EFTA00703319.pdf

From: Office of Tetje Rod-Larsen Subject: April 11 update Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 11:23:59 +0000 11 April, 2014 Article I. NYT The Limits of Special K' Roger Cohen Article 2. Bloomberg Can Kerry Get Netanyahu to Go Big? Jeffrey Goldberg Article 3. The Weekly Standard The Tinkerbell Effect Elliott Abrams Article 4. Al Monitor Islamic Jihad gains support in Gaza as Hamas declines Rasha Abou Jalal Article 5. The American Interest Can the Egyptian-American Relationship Be "Reinvented"? Daniel C. Kurtzer Article 6. The Wall Street Journal Here's What I Would Have Said at Brandeis Ayaan Hirsi Ali Article 7. The Washington Post The tension between global norms and national interests Fareed Zakaria Article R. New Statesman Why futurologists are always wrong l an Applemd• Anicic I. NYT The Limits of `Special K' Roger Cohen April 10, 2014 EFTA00703319 Poof. Poof. Poof. The word Secretary of State John Kerry used before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a good one. Nine months of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation and, faster than you can say Holy Land, everything goes up in smoke. Or rather, everything descends into a pre-K schoolyard squabble that amounts to proof that neither side is serious today about a two-state peace settlement. Worse than unedifying, the squabbling, grandstanding and horse-trading of the past couple of weeks has been pathetic. Kerry should leave the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, his Snapchat name and go home. "Hasta la vista, Baby," might be an appropriate adieu. This is what transpires when an intense diplomatic effort brings a changed style — Kerry's energetic shuttling — but no changed ideas. The "Special K" effect is not enough. It falls short when you have a 66-year-old conflict and a 47-year-old Israeli occupation of the West Bank during which the two sides have grown progressively more estranged, and the gap between the maximum potential Israeli offer and minimum Palestinian demand keeps growing. Time for a "reality check," Kerry says. In reality, meaningful negotiations stopped some months ago (Senator John McCain is right at least about this). In reality, the recent Israeli decision to move forward with plans to build 700 new settlement units in Jerusalem reflects a widespread view within Netanyahu's governing coalition (and quite likely in his heart of hearts) that not an inch of land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River should be surrendered. In reality, Abbas has zero democratic legitimacy; he leads a divided Palestinian national movement whose talk of reconciliation has proved as much hot air as promises of elections. In reality, both Israel and the United States have turned a blind eye to widespread corruption and nepotism within the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority, hoping Abbas will deliver if not peace then at least quiet. In reality this cynical attitude amounts to an investment in the status quo. EFTA00703320 In reality, Netanyahu's insistence on up-front Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (not a demand made of Egypt or Jordan) amounts to so much bloviation designed to undermine any talks by placing at the front of the agenda an issue that can be resolved with minimal drafting skills if the two sides are ever close enough to a deal for it to matter. In reality, for domestic political reasons, the Obama administration has lacked the courage to state again what the president said almost three years ago — that any territorial settlement should be based on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps (the only possible foundation for a two-state peace). In reality current attempts to prolong the negotiation amount to attempts to extend a non-negotiation without even an American framework for peace, an idea that has gradually vanished as the gulf between the sides (on everything from Jerusalem to refugees) has grown. Salam Fayyad, the former Palestinian prime minister, made a speech last month in Britain in which he said: "To us Palestinians, the Israeli occupation has certainly been oppressive enough for us to want to see it end yesterday. But just as the occupation is oppressive to us, it cannot but be corrosive to our Israeli neighbors. Evidently though, it has not been, and still it is not corrosive enough to bring about the transformation needed to bridge the expectations gap. For how else can one explain, inter alia, the insatiable appetite of Israel's settlement enterprise for more and more expropriation of, and building on, the very territory where the Palestinian state is supposed to emerge, and at a time when many, including in Israel itself, clearly see how damaging this is to whatever remains of the viability of the two-state solution concept?" There is not a more reasonable voice among Palestinians than Fayyad's. If the West Bank has begun to resemble a state, it is thanks to him. He believes, passionately, in two states living side by side in peace, security, freedom and prosperity. But Fayyad sees no chance of that being achieved in negotiations with the current leaders in the current political situations. Kerry should take a break. Prolonging failure only demonstrates weakness. His commitment deserves better than the shallow maneuvers of weasels. The secretary of state does not wield a "twig," as McCain suggested, but American clout can only be demonstrated if there is a limit to the accommodation of unserious people. EFTA00703321 Let the impasse fester for a while (it has for decades), focus on securing a lasting nuclear deal with Iran, and demonstrate thereby that the United States is capable of acting in its own interests when necessary, irrespective of the views of even its closest allies. More than a few people in the Middle East would then sit up, and — poof — drop their posturing and playacting. Bloomberg Can Kerry Get Netanyahu to Go Big? Jeffrey Goldberg Apr 10, 2014 -- John Kerry is waiting for Benjamin Netanyahu to nail himself to a very large cross. Unfortunately, you're going to have to keep reading to find out what I mean by this. First, here are four assumptions about the Middle East peace process: 1. It's dead. 2. John Kerry, the U.S. secretary of state, is the Captain Ahab of the two- state solution, a vainglorious and delusional man devoting too much time to a peace plan that won't work. 3. Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, is an old and weak man who will never acknowledge the validity of the Jewish narrative, and therefore never be able to make a historic compromise with the Jewish state. 4. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, is a small and cowardly man who will never accede to the creation of a Palestinian state. The first assumption, as we're learning today, isn't true. The death certificate for the process was issued last week, when Israel failed to deliver -- in line with a previously determined schedule -- on a promise to release a fourth set of Palestinian prisoners from its jails. This failure was followed by a Palestinian decision to seek membership in various international conventions, a move that violated a previously made promise to avoid "internationalizing" the negotiations. Then came the EFTA00703322 issuance of an Israeli tender for more housing units in a suburb of Jerusalem that offended the Palestinians. But the parties are actually working through their differences on the prisoner release issue. There is a decent-to-good chance they will succeed in pushing through the current bottleneck. It wouldn't surprise me if one of the many moving parts in this latest negotiation (to my chagrin) is Jonathan Pollard; the release of this American spy could be part of a deal to end the current crisis. Which brings me to John Kerry -- and the second assumption. Kerry is many things, but he is not delusional. He believes that Israel is heading down a dangerous path, and that it will not survive as a Jewish-majority democracy if it continues to occupy and settle the West Bank. Now, I know that every iteration of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process over the past 21 years has been called the last chance for peace. But the cliche feels truer now than it has in the past. Israel is tipping into broad isolation, and Palestinians -- those who may be predisposed to a two-state solution -- are giving up hope. Kerry, one of the last of a generation of intuitively, emotionally pro-Israel Democratic leaders, is not delusional to think that Israel is in trouble. Nor is he delusional to believe -- as he does -- that the average Palestinian on the West Bank is made miserable by the policies of Israeli occupation authorities. Nor is he delusional to believe that Palestinians already inclined to hopelessness might rise up in the absence of a Palestinian state and begin a third uprising. Is Kerry spending too much time on this issue? Maybe. Syria is a charnel house. The South China Sea is boiling. Putin is Putin. But it is difficult to argue, especially for supporters of Israel, that the two-state solution isn't worth pursuing. Assumption three may be true. Kerry appears to believe that Abbas has it in him to reach a historic compromise with his enemy. This compromise not only would mean that he has to make peace with the idea that Zionism is the movement of a people returning to its ancestral homeland, rather than a form of neo-colonialism, but it would also compel him to sell this idea to his people. Many Israelis have accepted the inevitability of some sort of Palestinian state coming into existence on the West Bank. Many Palestinians have not EFTA00703323 yet come to realize that Israel has a right to exist in at least part of Palestine. It will take a bold leader to convince Palestinians of this. Kerry, like U.S. President Barack Obama, believes Abbas is the best leader the Palestinians have, or will have. This may be true, but it doesn't mean that he's strong enough to deliver. Obama and Kerry are experts on the subject of Netanyahu's flaws. They might not have an adequate handle on Abbas's. The fourth assumption possesses elements of truth. Kerry believes that Netanyahu is the only Israeli leader strong enough to make peace and divide the land. Like Obama, he is unimpressed with Israel's light political bench. He also believes that Netanyahu is applying himself in good faith to the peace process. But he thinks that Netanyahu is torn between two roles - - world-historical peacemaker and mayor of Israel. Kerry's frustration with Netanyahu (a frustration he shares with Obama) is that Kerry believes the prime minister is often more interested in preserving his political coalition, and his hold on power, than in making the bold push for peace. So long as Netanyahu acts as a long-serving mayor, and not as a prime minister, there will be no breakthrough. Which brings us to the prime minister's cross. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden has often argued to Netanyahu that it would be best for him to nail himself to one large cross, rather than to a thousand small ones. (Only Biden would use crucifixion imagery to describe an Israeli prime minister's dilemma, but there you have it.) Kerry, Obama and their negotiators believe that Netanyahu will, sooner or later, have to stop nailing himself to a series of small crosses (prisoner releases, minor settlement compromises) and move to the big cross: Endangering, and possibly breaking apart, his right-wing coalition in order to advance to final-status negotiations with the Palestinians. In these broad negotiations, Israel would have to dismantle dozens of settlements in the West Bank: This is the biggest cross. It's an open question whether Netanyahu has this in him. Intellectually, he knows the price Israel must pay for a two-state solution. The question is whether this man of inaction can bring himself to risk his political career for a final deal. Kerry believes that Netanyahu is capable of taking a momentous step. Which is why he is sticking with the