EFTA01100373.pdf
dataset_9 pdf 470.3 KB • Feb 3, 2026 • 5 pages
DRAFT
EPSTEIN - CVRA - REPLY TO PETITONER'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION:
1. Any failure to notify or consult were not the result of any
"conspiracy" with JE, nor any bad faith by the Government: they
were the result of the USAO following the nationwide DOJ policy
that was reinforced by a Memorandum Opinion for the Acting Deputy
Attorney General from the Office of Legal Counsel on December 17,
2010 which determined that "The rights provided by the Crime
Victims' Rights Act are guaranteedfrom the time that criminal
proceedings are initiated (by complaint, information, or indictment)
and cease to be available if all charges are dismissed...(or if the
Government declines to bring formal charges after the filing of a
complaint". It was not until May 29, 2015 that Congress amended the
CVRA, 18 USC 3771(a)(9) to clarify that victims have the "right to be
informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred
prosecution agreement" a re-codification that still does not clearly
require CVRA rights to apply in the absence of a federal plea
agreement or in circumstances where there is a federal Non-
Prosecution Agreement, Summary Judgment Motion (hereinafter
"Motion") at 48 fn 175.
2. In addition to following nationwide DOJ policy, the USAO had its
own independent and good faith interests for any decision not to fully
confer with each identified victim during the Sept 24 2007-June 30
2008 period, that being the USAO's credible and principled interest in
protecting the credibility of their witnesses in the event that the NPA
was never implemented. Although signed, the Government was
aware that further negotiations regarding how to fairly implement the
unique monetary reward provisions of 18 USC 2255 as well as
appeals to the Department of Justice by Epstein's counsel contesting
whether there was a sufficient jurisdictional basis for the underlying
federal investigation were ongoing, see eg Motion, Exhibit 39 (May
15, 2008 letter by the head of CEOS to Epstein's counsel overruling
their objections). The Government properly determined that to
disclose the NPA to its victim-witnesses given its containing explicit
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financial incentives would risk impairing the credibility of their victim
witnesses in the event the NPA not be finalized and should a federal
trial ensue, see Villafana Declaration, Dkt 14 at pgs 4-5 ("the agents
and I concluded that informing additional victims could compromise
the witnesses' credibility at trial if Epstein reneged on the
agreement")(emphasis added), see also Motion at 29 where FAUSA
Sloman emphasized to Epstein's counsel that "none of the victims was
informed of any right to receive damages of any amount prior to the
investigation of her claim". Until the appeals to DOJ were concluded
on June 23, 2008, see Motion at 34-35, par 105, and until Epstein
entered his state court plea seven days later, there existed uncertainty
as to whether the NPA would be implemented. The Government
apprehension that Epstein would plead guilty resulted in their
determination that it would compromise their ability to prosecute
Epstein if they disclosed the NPAs monetary incentives to the
potential victim-witnesses. Such a disclosure was reasonably believed
to create a financial bias in favor of a potential witness falsely
claiming that she was a victim thus rendering her eligible for a
mandatory financial reward that, by statute, was set at a minimum of
either $50,000 or $150,000 (the statute was amended mid-way
through the implementation of the NPA period) without any
individualized proof of injury or damages, 18 USC 2255. Such a
disclosure was also reasonably believed to provide a basis for Epstein,
had he elected to go to trial, to impeach the credibility of the
Government victim witnesses. That the Government was uncertain
during the September 2007-June 30, 2008 period that the NPA would
be finalized was beyond dispute: the FBI continued to investigate
Epstein during this period and the Grand Jury continued to receive
evidence relating to the alleged federal offenses during this period.
Rather than proof that the "Government and Epstein conspired to
conceal the NPA from the victims to prevent them from voicing any
objection...", Motion at 7, the Government made its decisions to
protect its ability to successfully prosecute Epstein in the event that
Epstein failed to finalize his obligations under the NPA as the
Government reasonably apprehended he might, given his repeated
expressions of dissatisfaction with the NPAs provisions and his
repeated appeals to various decision-makers in the Department of
Justice unsuccessfully seeking amendments to the NPA.
3. Jane Doe 2, TM, was hostile to the efforts of the USAO and FBI to
cooperate against Epstein, Villafana Declaration, Dkt 14 at pg 4, 6.
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She was not listed as a federal "victim" in the list provided to
Epstein's counsel shortly after the June 30, 2008 state plea. She
ultimately consented, through counsel, to a significant multi-year
delay in litigating the current petition (which under the statute
contains very strict time limits to protect both the petitioners and any
defendant who was serving a sentence) in order to prioritize and profit
from litigating a separate monetary damage lawsuit against Epstein
during which time she never contested the NPA.
4. Jane Doe 1, CW, was one of four victims that in fact were provided
with notice of the NPA as early as October of 2008, and who were
also provided pro bono counsel with the assistance of the Government
at a time prior to her retaining Mr. Edwards, Villafana Declaration,
Dkt 14 at pg 4, Motion at 25 ("the Special Agents have said that they
explained that Epstein would plead guilty to state charges involving
another victim, he would be required to register as a sex offender for
life, and he had made certain concessions related to the payment of
damages"). Jane Doe 1 also consented through counsel to a
significant multi-year delay in litigating the current petition during
which Epstein completed the service of his state criminal sentence in
order to prioritize and profit from litigating a separate monetary
damage lawsuit against Epstein, during which she never contested the
NPA.
