EFTA01077101.pdf

To be Argued By: JAY P. LEFKOWITZ New York County Clerk's Index No. 30129/2010 Nein 'Nark $upnme Gantt APPELLATE DIVISION-FIRST DEPARTMENT she PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, —against— JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant. BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JAY P. LEFKOWITZ SANDRA LYNN MUSUMECI KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 601 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10022 jay.lefkowitz@kirkland.corn sandra.musumeci@kirkland.com Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant REPRODUCED ON RECYCLED PAPER EFTA01077101  TABLE OF CONTENTS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 I. The Underlying Offense 4 II. Sex Offender Registration 6 III. The Board's Recommendation 7 IV. Pre-Hearing Investigation By the District Attorney 11 V. SORA Hearing 12 ARGUMENT 16 I. THE COURT'S LEVEL 3 DETERMINATION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY SORA AND AS A MATTER OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 17 A. The People's Investigation Revealed That The Board's Recommendation Could Not Be Proven By Clear and Convincing Evidence. 20 B. The Court Improperly Relied on the Board's Recommendation Where the Facts Cited Therein Were Disputed and No Further Evidence Was Presented. 25 C. Determining Appellant To Be a Level 3 Offender Based on Factors That Were Not Proven by Clear and Convincing Evidence Violated Appellant's Federal Due Process Rights. 32 II. THE COURT BASED ITS LEVEL 3 DETERMINATION UPON IMPROPER CONSIDERATIONS. 36 A. The Court Improperly Assessed Points Against Appellant for Conduct That Is Not Scoreable Under SORA. 36 EFTA01077102  B. The Court Improperly Allowed Personal Feelings and Matters Outside the Record to Influence Its SORA Determination 38 III. THE COURT'S ORDER DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE MANDATES OF SORA AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND MUST BE VACATED. 45 CONCLUSION 49 ii EFTA01077103  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 32, 33, 35, 36 E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109 (1998) 34, 35 Fresh Del Monte Produce N.V. v. Eastbrook Caribe, 40 A.D.3d 415 (1st Dep't 2007) 43 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 48 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 32 New York State Bd. of Sex Exam'rs v. Ransom, 249 A.D.2d 891 (4th Dep't 1998) 18 People u. Arotin, 19 A.D.3d 845 (3d Dep't 2005) 24 People v. Boncic, 15 Misc. 3d 1139(A), 841 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2007) 31 People v. Brooks, 308 A.D.2d 99 (2d Dep't 2003) 34 People u. Coffey, 45 A.D.3d 658 (2d Dep't 2007) 24 People v. Curthoys, 77 A.D.3d 1215 (3d Dep't 2010) 27 People v. David W., 95 N.Y.2d 130 (2000) 32 iii EFTA01077104 People u. Dominie, 42 A.D.3d 589 (3d Dep't 2007) 19 People u. Donk, 39 A.D.3d 1268 (4th Dep't 2007) 31 People u. Ferguson, 53 A.D.3d 571 (2d Dep't 2008) 39 People v. Gilbert, 78 A.D.3d 1584 (4th Dep't 2010) 47 People u. Jimenez, 178 Misc. 2d 319, 679 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 1998) 18 People u. Johnson, 11 N.Y.3d 416 (2008) 18 People v. Jordan, 31 A.D.3d 1196 (4th Dep't 2006) 39 People v. Judson, 50 A.D.3d 1242 (3d Dep't 2008) 27 People u. Mabee, 69 A.D.3d 820 (2d Dep't 2010) 27 People u. Mingo, 12 N.Y.3d 563 (2009) 26 People u. Miranda, 24 A.D.3d 909 (3d Dep't 2005) 47 People u. Rampino, 55 A.D.3d 348 (1st Dep't 2008) 43 People u. Redcross, 54 A.D.3d 1116 (3d Dep't 2008) 31 People u. Sherard, 73 A.D.3d 537 (1st Dep't 2010) 43 iv EFTA01077105 People u. Smith, 66 A.D.3d 981 (2d Dep't 2009) 24 People u. Strong, 77 A.D.3d 717 (2d Dep't 2010) 47 People u. Wasley, 73 A.D.3d 1400 (3d Dep't 2010) 27 Rossi v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 103 A.D.2d 771 (2d Dep't 1984) 19 Solomon v. State of New York, 146 A.D.2d 439 (1st Dep't 1989) 19 Statutes 14 V.I.C. § 1722(b) 7 14 V.I.C. § 1724(d) 7 14 V.I.C. § 1724(e) 7 Correction Law § 168-a(2) 9 Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a) 5, 9 Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a)(i) 3, 37 Correction Law § 168-a(2)(d)(ii) 9, 17 Correction Law § 168-a(7) 45 Correction Law § 168-k 17, 45 Correction Law § 168-k(2) passim Correction Law § 168-1(6) 8 Correction Law § 168-1(6)(c) 8 Correction Law § 168-n 45 v EFTA01077106 Correction Law § 168-n(2) 16, 18 CPLR 5513 16 CPLR 5515 16 Fla. Stat. § 775.21 6 Fla. Stat. § 794.05(1) 21, 28 Fla. Stat. § 796.03 1, 4, 6 Fla. Stat. § 796.07(2)(f) 1 Fla. Stat. § 796.07(4)(c) 4 Fla. Stat. § 800.04(5) 21, 28 Fla. Stat. § 943.0435 4, 5, 6, 9 N.Y. Penal Law § 230.25 9 Rules Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 3-205 (Farrell 11th ed.) 19 Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, Commentary (2006) 22, 31, 41 vi EFTA01077107  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Appellant Jeffrey E. Epstein seeks to vacate the final decision and order of the New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term, New York County, determining him to be a Level 3 sex offender, without designation, under New York's Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA), Correction Law Article 6-C, based on a 