peace process, EFTA00703324 despite all the criticism. Kerry may be wrong about Netanyahu, and he may be wrong about Abbas. But he is not wrong to keep trying. Jeffrey Goldberg is a columnist for Bloomberg View writing about the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy and national affairs. He is the author of "Prisoners: A Story of Friendship and Terror" and a winner of the National Magazine Awardfor reporting. The Weekly Standard The Tinkerbell Effect Elliott Abrams April 21, 2014 -- In his Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony last week, Secretary of State John Kerry blamed Israel for the breakdown in peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. He argued that an Israeli announcement of 700 new housing units for a neighborhood in Jerusalem were what did in the talks. "Poof, that was sort of the moment," Kerry said. "We find ourselves where we are." This is an amazing claim, especially when the housing units are not in a settlement—but are in Jerusalem, Israel's capital, in a location that every Israeli and every Palestinian knows will be part of Israel in any possible peace agreement. In fact, Kerry's actions during his 15 months as secretary of state are why "we find ourselves where we are." The only surprise here is the total lack of introspection or comprehension he exhibits. Kerry jumped into these negotiations, secure in the belief that he could deliver success—and therefore not even thinking about the damage that could be done if the talks blew up. But why—why was he so confident? What was his analysis of world affairs, of events in the region, or of the politics of the two sides that led him to conclude this was the moment-2013 and 2014—when a deal was at hand? The answer is found in his speech last December to the Saban Forum, a gathering of Israeli and American officials and former officials at the Brookings Institution in Washington. Here are the key passages: EFTA00703325 Late last night I got back from my eighth visit to Israel. . . my eighth visit as secretary of state. Now, I am not a masochist. (Laughter.) I am undertaking this because I believe in the possibilities. And as many of ou know, I have spent almost 30 years in the United States Senate, and proud of my 100 percent voting record for Israel, but proud also that I built up relationships in the Mideast with leaders in Arab countries and elsewhere who learned that they could come to trust me. And I believe that I approach this great challenge with a huge sense of responsibility about building trust and ultimately building a process that will test and provide guarantees to people about this concept called peace. I will tell you point blank, and I've read all of the history of these negotiations and I've lived part of the history of these negotiations. I was on the lawn when the famous handshake took place. And I've had many, many a meeting over the course of time as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and as a senator. But I believe that if you indeed care about Israel, and everybody here does, if you care about its security, if you care about its future, if you care about Palestinians achieving their legitimate aspirations for self- determination, which we do also, we need to believe that peace is possible. And we all need to act on that belief. This is a combination of faith-based diplomacy and personal vanity. The argument seems to be that peace is possible because Kerry has relationships with leaders, Kerry is trusted, Kerry was in the Senate for 30 years, Kerry chaired the Foreign Relations Committee, and Kerry was on the White House lawn when Rabin shook hands with Arafat. So our job is to have faith in him, and if we believe that peace is possible, it will come. This latter is known as the Tinkerbell Effect, based on the passage in Peter Pan where the fairy Tinkerbell has taken poison but can be revived if people believe in her. Peter flung out his arms. There were no children there, and it was night time; but he addressed all who might be dreaming of the Neverland. . . . "If you believe," he shouted to them, "clap your hands; don't let Tink die." Apparently it didn't work with the Palestinians, who failed to clap. Kerry's casting of blame at Israel was rebuffed sharply by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: An official in his office told the New York Times, "Secretary Kerry knows that it was the Palestinians who said 'no' to continued direct talks with Israel in November; who said 'no' to his EFTA00703326 proposed framework for final status talks; who said `no' to even discussing recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people; who said `no' to a meeting with Kerry himself; and who said `no' to an extension of the talks." And remember, this comes after various bribes were paid to the Palestinians to get them to come to the negotiating table after four years of refusal—Barack Obama's entire first term. One of those bribes was the release of 78 murderers from Israeli jails—Palestinian terrorists who were granted a hero's welcome upon returning home. This is the rebuttal to those who believe Kerry's 15 months of efforts have produced nothing at all: Seventy-eight killers are free, anyway. It is also the rebuttal to those who think that efforts like Kerry's may of course fail but come at little cost: Freeing killers is a cost. Failure for the United States is a cost. And now, blaming Israel and thereby damaging U.S.