5. There was no impropriety during the plea negotiations with Epstein.
The negotiations at all time were arms-length negotiations between
two parties with differing interests. The suggestions that Epstein's
counsel had undue influence over the negotiations are baseless: it was
Epstein who appealed from what his counsel contended were overly
Draconian conditions within the NPA that required his incarceration,
that required a plea to and conviction of a state sex offense that
mandated lifetime sex offender registration, and that required him to
consent to pay damages to each identified federal witness pursuant to
18 USC 2255 despite the absence of a federal plea or conviction and
despite his not receiving the victim list until after his state plea was
entered and his state sentence commenced. The eventual plea
agreement was not "indulgent", Motion at 4, and the USAO was
always pursuing its self-interest in reaching such an agreement rather
than doing "Epstein's bidding", Id. Despite the Motion's claim that
Epstein launched an "assault" on the prosecution after the execution
of the NPA in September of 2007, no ameliorative change was made
by the USAO to the NPA to benefit Epstein, see Motion at 20.
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6. The evidence received by the FBI and Grand Jury that investigated
federal child sexual offenses did not overwhelmingly prove each
element of the two pivotal statutes under consideration. Although
Epstein was shown to have traveled interstate and thereafter to have
engaged in illegal sexual conduct, he was traveling to his home, a
factor that could reasonably be relied upon by Epstein to contest the
mens rea for violating 18 USC 2423(b) that required proof that his
dominant purpose in traveling was to engage in underage sex.
Likewise, although Epstein scheduled sexual massages with underage
females, there was no internet inducement and the telephone
communications lacked the required indicia of persuasion,
inducement, enticement that would indisputably prove a violation of
18 USC 2422(b). At the time, 18 USC 1591 had only been used to
prosecute pimps or traffickers who derived a financial benefit from
sexual offenses. That Epstein's counsel and the USAO considered
various alternatives to a state court resolution, Motion at 12-15, is
consistent with the give and take of plea negotiations as parties
advance their respective positions in an effort to reach a compromise
resolution of an outstanding investigation. What is unique about this
case is not that various options were considered; instead, it is that the
petitioners received hundreds of pages of letters and emails disclosing
what is ordinarily a negotiation and settlement process that remains
confidential. Ultimately, the USAO gained the benefit of avoiding the
inherent risks of litigation, while vindicating their prosecutorial
interest in assuring that Epstein plead guilty to serious state criminal
offenses, serve an 18 month jail sentence and community control
probation, register as a sex offender, and pay millions of dollars to
those victims who asserted their rights pursuant to the NPA and were
the beneficiaries of Epstein's agreement to make payments pursuant
to 18 USC 2255 which was fully applied, uniquely, in the absence of a
federal conviction.
7. That any failure to notify its victim-witnesses regarding the
imminence of a state plea was the result not of Epstein's "urgings" or
any fear that notification would lead to a public outcry but instead was
a good faith response to the legal uncertainty of whether a state court
plea involving allegations relating to just 3 women permitted or
required notification to those whose allegations were not the subject
of the state plea ADDLAW. The USAO did not just agree with the
good faith legal positions of Epstein's counsel, they deferred "to the
discretion of the State Attorney regarding whether he wishes to
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provide victims with notices of the state proceedings", Motion at 30-
31.
8. That the NPA contained confidentiality provisions was not illegal and
not atypical: it is commonplace that subjects and targets of federal
Grand Jury investigations who are not federally prosecuted are
protected by the secrecy provisions of F.R.Crim.P. 6(e). An agreement
not to prosecute (combined with a public state court plea and the
disclosure of such provisions of the NPA that conferred restitution-
related rights to the victims) was all that would be typically required
under these circumstances. The insertion of a confidentiality
provision in the NPA resulted not from any "urgings" or "insistence"
by Epstein's counsel but instead from a question as to the intention of
the USAO to disclose the eventual agreement with the "Office
respond{ing} `A non-prosecution agreement would not be made
public or filed with the Court...it is not something that we would
distribute without compulsory process", Motion at 15, Exhibit 10, 18,
and from the USAO's decision to "reevaluate" its notification
obligations in response to objections from Epstein's counsel, see
Exhibit 31 at pgs 2-3.
9. CAN GO THROUGH SJ MOTION - In particular, the SJ motion
raises material factual disputes not resolvable as a matter of law:
1. Pg 3 — Federal prosecutors had not {dispositively} disproven
{all} defense arguments regarding the applicability of the federal
sex offenses under investigation
2. Pg 3 — Neither Jane Doe 1 or 2 alleged interstate travel or
inducement through interstate communications as required by 18
USC 2423(b) and 2422(b)
3. Pg 4 — All of the offense conduct being investigated as well as
the state offenses of conviction did involve the payment of
money for sex (OMIT?)
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