DOJ-OGR-00019417.pdf

the collateral order doctrine, particularly when there is no serious argument that it satisfies each of the doctrine's three requirements: Judge Nathan's order (1) conclusively determined the disputed question, (2) it resolved an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) it is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Will, 546 U.S. at 349. In Flanagan v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that an order disqualifying criminal counsel pretrial was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 465 U.S. 259, 266 (1984). The Court explained that unlike an order denying a motion to reduce bail, which “becomes moot if review awaits conviction and sentence,” an order disqualifying counsel is fully remediable posttrial. Id. Moreover, a motion to disqualify counsel is “not independent of the issues to be tried” because its “validity cannot be adequately reviewed until trial is complete.” Id. at 268. Finally, unlike an appeal of a bail decision, “an appeal of a disqualification order interrupts the trial,” and any delay in a criminal case “exacts a presumptively prohibitive price.” Id. at 269. In contrast to the disqualification order at issue in Flanagan, the appeal of Judge Nathan's order is like the appeal of an order denying a motion to reduce bail. First, this appeal will “become[] moot if review awaits conviction and sentence.” See id. at 266. Unless Ms. Maxwell is permitted to share with Judge Preska what