2008 Florida conviction by plea of guilty to Procuring a Person Under 18 for Prostitution, Fla. Stat. § 796.03, and Felony Solicitation of Prostitution, Fla. Stat. § 796.07(2)(f), for which Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 12 months and 6 months incarceration, followed by 12 months of Community Control. (Pickholz, J. at SORA hearing). Appellant seeks to vacate the Order because the Court's risk level determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, was based on improper considerations, and was made without affording the parties an opportunity to present evidence concerning disputed relevant issues. More specifically, in making its determination, the Court summarily adopted the recommendation of the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (the "Board"), notwithstanding the position of the District Attorney's Office that the Board's recommendation was legally infirm 1 EFTA01077108 and not supported by provable evidence. Additionally, the Court issued a facially defective Order that fails to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by law. Accordingly, the Order determining Appellant to be a Level 3 offender should be vacated, and Appellant's risk level should be recalculated based solely on those factors that may be properly considered under SORA and which are proven by clear and convincing evidence. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. May the Court determine Appellant's risk level under SORA based on factors that are not proven by clear and convincing evidence? 2. Is the Court entitled to adopt the Board's recommendation in full, without hearing any further evidence, where Appellant disputes numerous unprosecuted allegations contained therein and the District Attorney, as representative of the State, disclaims the Board's recommendation as unreliable, based on allegations that were determined to be not prosecutable, and not provable by clear and convincing evidence? 3. In calculating Appellant's risk level under SORA, may the Court score points for consensual prostitution-related conduct involving 2 EFTA01077109 women who were seventeen years of age or over, particularly where SORA provides that such conduct is only registerable where the person patronized "is in fact less than seventeen years of age," Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a)(i)? 4. Where the Court's Order assigning Appellant a risk level of 3 under SORA does not include any findings of fact or conclusions of law to support a Level 3 determination, must that Order be vacated? STATEMENT OF FACTS Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey E. Epstein is a 58-year old financial advisor and philanthropist whose primary residence is in the U.S. Virgin Islands and who also maintains vacation properties in New York and Florida. See A.53 (Letter of M. Weinberg of Aug. 16, 2010).1 Appellant does not live in New York, and since the commission of the Florida offense that forms the basis of this matter, he has not stayed at his New York property for periods of ten days or more at a time. See A.53 (Letter of M. Weinberg of Aug. 16, 2010); A.87:21-25, 88:21- 89:3_(Tr.).2 1 References to the Record on appeal are denoted herein as "A." followed by the applicable Appendix number. 2 References to the transcript of the January 18, 2011 SORA hearing are denoted herein as "'Pr." followed by the applicable page and line citation. 3 EFTA01077110 I. The Underlying Offense On June 30, 2008, Appellant pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, Florida under an Information to the charge of Procuring a Person Under 18 for Prostitution, Fla. Stat. § 796.03, an offense which required him to register under Florida's sexual offender registration statute, Fla. Stat. § 943.0435. See A.31 (Information for Procuring Person Under 18 for Prostitution, dated June 26, 2008); A.32 (Guilty Plea, dated June 30, 2008). This single registerable charge was brought in connection with a consensual, commercial arrangement in which Appellant received massages and engaged in sexual conduct with a young woman who was over the age of consent under New York law but just under 18 when the offense in the Information occurred back in 2005. See A.53 (Letter from M. Weinberg, dated Aug. 16, 2010, at 1, 3). Appellant concurrently pleaded guilty to an Indictment charging him with one count of Felony Solicitation for Prostitution, Fla. Stat. §§ 796.07(2)(f), (4)(c) -- a solicitation offense which does not include any elements of sexual contact with underage women and which is not registerable under either Florida or New York law. See A.26 (2006 Grand Jury Indictment of Felony Solicitation of Prostitution); A.32 4 EFTA01077111 (Guilty Plea, dated June 30, 2008); Fla. Stat. § 943.0435; Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a). Despite an extensive investigation by Florida prosecutors regarding various other complaints alleged against him and reported in police paperwork, Appellant was never charged with any other crimes or prosecuted on allegations made by any other complainants. See A.26 (2006 Grand Jury Indictment of Felony Solicitation of Prostitution); A.31 (Information for Procuring Person Under 18 for Prostitution, dated June 26, 