-Israel relations is another cost. Kerry gets an A for effort, to be sure, and was sincere and dogged throughout these 15 months of exertion. He displayed a deep desire to help both sides move forward. But his own vanity got in the way of a sober assessment of the chances for success, and the failure of the effort—even if sooner or later the two sides do sit down together again—diminishes his own prestige and effectiveness as our top diplomat. It's past time for the administration to keep him home and spend a while rethinking five years of failed Middle East policy. "Clap your hands; don't let Tink die" doesn't make the grade. Elliott Abrams served as an assistant secretary ofstate in the Reagan administration and deputy national security adviser to President George W. Bush. Al Monitor Islamic Jihad gains support in Gaza as Hamas declines Rasha Abou Jalal April 10, 2014 -- Gaza City -- Despite the general harmony between Hamas and Islamic Jihad on political positions involving the Israeli- EFTA00703327 Palestinian conflict, a rivalry exists behind the scenes. The two compete to attract Islamist supporters and appear to the public as the group best suited to achieve the aspirations and hopes of the Palestinian people. These Islamist movements use various methods to garner support, such as mass mobilizations, donating food and money to the poor, proselytizing and insisting on such Palestinian constants as the importance of Jerusalem and the right of return of the refugees. In general, they aim to fulfill the public's wishes. Although Hamas is more popular than Islamic Jihad, a recent poll by the Watan Center for Studies and Research in the Gaza Strip suggests increased support for the Islamic Jihad movement amid reports of declining popularity for Hamas. Among Gazans, 23.3% expressed support for Hamas, while 13.5% preferred Islamic Jihad. Fatah, however, was more popular than the Islamist movements individually, with the support of 32.9% of Gazans. Backing for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine stood at 4.2% and 1.5% for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Of all those surveyed, 24.6% had no opinion. Because Islamic Jihad has not participated in elections, it is difficult to determine its popularity in that respect. This latest poll suggests a rise in the group's popularity compared to the results of previous polls conducted by local research centers in recent years. In a 2010 poll, for example, Islamic Jihad registered only 1% in terms of popularity vis-a-vis other Palestinian factions. The Watan Center survey consisted of interviews with 467 people of both sexes and was conducted throughout the Gaza Strip on Feb. 9-17. The results were picked up by various media outlets at the end of March. The poll also revealed that the public largely supports armed resistance to obtain Palestinian rights. Of those surveyed, 60.3% believe that armed resistance is the most appropriate way to attain the rights of the Palestinian people if negotiations fail, while 6.5% support continuing negotiations. The burden of governance has cost Hamas popularity on the ground as it struggles to steer Gaza through the hardships associated with the Israeli- Egyptian siege and a series of economic and political crises. Political analyst Iyad Atallah explained, "Hamas suffers from declining grassroots popularity due to growing discontent caused by the lack of success in EFTA00703328 resolving livelihood crises for citizens, such as providing electricity and fuel, and solving the problem of the Rafah crossing." He also explained to Al-Monitor, "Hamas came to power in Gaza and started running civil affairs for the citizens. That distracted the movement on many occasions from confronting Israel militarily, thus leaving the pro—armed resistance public to the Islamic Jihad movement, which still conducts organized retaliations against Israeli attacks." On March 12, the Al-Quds Brigades, the military wing of Islamic Jihad, launched 130 locally made rockets at Israel as part of a military operation dubbed Breaking the Silence. The attack was in response to the killing of three Islamic Jihad fighters. The group threatened that the response "will be of the same size as Zionist violations if they continue." Khader Habib, an Islamic Jihad official, told Al-Monitor that the movement has become more popular because it has stuck with armed resistance, has not granted legitimacy to Israel's existence anywhere on Palestinian soil and has stayed away from governance and participation in the Palestinian Authority, which stems from the 1993 Oslo Accord. "We are a movement that refuses to let Israel go unpunished when it attacks our people, and we believe that becoming part of the ruling authority would be catastrophic. That's the secret behind why more people are supporting us," Habib asserted. The results of the Watan Center poll were in line with those of a survey by Alam wa Sinaa, an Iranian university, involving 1,263 Gazans after March 2012 clashes between Islamic Jihad and Israel. The Iranian poll showed a clear change in attitudes among Gaza residents in revealing a rise in popularity for Islamic Jihad at the expense of Hamas, because the former adhered to the option of resistance to the occupation. Islamic Jihad's Habib said his movement was closely following opinion polls about its support among the Palestinian street and asserted that it reinforces its leadership's conviction that armed struggle is the only way to fully obtain Palestinian rights. The analyst Atallah explained Hamas' situation, stating, "Hamas has more elements and more hardware compared to Islamic Jihad, but it doesn't want continuous conflict with Israel," he said. "A new military confrontation will cause material losses that would include the homes of citizens and possibly factories and iron workshops, resulting in more unemployed and EFTA00703329 people in need of shelter. This would increase the material burden on Hamas." Political analyst Hassan Abdo said that Islamic Jihad's decision to stick with armed resistance and immediately respond with attacks against the occupation are the main reasons for its increased support. He contended that immediately responding to the occupation inspires people, earns their admiration and fulfills their desire not to let Israel's actions go unpunished, leading to increased popular support. Abdo also noted that Islamic Jihad has stuck to its political principles, despite the local and regional changes around it. This is evidenced by the group sticking with its allies in Syria and Iran despite their current crises. Abdo believes this