 15 Feb pro - the I" suicide bombing in connection with polio! Four bodies & the polio ambulance were recovered (3 so far identified: 1 ambulance driver & 2 Loin). The fate of the still-missing workers is not yet known, the militants switch locations to avoid detection. IPI is following up. The Balochistan Provincial Govt has postponed PEP in Quetta. Zhob. Sherani & SIM districts. Refusals: PEP refusals are related to parental refusal which pre-dates the Taliban ban. IPI recommendation: As requested. In view of the inter-related context as above, attacks by militants (whether shooting, kidnapping or other) is pan of the strategy by militants, especially TTP. to attack security forces - it is not a new tactic. It pit-dates the Zarb Arab military operation begun in June 2014, but now. in response, all uniformed personnel. anywhere in Pakistan, am renewed targets of the TTP& its allies. The police antor 1.cvies accompanying polio teams offer the right target & polio workers are collateral damage, sometimes in gunfire by the security forces. Since the December 2014 suicide operation on the Army Public School in Peshawar, a true game-changer, members of TTP. Lashkar Jhangvi. Jundallah & allies arc being hanged by the authorities - hence any chance of a dialogue with any of the militant groups cited above is. for the present. neither possible nor recommended. In addition. IPI notes that the 4 day 16.19 February PEP in Quetta was postponed both due to PM Sharif's visit as all security forces were diverted for his protection + Matriculation exams beginning IR February. IPI therefore recommends that PEP be coordinated in advance regarding known events such as examinations. What cannot be foreseen arc security-related postponements. as in December 2014. Also, the renewed campaign by UNICEF which focuses on parental refusal should be improved (it is criticized by the target group. enter alio. as not adquately taking into account local cultural traditions). OH Khyber Agency, FATA: Khyber Agency is gee-strategically important, historically as well as in the present context. It touches Peshawar. KP's provincial capital, two other FATA agencies + Afghanistan. in addition to being the entry/exit point for the traffic & transport of people, goods. NATO supplies. As the military operation Zarb Azab progressed, militants fleeing North Waziristan have sought refuge in Khyber. leading the Pak military to launch a military operation titled Khyber I in mid-October 2014. Even prior to this launch. pans of Khyber (in particular Bare & Tirah Valley) saw combat between militant groups & Pak military - the former composed of a combination of 3 militant groups which elsewhere have been fighting each other, but arc here defending a prized transit route for massive smuggling. Khyber I is also aimed at clearing the transit route for NATO's retrograde mission (supplies & equipment being withdrawn from Afghanistan). Khyber has valuable mineral deposits & mines, exploited by militants groups for income. EFTA00864081 Polio incident: On Sat 14 February 2015. gunmen fired at a van carrying a polio vaccination team, killing the driver. as it was preparing fora 3-day PEP 16-1S February. The shots were fired from a nearby hill in the Lowi Shalman area of Land, Kotal. Khyber. which has. in addition to the aspects cited above, valuable mineral deposits which are mined & sold by the militants. On the same day. a number of militants were killed by Pak forces in an adjacent FATA area. as Pak forces began preparations to launch a fresh crackdown in Bars. & locals were ordered to evacuate the area by that pm. IPI does not see this as either a direct attack on the polio team. nor an attempted abduction - the militants shoot from surrounding hilltops at any thing which moves & go into hiding only when Pak helicopters secure the air above. Other polio-related recent attacks: ■ 19 January 2015, in Orangi Town, Karachi. a junior police official belonging to the Anti-Encroachment Police was shot when he was guarding a polio team nearby - however. IPI would point out that encroachment & illegally occupied sullen land. especially in Karachi, is a major combat arena between the "land math" and the authorities; ■ 26 Jan 2015. in Nazimabad, Karachi. a police recruit under uaing was shot dead as he guarded a polio team - this attack. too, was aimed at the uniform. not at the polio workers who escaped into a house - the attackers on a motorbike could easily have Emoted them too. ■ 4 Feb 2015 in Quetta. 1 policeman guarding a polio team was killed near the Basic Health Unit in Pashtunabad, on his way back from prayers in a nearby mosque - hence not polio but the uniform was the direct target; ■ 4 Feb 2015 in lacobabad dish. Sindh. 2 brothers administering anti-polio drops without police escort were attacked by 6 men armed with hachets & clubs, the leader of the attackers was identified - IPI research has so far not yielded the true motive but the modus operand! & names lead to the suspicion that family or business rivalry was involved. END. EFTA00864082