2008); A.83:23-84:6, 85:19- 86:1, 90:16-91:15, 95:14-18 (Tr.). As a result of his two concurrent Florida convictions -- the first and only criminal convictions of his life -- Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 12 months and 6 months incarceration in a Palm Beach County Detention Facility, followed by 12 months of Community Control supervision. See A.32 (Guilty Plea, dated June 30, 2008); A.34 (Sentence, dated Jun. 30, 2008). Appellant satisfactorily served 13 months of incarceration (during which time he was granted permission to participate in the Sheriffs work release program) and completed a subsequent period of 12 months Community Control (during which the Court trusted him, for business purposes, to travel outside of Florida 5 EFTA01077112 with prior notice and approval by his supervising probation officer) without incident. See A.49 (Letter from Florida Department of Corrections, dated Jul. 21, 2010); A.50 (Letter from Palm Beach Sheriffs Office, dated Aug. 12, 2010); A.51 (Letter from J. Goldberger, dated Aug. 12, 2010); A.48 (Order Granting Motion for Travel, dated Dec. 18, 2009); A.53 (Letter from M. Weinberg, dated Aug. 16, 2010, at 4). Appellant has had no subsequent instances of misconduct of any kind. See A.53 (Letter from M. Weinberg, dated Aug. 16, 2010, at 1). II. Sex Offender Registration As required under Florida law in connection with his conviction for Procuring a Person Under 18 for Prostitution, Fla. Stat. § 796.03, Appellant registered as a sex offender with Florida authorities and was designated at the lowest level under that state's sex offender registration act. See A.88:6-15 (Tr.); see also A.51 (Letter from J. Goldberger, dated Aug. 12, 2010); Fla. Stat. §§ 775.21, 943.0435. Appellant also registered in his home jurisdiction of the U.S. Virgin Islands (where Appellant maintains his primary residence and actually lives), where authorities reviewed Appellant's Florida offenses and 6 EFTA01077113 determined that he is only subject to that jurisdiction's lowest reporting obligations. See A.88:1-5 (Tr.); see also 14 V.I.C. §§ 1722(b), 1724(d), (e). Although he does not actually reside in New York, before the completion of his term of Community Control, Appellant notified the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services ("the Division") of his registerable Florida conviction and his ownership of a secondary residence in New York. See A.88:21-24 (Tr.). Since May 2010, Appellant has been registered with the Sexual Offender Monitoring Unit (SOMU) of the New York Police Department. See A.88:21-89:3 (Tr.). III. The Board's Recommendation On or about August 26, 2010, Appellant received notice that a SORA hearing had been scheduled to determine a risk assessment level, accompanied by a copy of the recommendation of the Board. See A.67 (Letter from Supreme Court, dated Aug. 26, 2010); A.65 (Recommendation of Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders ("Board Recommendation").). In stark contrast to the other jurisdictions to have considered Appellant's Florida convictions (including Florida), the Board recommended that Appellant be assigned the highest risk level -- 7 EFTA01077114 Level 3, representing a high risk of repeat offense -- without further designation.3 See A.67 (Letter from Supreme Court, dated Aug. 26, 2010); A.65 (Board Recommendation); see also Correction Law § 168- 1(6)(c). The Board's recommendation included a Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI) that improperly calculated a total risk factor score of 130. See A.65 (Board Recommendation). Almost all of the points scored by the Board were based on "Current Offense" factors,4 including: 10 points for "Use of Violence" (forcible compulsion); 25 points for "Sexual Contact with Victim" (sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse); 30 points for "Number of Victims" (3 or more); 20 points for "Duration of Offense Conduct with Victim" (continuing course of sexual misconduct); and 20 points for "Age of Victim" (11 through 16). See A.65 (Board Recommendation). The Board's RAI did not assign Appellant 3 SORA requires the Board to recommend an offender's notification level of 1, 2, or 3, pursuant to Correction Law § 168-1(6), and to recommend whether any designations defined in Correction Law § 168-a(7) apply. See Correction Law §§ 168-k(2), 168-n(2). 4 The Board also assessed Appellant 5 points for "Criminal History," even though the Board itself noted that it was assessing points "absent specific information." See A.65 (Board Recommendation). Appellant submits that this scoring is unsupported by the Record. 