adds to Palestinians' impression that Islamic Jihad is more consistent in its positions as opposed to Hamas. According to Atallah, Islamic Jihad's continued alliance with Syria and Iran forces the movement to resist being silent in the face of Israeli attacks. "Islamic Jihad sticking to the Syria and Iran axis is a source of strength for it, especially in light of the lack of Arab funding sources for [the movement]," he said. On the other hand, he noted, Hamas' alliance with Qatar has not been warmly received by locals. "[The Qatar-Hamas alliance] is something the Palestinians don't want. ... The Palestinians respect Qatar for its assistance and funds, but they fear a political role by [Qatar] because of its good relations with America and Israel." Rasha Abou Jalal is a writer andfreelance journalistfrom Gaza specializing in political news and humanitarian and social issues linked to current events. The American Interest Can the Egyptian-American Relationship Be "Reinvented"? Daniel C. Kurtzcr April 8, 2014 -- For more than thirty years the Egyptian-American relationship has been at the heart of U.S. policies in the Middle East. Because of its depth and breadth, it was able to withstand the normal EFTA00703330 differences of opinion and policy that divide global and regional powers. That relationship, based on peace between Egypt and Israel but extending to every one of America's engagements in the region, is broken, and merely tinkering around the edges will not repair it. The decline of understanding between the United States and Egypt has jeopardized our image in Egypt and our ability to influence Egypt's domestic order. Without a strong U.S.-Egyptian relationship, the United States cannot achieve its many objectives in the region. While both countries can survive the parting of ways that appears increasingly likely, there is no reason to consummate the divorce without one more effort to renew vows according to a revised set of mutual interests and a clearer understanding of where we differ. The American administration and the Egyptian government have an opportunity to reinvent the bilateral relationship to mutual advantage. The tumult since the 2011 ouster of President Hosni Mubarak has obscured the fact that at least three of the four pillars on which the decades-old relationship between the two countries was built still remain in place. Egypt has as great an interest today as it had in 1979 in maintaining the peace treaty with Israel, which is perhaps the primary anchor for the relationship. Insecurity is growing in the Sinai, and Egypt requires the intelligence and security cooperation it enjoys with Israel. Radical Islamists from Gaza now represent as much of a threat to Egypt as they do to Israel, and Egypt has seen fit to aggressively act to shut down tunnels used for smuggling. The preservation of the peace treaty and the strengthening of Egyptian-Israeli ties are still important to the United States as well, especially as the Administration actively pursues a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. No less important is the strategic military and intelligence cooperation Egyptians and Americans have fostered over more than three decades. Egypt faces a number of significant security challenges, all of which are also important to the United States, including the peaceful resolution of disputes over Nile waters, managing the chaos in Libya, and focusing on counterinsurgency so as to push back against the efforts by terrorists to establish a base of operations in Sinai. Egypt needs the tools to fight terrorism, and this is where U.S. and Egyptian interests continue to coincide. Moreover, Egypt's political and security interests extend far EFTA00703331 beyond its own borders. Our friends in the Gulf regard Egypt as a key component in their security and judge the quality of the U.S.-Egypt relationship as a part of their security ties to the United States. A third pillar of the relationship relates to Egypt's economic well-being, a matter of deep concern more than thirty years ago that has returned to the fore since the 2011 revolution. It is in no one's interest for the Egyptian economy to remain reliant on the largesse of the Saudis and other Gulf states. Economic growth rates before the revolution demonstrate that Egypt has the means to advance economically with less foreign assistance. The fourth pillar of the relationship has created a wide chasm of mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides: the degree to which Egypt remains a military-dominated authoritarian state or begins moving toward a more open, democratic society in which there is respect for diversity, human rights, and basic freedoms. Astonishingly, Egyptians believe the United States is responsible for all the ills that have befallen their country since the revolution. They even believe that the United States installed the Muslim Brotherhood in power in order to dominate Egyptian society. Equally astonishing, some in the United States believe that the only metric by which to measure the value of relations with Egypt is the degree to which Egypt meets their democratization standards. To be sure, the direction of Egyptian internal politics does not lend itself to optimism or complacency with regard to the prospects for democratization. The brutal crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood and some liberal opponents of the military-backed government have closed off Egypt's political space in ways reminiscent of the worst periods of repression in the past. The prospect that General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will be the next President is not in itself a danger, but the military's tone-deafness regarding the balance between stability and openness is a bad sign. Al-Sisi's decision to resign as Defense Minister and to declare his candidacy just a day after more than 500 Muslim Brotherhood members were sentenced to death could not have been more ominous or poorly timed. Egyptian-American relations have always been fractious, even during periods that appeared calm on the surface. The two countries do not share a common political culture or a common view of the region or the world. In the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt guarded its professed neutrality in the Cold War, even as it opened its doors to thousands of Soviet military advisors EFTA00703332 and adopted strident anti-American positions in public. For the Eisenhower Administration, which demanded that countries make a choice between the Soviets or the United States, Egypt was considered part of the opposition, notwithstanding Egypt's formal non-aligned status. President Kennedy and to some extent President Johnson tested the waters for improved U.S.