8 EFTA01077115 any points under the "Post-Offense Behavior" and "Release Environment" categories. See A.65 (Board Recommendation). In its "Case Summary," the Board noted that Appellant was convicted of just two Florida sex offenses: (1) Procuring a Person Under 18 for Prostitution, and (2) Felony Solicitation of Prostitution.5 See A.65 (Board Recommendation). The Board then aggregated into just over a single page a host of uncharged allegations made by "numerous females," including "female participants [who] were age 18 or older," regarding "massages and unlawful sexual activity" that allegedly took place at Appellant's Florida residence. See A.65 (Board Recommendation). The case summary referred to "vaginal intercourse" and various other forms of sexual contact allegedly taking place without connecting specific females to such allegations, and more significantly, without identifying the age of the participants -- some of whom the Board noted were "age 18 or older" -- specifically at the time of such 5 Only one of these charges -- the procurement charge -- is registerable under SORA, and that charge is registerable under SORA only because it is registerable in Florida. See Correction Law § 168-a(2)(d)(ii). (Notably, the New York cognate of this offense, Promoting Prostitution in the Third Degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 230.25, is not itself a registerable offense under SORA. See Correction Law § 168-a(2).) The charge of Felony Solicitation of Prostitution, Fla. Stat. § 796.07(2)(0, (4)(c) -- which does not include any age-related elements and pertains solely to consensual, commercial conduct -- is not a registerable offense under either Florida or New York law. See Fla. Stat. § 943.0435; Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a). 9 EFTA01077116 alleged conduct. See A.65 (Board Recommendation). Although Appellant was only convicted of two prostitution-related offenses and was neither charged with nor convicted of any rape, sexual abuse, or violent offenses,6 the case summary highlighted hearsay-based claims in police paperwork -- namely a probable cause affidavit signed by a Palm Beach Police detective that did not result in any of the charges sought -- involving alleged sexual abuse of underage girls and an alleged forcible rape (which claims were found by the Florida prosecutors to be unreliable to support charges against Appellant), and assessed points against Appellant based on these unprosecuted allegations. See A.65 (Board Recommendation). The Board recognized Appellant's conduct on Community Control as satisfactory and noted that he has no history of substance abuse. See A.65 (Board Recommendation). The Board also credited Appellant with accepting responsibility for his actions. See A.65 (Board Recommendation). 6 The only registerable charge for which Appellant was prosecuted and convicted pertained to consensual, commercial, non-violent interaction with one woman, A.D., who was 17 years old (and therefore over the age of consent in New York but not in Florida) at the time of the relevant conduct. See A.31 (Information for Procuring Person Under 18 for Prostitution, dated June 26, 2008); A.53 (Letter of M. Weinberg of Aug. 16, 2010, at 1, 3); £91:20-92:7 (Tr.). 10 EFTA01077117 IV. Pre-Hearing Investigation By the District Attorney The SORA hearing, originally scheduled for September 15, 2010, was adjourned on consent of the parties until January 18, 2011 to provide the New York District Attorney ("the People"), which represented the State of New York at the SORA hearing, an opportunity to investigate Appellant's Florida convictions and assess the validity of the Board's recommendation. See A.81 (Handwritten Notations on Court Jacket); A.89:22-90:8 (Tr.). As part of their investigation, the People were in contact with members of the Palm Beach County State's Attorney's Office to understand the investigation and prosecution of the allegations at issue in this SORA matter. See A.83:14-84:19 (Fr.). Based on these interactions with Florida prosecutors, the People determined that they could not rely on the Board's recommendation and the underlying probable cause affidavit (which the Florida prosecutors determined not to be reliable, and which therefore certainly could not satisfy the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence), and would score Appellant based only on the conduct for which he was actually prosecuted, and not on the 11 EFTA01077118 unprosecuted allegations in the probable cause affidavit cited by the Board. See A.83:14-84:19 (Tr.). Although the People presented Appellant a new SORA risk assessment instrument (RAI) immediately before the SORA hearing itself, scoring Appellant as a Level 1, the People apparently did not present their proposed alternative RAI or any other written submission setting forth their departure from the Board's recommendation to the Court, as no such statement is in the Court's file. See Appendix generally. V. SORA Hearing On January 18, 2011, a SORA hearing was conducted in New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term, New York County, Part 66 before Hon. Ruth Pickholz. See A.81 (Handwritten Notations on Court Jacket); A.82 (Tr. generally). At the hearing, the People made a record that based on their investigation and contact with the Florida authorities who handled Appellant's prosecution, the probable cause affidavit underlying the Board's recommendation could not be relied upon. See A.83:14-18 (Tr.). Specifically, the People informed the Court that many of the women referenced as complainants in the police 12 EFTA01077119 affidavit were not cooperative with Florida prosecutors, and accordingly, the Florida authorities chose not to prosecute any allegations other than those reflected by the two offenses to which Appellant ultimately pleaded guilty. See A.84:2-6, 14-19 (Tr.). The People further noted that in light of Florida's decision not to prosecute the majority of the allegations in the affidavit, (and under the SORA statute and guidelines), only the conduct pertaining to the sole registerable crime for which Appellant was charged and to which he pleaded -- Procuring a Person Under 18 for Prostitution, involving a single complainant -- could be proven and should be considered in evaluating Appellant's SORA score. See A.85:11-16, 85:24-86:1 (Tr.). Counsel for Appellant corroborated the record made by the People that the Florida Assistant State Attorney who prosecuted Appellant determined, after a full investigation, that there were "no victims" and that the only crime that could be presented to the grand jury was the single solicitation offense to which Appellant pleaded guilty. See A.89:22-90:21, 95:12-18 (Tr.). Appellant disputed many of the allegations contained in the Board's case summary, both with respect to specific facts (such as the suggestion of any forcible compulsion and the 13 EFTA01077120 exact age of complainant A.D. at the time of specific conduct) and more broadly by noting that the Board's recommendation was based on police documentation that was not credible and that contained hearsay allegations that the lead sex crimes prosecutor in Florida decided not to prosecute. See A.90:9-12, 92:13-21, 95:12-18 (Tr.). Further, Appellant advised the Court that there was sworn testimony from many of the women referenced in the police paperwork and the Board's case summary which expressly disclaimed allegations attributed to them. See A.95:19-23 (Tr.). Notwithstanding the clear record that facts underlying the Board's recommendation were disputed, the Court announced that it was relying on the Board's case summary and adopting the Board's calculation and recommendation in full. See A.93:21, 94:6-95:9 (Tr.). The Court did not conduct any factual hearing as to specific claims for which points were assessed. See A.82 (Tr. generally). The Court scored Appellant for factors such as number of victims, use of violence / forcible compulsion, duration of offense, and sexual intercourse, based on allegations that the People -- as the party bearing the burden of proof -- asserted on the record could not be supported by clear and convincing 14 EFTA01077121 evidence. See A.94:7-95:9 (Tr.). Despite the legal and factual position of the People that the Board's recommendation could not be relied on and that allegations concerning all complainants but the one in the Information could not be proven, the Court ruled that it was relying on the Board's recommendation in full and adjudicating Appellant a Level 3 sex offender with no additional designation. See A.93:21, 93:25-94:3 (Tr.). On the record, the Court recited the scoring of the Board in abbreviated form, without identifying any particular facts or allegations to support each factor. See A.94:6-95:9 (Tr.). In its written Order, the Court indicated a final risk level determination of Level 3 by merely circling a pre-printed form. See A.4 (Order Appealed From, dated Jan. 18, 2011). The Court failed to articulate any findings of fact or conclusions of law, as required under SORA. See A.4 (Order Appealed From, dated Jan. 18, 2011); A.82 (Tr. generally). Appellant was served with a copy of the Court's Order on or about January 19, 2011. See A.78 (Letter from Supreme Court, dated Jan. 19, 2011). Appellant served a Notice of Entry of the Court's Order on February 9, 2011, and on the same day filed a Notice of Appeal to 15 EFTA01077122 invoke this Court's jurisdiction. See A.4 (Order of Appealed From, dated Jan. 18, 2011, with Notice of Entry); A.3 (Appellant's Notice of Appeal, dated Feb. 9, 2011). Appellant now respectfully files this appeal as of right, pursuant to Correction Law §§ 168-k(2), 168-n(2) and CPLR 5513, 5515, to vacate the legally erroneous and factually unsupportable Order and re-calculate Appellant's SORA risk level based solely on those factors that may properly be considered under SORA and that have been proven by clear and convincing evidence.' ARGUMENT The Court's reliance on allegations that were flatly rejected by the Florida prosecutors who investigated them and which, by the People's own admission, could not be proven by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes clear legal error and a violation of Appellant's due process rights, warranting vacatur of the Court's Order. Specifically, the Court calculated a risk assessment score based on untrustworthy double and 7 Appellant asks this Court to render its own findings of fact and conclusions of law -- assigning a risk Level 1 -- based on an appropriate consideration of the undisputed facts in the Record proven by clear and convincing evidence concerning Appellant's conviction. To the extent this Court is unable to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the present Record, Appellant seeks remand to the lower court before a different Justice for a recalculation in which the parties are afforded an opportunity to present evidence regarding contested relevant issues, if necessary. See Section II(B), infra. 