- Egyptian ties, but the gaps were too deep and wide. Indeed, it wasn't until Gamal Abdel Nasser passed from the scene in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat that a real opportunity presented itself to change the nature of bilateral relations. Sadat held to a strategic view that the United States was and would remain the dominant power in the Middle East. He was frustrated with the stagnation in the peace process, which he attributed to Israeli obstinacy; upset over the American preference for "standstill diplomacy" and its growing strategic ties with Israel; and angry at the Soviets for withholding arms and support he required to break the diplomatic logjam. His strategy for the 1973 war was designed to deal with all of these frustrations, to change the regional balance of power and alignments. His goals were to build a U.S.-Egyptian partnership that would unlock the stalled peace process and recover Egyptian territory, and to help Egypt escape from its pressing economic crisis. The forging of the strategic relations between Egypt and the United States during the 1973-79 period resulted from the convergence of three critical factors. First, the interests of the two countries coincided far more than they diverged, including replacing the Egyptian-Soviet alliance with an Egyptian-American relationship; starting (and ultimately concluding) a peace process in which Egypt would recover the Sinai; and building a bilateral military and economic relationship fueled by American assistance. Second, the degree to which these goals were translated into action resulted from the growing trust and mutual admiration between Sadat and senior American officials. Third, the United States was seen, and acted, as the dominant power in the region, acting with diplomatic agility and determination that was backed up by strong presidential leadership. This common strategic vision provided the foundation for the policy goals of the emerging Egyptian-American relationship—namely, peace between Egypt and Israel, supported actively by the United States, as evidenced by the American role in negotiating the treaty and its ongoing role in treaty EFTA00703333 compliance; Egyptian-American military partnership which, through 2012, was fueled by $41.85 billion in U.S. military aid; and the transformation of the Egyptian economy, assisted by $31.3 billion in U.S. economic assistance. On the eve of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, therefore, Egypt and the United States could point to a strategic relationship that had accomplished many of its major goals, weathered some significant storms, and appeared resilient and flexible. Indeed, one could not help but recall the story, probably apocryphal, of the Soviet General who was asked to reflect on Sadat's 1972 decision to kick the Soviets out of Egypt. "Yes, we are disappointed," said the General, "but we did get seventeen good years, not bad for a big power-small power relationship." By 2011, the United States could point to more than thirty good years of strategic partnership. No reasonable analyst of the Egyptian-American relationship should overlook the huge contributions Egypt made directly and indirectly during the Gulf War and later in sustaining U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the relationship is hanging by a thread, with accumulating anger in both Cairo and Washington over real and perceived policy differences. The Egyptian military may feel less dependent on the United States for modernization; Washington may place less value on military relations; Egypt's economy is in a free fall from which the United States, with limited resources and even less will, cannot extricate it; and the promising 2011 road to democracy is now strewn with the bodies of Muslim Brothers, Coptic Christians, and some liberals. Paradoxically, however, the respective interests of Egypt and the United States continue to converge and, in some respects, may call for further cooperation. Strategic, mutual interests are evident in the need to prevent the Sinai Peninsula from becoming a lawless haven for criminal and terrorist activity; in the imperative of resolving Nile water disputes between Ethiopia and Egypt amicably in an increasingly water-challenged region; in the continued instability in South Sudan and the acute possibility that internal differences there will revive cross-border fighting with Sudan; and in the U.S. requirement, at least for several more years, of a stable, secure transportation and logistics route as U.S. forces transition out of Afghanistan. EFTA00703334 The divide between these two partners thus comes down almost entirely to the future direction of Egypt's political system. For a majority of the Egyptian population, the military's role in politics promises stability and normalcy missing from Egyptian life since Mubarak's overthrow. The liberal opposition in Egypt, now affected by the military-backed government's crackdown on all forms of opposition, may not sit as still in the future as it did under Mubarak. For the foreseeable future, however, its demands for political inclusiveness and respect for the rule of law will likely not have resonance among the masses. NGOs and outsiders, including the United States, have been relegated to the sidelines; even the threat or reality of aid cutoffs seems to leave little impression on Egypt's rulers. Still, it is unwise to write off Egypt's revolution as a lost cause and to conclude that Egypt has returned permanently to the repression of the past. Egypt is just emerging from a time of crises and chaos. The end of the story has not yet been written. All of Egypt's leaders, military and civilian, agree on one point: They can no longer take the Egyptian public for granted. When aroused, it can destroy any offending political order. This disparity between the two countries' hard interests and the "softer" issues of democracy and respect for human and civil rights is being driven largely by deep debates within both societies. In Egypt, the army and its allies are vying with the Islamists for influence and power, each pretending to speak for the nation while protecting and advancing its own narrow interests. The liberal opposition is a new political force and a potent check on absolute power, but has yet to organize politically or develop a positive agenda for change. Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy has said that "the outlook for the new Egypt...[is] a country whose future will be driven increasingly by the absolute imperative of sustained economic growth; increased resource and demographic pressures; and all of this against the backdrop of greater pluralism and political openness." Strong and positive words, but they have yet to be backed up by a serious political commitment to an open, pluralist system. In the United States, liberals have joined forces with neoconservatives to oppose further assistance to Egypt, while some realists and traditional conservatives have argued for the strategic importance of maintaining ties with Egypt. No one argues the case against Egypt's continued importance in strategic terms, but the question is whether American political values EFTA00703335 can coexist with an Egypt that is likely to exhibit strong authoritarian tendencies into the future. Will shared strategic interests—largely unchanged over the past thirty years—be able to withstand the political and emotional roller coaster of Egyptian politics and the vagaries of American policy preferences? Since almost all of the longstanding shared interests remain substantially the same, a new "social contract" between the United States and Egypt will need to be nuanced and textured, encompassing areas where agreement includes joint action, as well as areas where there is no agreement but a willingness to engage in dialogue. First, Egypt and the United States should recommit not only to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty but also to coordinating policy with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It is important to reconstitute this dialogue and this arena of cooperation if any progress is to be made in resolving the underlying conflict in Palestine. Second, Egypt and the United States should reinvigorate the moribund strategic dialogue and invest it with meaning. Senior officials should meet semi-annually to share analysis and try to concert approaches on issues such as Nile waters, Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and the like. This dialogue needs to be institutionalized and invested with meaning. Third, a high-level dialogue must yield a fundamental reorientation of American military assistance. Egypt needs equipment and training related to Canal transit protective equipment and training and for counter- terrorism, the principal threat Egypt now faces. Fourth, a high-level dialogue must also yield a fundamental reorientation of American economic assistance. American aid to Egypt has been more successful than most Egyptians are prepared to admit, but it is now accomplishing little, as Egypt's economy (hopefully) recovers from the downslide of the past three years. One of Egypt's most pressing problems in the years ahead will be job creation, as the population surpasses 100 million and 750,000 Egyptians enter the workforce annually. The newly established U.S.-Egypt enterprise fund is a creative way for the United States to use assistance funds for the purpose of economic growth and employment. The United States can make a special and lasting contribution through support for education, such as assured annual funding for the American University in Cairo (where I serve as a member of the Board), EFTA00703336 and substantial funding for scholarships for Egyptian students to study in American universities. This will help prepare Egyptians for the jobs so desperately needed and provide exposure to the American educational system and its values of democracy and freedom. With these important areas of cooperation and partnership reaffirmed, and with American assistance reconfigured and continued, Egypt must be ready to embark on a path to pluralism and openness. The United States cannot expect to dictate the terms of this transition; the pace and scope of change must be decided in Egypt. But Egypt must be open to American thinking, and must make a convincing case that change is more than cosmetic. An important start and sign will be an end of the brutal repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and the liberal opposition. A second step must be a serious national reconciliation process, to include young and old, Muslim and Copt, military and civilians. After all, national reconciliation is in Egypt's interests, and respect for human rights, freedom of expression, judicial independence, religious tolerance, and the rights of women should be included in Egypt's newly-drafted and approved constitution. Surely these issues can be part of a reasoned, respectful bilateral dialogue. None of these steps, individually or collectively, is assured to rebuild trust. But the failure to take these steps assuredly will allow for the continued erosion of trust. Trust is built on facts, and these will take time to accumulate. It is late, but not too late to recreate the basis for a serious strategic relationship between two longstanding allies. Daniel