16 EFTA01077123 triple hearsay allegations cited in the Board's recommendation that were squarely rejected as a basis for state prosecution in Florida, were disputed by Appellant, and did not constitute registerable conduct under New York law, all in violation of SORA and its guidelines and Appellant's constitutionally guaranteed right to due process. Moreover, the Court abused its discretion and failed to abide by the guidelines and mandates set forth in SORA, including by improperly considering factors outside the record and issuing a legally deficient Order that fails to set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the Court's determination was based. I. THE COURT'S LEVEL 3 DETERMINATION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY SORA AND AS A MATTER OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The SORA statute sets forth a formal procedure to determine the required level of notification for those individuals convicted of a qualifying out-of-state offense,8 based on a systematic assessment of the risk of reoffense posed by the particular individual. See Correction Law § 168-k. After the Board generates an initial recommendation based on 8 Appellant's Florida conviction for Procuring a Person Under 18 for Prostitution is a qualifying "sex offense" under SORA solely pursuant to Correction Law § 168-a(2)(d)(ii), which makes an out-of-state offense registerable under SORA if that particular offense is registerable in the jurisdiction where it was committed. 17 EFTA01077124 its review of the out-of-state offense and other factors, the Court has the duty of conducting a hearing to consider the Board's recommendation and other evidence presented in order to reach its own independent determination of an offender's SORA registration level. See Correction Law §§ 168-k(2), 168-n(2); People v. Johnson, 11 N.Y.3d 416, 421 (2008) (holding that "the Board's duty is to make a recommendation to the sentencing court... and the court, applying a clear and convincing evidence standard, is to make its determination after considering that recommendation, and any other materials properly before it") (internal statutory citation omitted); see also New York State Bd. of Sex Exam'rs v. Ransom, 249 A.D.2d 891, 891-92 (4th Dep't 1998) (holding the "Board ... serves only in an advisory capacity ... similar to the role served by a probation department in submitting a sentencing recommendation."); see also People v. Jimenez, 178 Misc. 2d 319, 322-23, 679 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 1998) (observing "the Legislature did not intend to place upon the criminal courts of this State a burden to act merely as a regulatory body to confirm the determination of the Board," and noting that a SORA hearing is a "judicial proceeding in which the court must make a de novo determination."). Yet the Court's authority 18 EFTA01077125 to determine a SORA risk level is not unfettered; instead, SORA requires the Court to determine an offender's risk level based on an evaluation of evidence in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Board. See Correction Law §§ 168.1(2), 168-n(2) ("It shall be the duty of the court applying the guidelines established [by the Board under SORM to determine the level of notification...."). Moreover, the Court's determination must be wholly based on facts that are provable by clear and convincing evidence. See Correction Law §§ 168-k(2), 168- n(2). Under New York law, "clear and convincing evidence" is defined as evidence that makes it "'highly probable' that the alleged activity actually occurred." People v. Dominie, 42 A.D.3d 589, 590 (3d Dep't 2007); see also Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 3-205, at 104 (Farrell 11th ed.). Clear and convincing evidence is "a higher, more demanding standard" than the preponderance standard, Rossi v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 103 A.D.2d 771, 771 (2d Dep't 1984), in that it is evidence "that is neither equivocal nor open to opposing presumptions." Solomon v. State of New York, 146 A.D.2d 439, 440 (1st Dep't 1989). Under SORA, the "burden of proving the facts supporting the determinations sought by 19 EFTA01077126 clear and convincing evidence" is assigned to the District Attorney, which represents the State in the proceeding. Correction Law §§ 168- k(2), 168-n(2). In the instant case, the Court did not conduct its own inquiry of relevant facts to determine Appellant's risk level in accordance with the SORA guidelines. Instead, as described further below, the Court improperly adopted a Board recommendation that had been rejected by both the People and Appellant as unreliable. Without any meaningful consideration of other evidence, the Court made its risk assessment determination based on allegations that did not -- and indeed could not, as a matter of law -- constitute clear and convincing evidence. Such a determination was made in contravention of SORA and its guidelines and violated Appellant's federal due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. For these reasons, the Court's determination should be vacated. A. The People's Investigation Revealed That The Board's Recommendation Could Not Be Proven By Clear and Convincing Evidence. The People began the SORA hearing by advising the Court that their own