C. Kurtzer, a former United States ambassador to Egypt and to Israel, is a professor of Middle Eastern policy studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. Anock 6. The Wall Street Journal Here's What I Would Have Said at Brandeis Ayaan Hirsi Ali April 10, 2014 -- On Tuesday, after protests by students, faculty and outside groups, Brandeis University revoked its invitation to Ayaan Hirsi Ali to receive an honorary degree at its commencement ceremonies in May. EFTA00703337 The protesters accused Ms. Hirsi Ali, an advocatefor the rights of women and girls, of being "Islamophobic." Here is an abridged version of the remarks she planned to deliver. One year ago, the city and suburbs of Boston were still in mourning. Families who only weeks earlier had children and siblings to hug were left with only photographs and memories. Still others were hovering over bedsides, watching as young men, women, and children endured painful surgeries and permanent disfiguration. All because two brothers, radicalized by jihadist websites, decided to place homemade bombs in backpacks near the finish line of one of the most prominent events in American sports, the Boston Marathon. All of you in the Class of 2014 will never forget that day and the days that followed. You will never forget when you heard the news, where you were, or what you were doing. And when you return here, 10, 15 or 25 years from now, you will be reminded of it. The bombs exploded just 10 miles from this campus. Related Video Associate books editor Bari Weiss on Brandeis University's decision to withdraw its offer of an honorary degree to women's rights activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Photo credit: Associated Press. I read an article recently that said many adults don't remember much from before the age of 8. That means some of your earliest childhood memories may well be of that September morning simply known as "9/11." You deserve better memories than 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing. And you are not the only ones. In Syria, at least 120,000 people have been killed, not simply in battle, but in wholesale massacres, in a civil war that is increasingly waged across a sectarian divide. Violence is escalating in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Libya, in Egypt. And far more than was the case when you were born, organized violence in the world today is disproportionately concentrated in the Muslim world. Another striking feature of the countries I have just named, and of the Middle East generally, is that violence against women is also increasing. In Saudi Arabia, there has been a noticeable rise in the practice of female genital mutilation. In Egypt, 99% of women report being sexually harassed and up to 80 sexual assaults occur in a single day. EFTA00703338 Especially troubling is the way the status of women as second-class citizens is being cemented in legislation. In Iraq, a law is being proposed that lowers to 9 the legal age at which a girl can be forced into marriage. That same law would give a husband the right to deny his wife permission to leave the house. Sadly, the list could go on. I hope I speak for many when I say that this is not the world that my generation meant to bequeath yours. When you were born, the West was jubilant, having defeated Soviet communism. An international coalition had forced Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The next mission for American armed forces would be famine relief in my homeland of Somalia. There was no Department of Homeland Security, and few Americans talked about terrorism. Two decades ago, not even the bleakest pessimist would have anticipated all that has gone wrong in the part of world where I grew up. After so many victories for feminism in the West, no one would have predicted that women's basic human rights would actually be reduced in so many countries as the 20th century gave way to the 21st. Today, however, I am going to predict a better future, because I believe that the pendulum has swung almost as far as it possibly can in the wrong direction. When I see millions of women in Afghanistan defying threats from the Taliban and lining up to vote; when I see women in Saudi Arabia defying an absurd ban on female driving; and when I see Tunisian women celebrating the conviction of a group of policemen for a heinous gang rape, I feel more optimistic than I did a few years ago. The misnamed Arab Spring has been a revolution full of disappointments. But I believe it has created an opportunity for traditional forms of authority—including patriarchal authority—to be challenged, and even for the religious justifications for the oppression of women to be questioned. Yet for that opportunity to be fulfilled, we in the West must provide the right kind of encouragement. Just as the city of Boston was once the cradle of a new ideal of liberty, we need to return to our roots by becoming once again a beacon of free thought and civility for the 21st century. When there is injustice, we need to speak out, not simply with condemnation, but with concrete actions. EFTA00703339 One of the best places to do that is in our institutions of higher learning. We need to make our universities temples not of dogmatic orthodoxy, but of truly critical thinkin , where all ideas are welcome and where civil debate is encouraged.. used to being shouted down on campuses, so I am grateful for the opportunity to address you today. I do not expect all of you to agree with me, but I very much appreciate your willingness to listen. I stand before you as someone who is fighting for women's and girls' basic rights globally. And I stand before you as someone who is not afraid to ask difficult questions about the role of religion in that fight. The connection between violence, particularly violence against women, and Islam is too clear to be ignored. We do no favors to students, faculty, nonbelievers and people of faith when we shut our eyes to this link, when we excuse rather than reflect. So I ask: Is the