investigation and communications with the Florida State 20 EFTA01077127 Attorney's Office that handled Appellant's case revealed that the majority of allegations in the Board's recommendation (and in the police affidavit on which the recommendation was based9) were not prosecuted by Florida authorities and could not be proven by other evidence. See A.83:14-84:19 (Tr.). In relevant part, the People made the following record: I tried to reach -- I reached the authorities in Florida to try to see if they had all the interview notes or other things that we can then subsequently rely on that might be considered clear and convincing evidence, if they had interviewed these women on their own, and they never did. No one was cooperative and they did not go forward on any of the cases and none of them were indicted. So I don't know. A.85:19-86:1 (Tr.). As explained by the People, Appellant's Florida case was not one where a host of allegations were encompassed within a plea deal, but rather, the only charges that were determined to be 9 It bears noting that the police affidavit upon which the Board based its case summary and recommendation appears not even to have been drafted to sustain charges against Appellant, but instead, recited numerous allegations based on doub iple hearsay directed toward filing charges against a defendant named . See A.6 (Palm Beach Police Department - Probable Cause Affidavit of J. Recarey, dated May 1, 2006). Furthermore, the Florida State Attorney ex ressly rejected the claims asserted in the police affidavit (which sought to charge as an accomplice to Appellant) by determining that there was not sufficient probable cause and not charging Appellant with the serious second-degree felony offenses which the affidavit sought to support, to wit, Unlawful Sexual Activity with a Minor, Fla. Stat. § 794.05(1), and Lewd and Lascivious Molestation, Fla. Stat. § 800.04(5). 21 EFTA01077128 prosecutable were the charges for which Appellant was ultimately convicted: So it is unlike a situation where everything was indicted and then we get to sort of assess points for all of the victims, if it was part of a plea bargain. They did not actually choose to go forward on any except for the one victim. A.84:2-6 (Tr.). Given this history, the People advised the Court that it should depart from the Board's recommendation, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, in accordance with the SORA guidelines. See A.83:14-84:19, 85:11-16, 87:10-12 (Tr.). The SORA guidelines are intended to provide clear guidance to the Court and the parties with respect to how various potential risk factors should be evaluated, including allegations that have not been prosecuted. While, in general, conduct not directly encompassed by the crime of conviction may be considered in scoring for given factors on the RAI, the SORA guidelines deem, "Points should not be assessed for a factor... unless there is clear and convincing evidence of the existence of that factor." Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, Commentary (2006), at 5, ¶ 7 (emphasis added). Indeed, in deciding how to evaluate allegations outside of the crime of 22 EFTA01077129 conviction, the SORA guidelines expressly caution, "the fact that an offender was arrested or indicted for an offense is not, by itself, evidence that the offense occurred." Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, Commentary (2006), at 5, ¶ 7. More to the point here, the guidelines emphasize, "[T]he fact that an offender was not indicted for an offense may be strong evidence that the offense did not occur," amplified with a relevant example: For example, where a defendant is indicted for rape in the first degree on the theory that his victim was less than 11 [years old], but not on the theory that he used forcible compulsion, the Board or court should be reluctant to conclude that the offender's conduct involved forcible compulsion. Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, Commentary (2006), at 5, ¶ 7 (emphasis in original, internal statutory citations omitted ).10 In other words, SORA and its guidelines clearly prescribe that where allegations were reported to and investigated by law enforcement but not prosecuted (and not encompassed within a broader plea 10 Of note, at one point during the SORA proceeding, the Court seemingly dismissed out of hand the SORA guidelines concerning uncharged allegations. See A.84:7-13 (Tr.) (Court expressing skepticism toward the Board's guidelines that "if somebody is not indicted it is strong evidence that it did not occur."). 23 EFTA01077130 bargain), they should not be scored on the RAI or factored into a risk determination in the absence of other evidence to corroborate their validity. See Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, Commentary (2006), at 5, ¶ 7; see also People v. Smith, 66 A.D.3d 981, 983 (2d Dep't 2009) (holding that defendant's alleged use of knife was not proven by clear and convincing evidence and could not be scored against defendant in SORA hearing where testimony about use of knife was presented to grand jury but grand jury did not indict on weapons charge); People v. Coffey, 45 A.D.3d 658 (2d Dep't 2007) (holding that it was improper for court to consider allegations concerning a charge that was dismissed in evaluating defendant's SORA risk level); People v. Arotin, 19 A.D.3d 845 (3d Dep't 2005) (holding that defendant could not be scored under SORA for deviate sexual intercourse where defendant was not indicted for such an offense and the only evidence of such conduct came from triple hearsay in a police report used by the Board). Significantly, here, the People did not merely apply the SORA guideline suggesting that uncharged allegations may not be reliable evidence of an offense. Instead, the People had actual information from 24 EFTA01077131 the Florida State Attorney's Office that the complainants referenced by the Board in connection with uncharged claims were not cooperative with authorities, prompting the Florida State Attorney's Office to decide not to pursue charges in connection with those unsupported allegations. See A.84:14-19, 85:19-86:1, 86:10-12 (Tr.). Moreover, the People acknowledged that they had no corroborating materials -- such as interview notes, sworn statements, or affidavits -- which would permit them to meet their burden of proving disputed allegations by clear and convincing evidence. See A.84:14-19, 85:19-86:1, 86:10-12 (Tr.). As a result, the People advanced the position that the law compelled they take -- advising the Court that the Board's recommendation was wrong and that a Level 3 determination was not supported by the provable evidence. B. The Court Improperly Relied on the Board's Recommendation Where the Facts Cited Therein Were Disputed and No Further Evidence Was Presented. Notwithstanding the reasoned, evidence-based disavowal by the People of the Board's recommendation (based on the People's communications with the Florida prosecutor), the SORA Court relied wholesale upon the Board's recommendation. See A.93:21, 94:6-95:9 25 EFTA01077132 (Tr.). The Court improperly overlooked the burden of proof statutorily imposed on the People and its own duty to evaluate the evidence, and adopted the Board's recommendation, seemingly as a per se matter. See A.85:11-18 (Tr.) (the Court opining, without factual basis, that the Board "obviously took [their own guidelines] into consideration" when assessing points for uncharged conduct). Indeed, although the Court cited no specific information to suggest that the Board itself communicated with Florida prosecutors in preparing the case summary, the Court attempted to justify its blind reliance on the Board's recommendation by stating, "I feel the board looked into all of this, made their recommendation, found him to have 130 points and I see no reason to disturb that." A.96:11-13 (Tr.). While the Court of Appeals has recognized that a Board-generated case summary may constitute "reliable hearsay" upon which the Court may base a SORA risk calculation, the law is equally clear that a Board's case summary is not per se reliable, particularly in the face of countervailing evidence. See People v. Mingo, 12 N.Y.3d 563, 572-73, (2009) ("Of course, information found in a case summary ... need not always be credited -- it may be rejected when it is unduly speculative or 26 EFTA01077133 its accuracy is undermined by other more compelling evidence"); see also People u. Mabee, 69 A.D.3d 820 (2d Dep't 2010) (finding Board's case summary did not constitute clear and convincing evidence to support scoring under SORA where it provided only very limited information pertaining to the particular factor). Indeed, information contained in a Board's case summary does not by itself clear the hurdle of "clear and convincing evidence" -- a higher standard than mere "reliable evidence" -- where the offender disputes the relevant contents of that evidence. See People v. Judson, 50 A.D.3d 1242 (3d Dep't 2008) (holding that case summary alone could not satisfy state's burden of proving factors by clear and convincing evidence to support level 3 determination where defendant contested certain factual allegations related to those factors); cf. People v. Wasley, 73 A.D.3d 1400, 1401 (3d Dep't 2010) (holding "evidence included in the case summary may provide clear and convincing evidence in determining a defendant's risk assessment level where defendant did not dispute its contents insofar as relevant.") (emphasis added); People v. Curthoys, 77 A.D.3d 1215, 1216 (3d Dep't 2010) (noting that the "uncontested contents of a case summary can satisfy the People's burden of demonstrating . . . clear and convincing 27 EFTA01077134 evidence") (emphasis added). Thus, it certainly follows that a Board's case summary cannot, as a matter of law, constitute the sole requisite "clear and convincing evidence" required to support a SORA determination where the People, as the party representing the Board, also expressly disclaim the reliability of that case summary. Here, the Board's case summary was based almost entirely on double and triple hearsay allegations described in an affidavit submitted by police to the Florida prosecutor. See A.65 (Board Recommendation); A.6 (Palm Beach Police Department - Probable Cause Affidavit of J. Recarey, dated May 1, 2006). The allegations, even when aggregated, were not deemed by the Florida prosecutor who reviewed them to consti